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Abstract
This thesis, first and foremost a contribution to novel-into-film adaptation
scholarship, is situated at the juncture of multiple fields of study, bringing
together such disparate subjects as the twenty-first century genre of chick-lit,
the challenges posed by constructivist approaches to feminism, Angela Carter’s
subversive renditions of “Beauty and the Beast”, Derrida’s concept of the
undecidable and Sex and the City’s post-structural use of outlandish fashion.
These concerns are brought together in a provocative way that serves to
underwrite the thesis’ dual central aims.
Adaptation scholarship has been rendered somewhat static by what is
seemingly an intractable fixation with fidelity. Along with complicating fidelityfocused criticism of novel-into-film adaptation by way of providing an alternative
analytical framework that looks at meaning-making via intentional and
revisionary infidelity, this thesis posits feminist adaptation as a continuing
political project. This thesis, then, is intended to inspire and encourage
practitioners of feminism, as well as to locate feminism as just one of plural and
equally plausible interpretative possibilities with respect to works of chick-lit.
This thesis embraces chick-lit’s ambiguous politics, ultimately seeking to
harness the contestedness of the genre as a means of challenging the validity
of adaptation theory’s fidelity fixation. The chick-lit novel, as a potentially
and/or partially feminist text, is particularly open to generating a number of
possible adaptations, and, as such, renders arguments for fidelity to the spirit or
essence of a text flawed.
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Introduction

What constitutes feminist art or political practice is very much dependant on how the commentator
defines feminism.
Joanne Hollows

This thesis, an amalgamation of an array of approaches, axioms and analyses,
was born of equal parts frustration, conviction and passion. Back in 2003,
having completed an undergraduate degree’s worth of literary study, and
having been willingly drilled in feminist literary criticism, my burgeoning
enthusiasm for works of chick-lit, and my particular zeal for Sex and the City in
all its forms, had me feeling confused. The genre’s spurious links to the
Harlequin Mills & Boon brand made me initially ashamed of my rabid
consumption of the oeuvre of Marian Keyes, Jane Green, Jennifer Weiner and
their ilk, and then indignant. I felt that chick-lit was in fact a knowing, satirical
rejoinder to the popular romance genre, and felt inspired to demonstrate this.
At that point little, other than fairly brief, superficial, summary dismissals of the
genre, had been written about it from an academic perspective. I was keen to
fill this void.
At the same time, I was beginning to take exception to the plethora of
predictably fidelity-focused critiques of novel-into-film adaptations that littered
both popular press and scholarly commentary. I looked forward to viewing
adaptations of texts I loved, anticipated the exciting detours such renderings
tended to take, and sought to find a way to talk about adaptations that
celebrated, rather than automatically denigrated, an overtly revisionary
approach.
This thesis brings together these diverse interests and ideas in a way that aims
to be distinctive and provocative. It embraces chick-lit’s ambiguous politics,
7

ultimately seeking to harness the contestedness of the genre as a means of
challenging the validity of adaptation theory’s fidelity fixation. The chick-lit
novel, as a potentially and/or partially feminist text, is particularly open to
generating a number of possible adaptations, and, as such, renders arguments
for fidelity to the spirit or essence of a text flawed. Chick-lit’s ideological
ambiguity makes it a site particularly suitable for subversive approaches to
adaptation. This piece aims to demonstrate this, and to thereby establish a
feminist theory of adaptation that provides critics with an alternative framework
within which to examine the adaptation process.

AT THE INTERSECTION OF#
This work is situated at the juncture of a fairly extensive array of academic
approaches. Whilst adaptation theory and feminist responses to both the
Harlequin Mills & Boon brand and its ostensible twenty-first century rendering,
the chick-lit genre, provide the bulk of referenced scholarship, Derridean and
Butlerite versions of post-structuralist thought are also utilised heavily, as is the
well-documented practice of feminist literary revision. The broad scope of this
thesis means that it examines feminist interpretations of the fairy-tale at one
point, and considers the use of metaphor in film at another. Prior to this thesis’
engagement with its central concerns, it is necessary to define and scrutinise
some of the schools of thought upon which this work is premised.

FEMINISM, FEMINISMS
Feminism’s branches are multitudinous. In twenty-first century scholarship,
feminism is rarely invoked sans prefix — post-, neo-, or eco-, for example — or
without a preceding qualification. Feminism can be radical or liberal, black,
lesbian, separatist, Marxist, psychoanalytic, first, second or third wave,
American, British or French. It is still popularly referred to in the singular,
belying rather than bespeaking its internal discord and diversity; but, as Diane
Elam succinctly puts it, feminism “is not, in any simple way, one thing” (4).
Indeed, while the many varieties of feminism may be united by a collective goal
— that of redressing women’s oppression — each branch approaches this from
a specific perspective and mandates a particular set of political strategies.
8

In the opening pages of her monograph, Modern Feminist Thought, Imelda
Whelehan states
Before I embark upon a critical account of feminism’s ‘strands’, I should reiterate that
the term feminism is itself problematic, because the theories that inform it are
heterogeneous. Although I shall often use ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ as if they can
incorporate a collective vision of political change, the use of these terms is always
1

accompanied by a certain degree of anxiety (25) .

A similar anxiety is likewise the impetus for this introductory chapter, which
seeks to avoid ambiguity by establishing a clear and specific feminist exegetical
approach — an approach informed by post-structuralism generally, as well as,
more specifically, the deconstructive work of Jacques Derrida and the more
recent and specialised post-structural critique of gender articulated by Judith
Butler. The exposure and scrutiny of binaric thought, which is situated at the
intersection of both feminism and post-structuralism, is one of the primary
concerns of this thesis.
The term “binary” means “composed of two” or “twofold” (Cuddon 82). Binary
oppositions, as envisaged by structuralists such as Ferdinand de Saussure and
Claude Levi-Strauss, are “contrary pairs”, similarly comprising two terms (Murfin
and Ray 39). White, for example, is understood as the opposite of
black, up the opposite of down, inside the opposite of outside and man the
opposite of woman. For structuralists, binary oppositions are the means that
provide units of language with value and meaning. Post-structuralists, led by
Derrida, are also interested in binary oppositions, but to a subversive, rather
than complicit end.
Derrida has compellingly argued that binary oppositions are not simply
dichotomous antagonisms — they are also, importantly, valuative, “violent
hierarchies” (Orton 36). Rational/emotional, white/black, day/night,
culture/nature. As Toril Moi explains,

1

Emphasis added.
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Western philosophy [is and has] always been caught up in this endless series of
hierarchical binary oppositions that always in the end come back to the fundamental
‘couple’ of male/female [N] It doesn’t much matter which ‘couple’ one chooses to
highlight: the hidden male/female opposition with its inevitable positive/negative
evaluation can always be traced as the underlying paradigm (102).

Moi’s discussion of binary oppositions is particularly relevant here, given that it
situates the male/female hierarchy as being foundational to both feminist and
post-structuralist projects, thereby flagging the theoretical overlap that has
made way for the development of a specifically constructivist variety of
feminism. The primordial man/woman (or male/female) binary, the subject of
extensive critique by French feminist philosophers Hélène Cixous and Luce
Irigaray, demonstrates both the diametrical and the hierarchical nature of binary
oppositions — man is understood not simply as the opposite of woman, but
also as her superior, the norm from which she, an aberration, differs.
According to conventional, dualist thought, the disparate categories of man and
woman are discrete and divergent — their meaning depends upon the fixity of
their distinction, upon what Irigaray calls the “dichotomising [N] break” (79).
“On one side”, explains Donna Warnock, “is posited rationality, objectivity,
aggression, order, dominance; on the other is intuition (‘irrationality’),
emotionalism, passivity, chaos, submission” (Rivkin and Ryan 24). This
normative notion of sexual binarity has generated dual and dissonant feminist
responses, which has led to one of feminism’s most significant fissures. As
Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan explain:
Feminists [have] been in disagreement since the 1970s regarding the direction the
women’s movement should take — toward a deeper identification with a female
‘essence’ or toward a departure from the way women had been made to be by
patriarchy, the very thing [essentialist] feminists construed as essentially female [N
T]wo perspectives began to form, one ‘constructionist’ or accepting of the idea that
gender is made by culture in history, the other ‘essentialist’, more inclined to the idea
that gender reflects a natural difference between men and women that is as much
psychological, even linguistic, as it is biological. And there was no possible meeting of
minds between the two, for each necessarily denied the other. (529).
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These competing feminisms, essentialist and constructivist, differ primarily by
way of their contrasting responses to the problem of sexual binarity. Simply put,
essentialist feminism works to upend and invert the man/woman binary by
attempting to reverse its implicit hierarchy, venerating and reclaiming those
concerns and qualities typically associated with the feminine and thereby
traditionally undervalued. Diana Fuss aptly defines essentialism as a belief in
“the invariable and fixed properties which define the ‘whatness’ of a given
entity” (xi). Essentialist feminism, then, in its endeavour to celebrate and
champion feminised traits, also works to reassert femininity’s fixity. An example
of this is essentialist feminism’s renegotiation of the binaric characterisation of
man as active, and woman as passive. Rather than denying the inherent
passivity of woman, this particular strand of feminism recasts and privileges
passivity as pacifism — a positive, feminine alternative to the active masculinist
violence that facilitates rape, murder and warfare. Sally Miller Gearhart, a
proponent of this approach, clarifies its logic:
If by believing that women are by nature less violent we reinforce the sex roles that
have held women down for so long, then perhaps it is time to dare to admit that some
of the sex-role mythology is in fact true and to insist that the qualities attributed to
women (specifically empathy, nurturance and cooperativeness) be affirmed as human
qualities [N] That kind of flipping of the coin can only be beneficial (271).

Essentialist feminism seeks to challenge, “not the significance of gender
differences, but the value society has attached to them” (Rhode 5). As
Whelehan observes, it is “common for oppressed social groups to appropriate
negative terms, defining and positioning them to redefine them positively”
(Modern Feminist Thought 147). The problem, of course, is that “previous
negative connotations” are impossible to erase entirely and thus are inevitably
retained in dominant discourse (147). Thus, whereas passivity may be
subversively considered an asset in that it can be associated with peace and
placidity, it will also always imply inaction and helplessness. Another issue is
the fact that the singular championing of a specific facet of femininity implies, by
extension, the ratification of other associated aspects of conventional
femininity, which may themselves be impossible to recast positively. As Bruce
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Kokopeli and George Lakey explain, along with perceived “virtues such as
gentleness and nurturance”, femininity is conventionally characterised by
“dependency” and weakness (239).
The definition and delimitation of woman is another of the hazardous
implications of essentialist feminism’s insistence upon a discernable female
essence, and reflects its operation within rather than outside binaric thought.
By their very nature, “definitions threaten to function like final answers [N]; their
status becomes unshakable, almost natural, and [is] rarely [N] interrogated”
(Elam 4). To define woman is to contain her, to proscribe, to suppress. Thus,
“the more [N] well-established the category of woman is”, writes Peter Digeser,
“the more [N] oppressive it becomes” (655). If woman is — as dominant,
binaric discourse dictates — passive, emotional and submissive, she is
naturally suited to the work of mothering, counselling and nursing, or to
secondary and ancillary secretarial and administrative work. Woman’s alleged
nature has thus, in Linda Alcoff’s words, “overdetermined [N] the limits of her
intellectual endeavours” (406).
Chris Weedon clarifies what is perhaps the most troubling and dangerous
feature of essentialist feminism:
Although often inspirational, the effect of [essentialist] feminist celebrations of longestablished but traditionally devalued ideas of female difference is twofold. It both
revalues the female and the feminine and tends to leave old binary oppositions intact

2

(Feminism, Theory and the Politics of Difference 31).

The gender dichotomy upheld by essentialist feminism underpins and elicits the
hierarchical ramifications of the man/woman binary. Polarity is a necessary
precondition of binary thinking — as Alcoff explains, “women have always been
defined as a subjugated difference within a binary opposition. To assert
essential gender difference [N] is to reinvoke this oppositional structure” (415).
In its avowal of fixed gender difference, essentialist feminism propagates the
conventional and rigid bifurcation of the sexes that has long perpetuated sexist
2

Emphasis added.
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oppression. Difference is the very premise upon which the insidious sexual
hierarchy depends. Rivkin and Ryan perhaps put it best:
Gender identity is no less a construction of patriarchal culture than the idea that men
are somehow superior to women; both are born at the same time and with the same
stroke of the pen (530).

Practitioners of the post-structuralist alternative to essentialist feminism,
constructivist feminism, believe that subscription to a strictly differentiated and
dualist approach to gender reifies sexual hierarchies, which in turn facilitate the
subordination of women. In response to the perceived perils of essentialism,
constructivist feminism works to deconstruct the very notion of gender, refusing
the rigidity and alleged naturalness of the categories of man and woman and,
consequently, the binaric thinking such categories generate. For, as Derridean
scholars Jeff Collins and Bill Mayblin note, “if the categories [themselves] are
disturbed, the hierarchy too might begin to lose its grip” (99).
Derridean deconstruction, a critical approach frequently employed by
constructivist feminists, “lays bare” the man/woman binary so as to undermine
its discursive power (Weedon, Feminism, Theory and the Politics of Difference
23). A number of strategies are involved in this project. One such strategy is to
either undo or weaken the polarity of the terms — in this case, man and
woman, or male and female — that are binarically opposed. Derrida’s theory of
undecidability, a key concept that will be elaborated on further into this thesis,
locates the in-between, the ambiguous, so as to disrupt the opposition and
suggest in its stead a continuum of difference. By way of its very existence,
the undecidable complicates the ease with which seemingly opposing terms are
categorised. A third term — signified by the slash that divides the opposing
terms — functions so as to bespeak their commonality, indicating an overlap
that denies their dichotomous relationship. In this case, the androgyne or
hermaphrodite, at once neither man nor woman, both man and woman,
effectively disables the man/woman antagonism and its associated hierarchy.
Another means of achieving the same effect is to downplay the extent to which
men and women differ, to posit their differences as variations rather than
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absolute and antagonistic oppositions, to focus on what is shared; what is
common to each category. This latter approach has long featured as part of
both second wave feminist and post-structural practice, and thus constitutes
another point of resonance and intersection between the two schools of
thought.
Another strategy is to complicate the simplistic definitions upon which binaries
are built. In many instances definitions are rejected altogether as dangerously
limiting and proscriptive. “The only way to break out of [the binary] and in fact
subvert the structure itself”, writes Alcoff, “is to be that which cannot be pinned
down or subjugated within a dichotomous hierarchy, [to refuse to] demarcate a
definitive category of ‘woman’” (417). This is perhaps post-structural
constructivism at its most extreme — the notion that there is no such thing as
woman. By evading definition and stability of meaning woman dodges and
thereby undoes the binary. The term itself is left open and inclusive, disabling
discrimination. Individuals who identify with the term, yet do not bear the
conventional hallmarks of femininity — such as a uterus, a pair of breasts, long,
lustrous hair or a desire to mother — are thus allowed access to the category.
Like essentialist feminists, constructivists celebrate difference, but a version of
difference that resides within, and thereby dismantles, the term ‘woman’, rather
than figuring as the basis for sexual binarity.
Yet another deconstructive strategy is to expose the “cultural and therefore
changeable status” of a given category or set of categories (Weedon, Feminist
Theory and the Politics of Difference 23). The result of post-structuralist
theory’s intersection with feminism is that constructivist feminists “see
difference as [N] produced, [N] as ungrounded in any fixed nature” (24).
Rather than appealing to nature, to an inherent female biology or psychology as
does essentialist feminism, constructivism reveals gender classification as
contrived and thereby pliable. “Post-structuralist thinkers”, writes Tania
Modleski, have thus “provided the analytical tools by which [women] may begin
the arduous task of unbecoming women” (Modleski, Feminism Without Women
91). Butler is arguably the leading practitioner of this approach and has
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provided feminists with specific methods by which they themselves can subvert,
or critically identify subversions of, normative notions of gender.
First published in 1990, Butler’s seminal constructivist treatise, Gender Trouble,
argues that “gender should be [N] rendered fatally ambiguous precisely
because it is always a sign of subordination for women” (xiii). Butler contends
that gender is “performative” in that it does not exist outside of its “expressions”
(33). Rather, it is “constituted by the very expressions [be they, for instance,
dress, “gesture” or “gait” (Rivkin and Ryan 728)] that are said to be its results”
(Butler Gender Trouble 33). Gender, according to Butler, is “a ‘doing’ which
[only] appears as a ‘being’” (Richardson, Niall 164-5) [—] a performance that
“produces the illusion of an inner sex or essence or psychic gender core”
(Rivkin and Ryan 728). Her theory works to destabilise the man/woman binary
by exposing as contrived the supposedly natural differences between the sexes
and “subverts a kind of feminism that demands that the word woman signify an
essential set of characteristics” (Digeser 660). As Butler disciple Ruth Holliday
explains, “if femininity is [shown to be] socially constructed, then it can be
[contested], or at least resisted” (220).
Butler does not seek to claim, as many of her critics initially believed, that
gender is a choice as simple as that of selecting an outfit for the day. Rather,
she acknowledges the compelling power of the very naming of one’s gender at
birth, the persuasiveness of the proclamation of one’s sexed identity — the fact
that, “a ‘girl’ [, so named,] is compelled to ‘cite’ the norm”, to perform her
femininity (Bodies That Matter 232). The practice of gender is ultimately “a kind
of persistent impersonation” (Gender Trouble xxviii), albeit an impersonation of
an “idea of the natural” (31), an iterative enactment, a ritual that is socially
enforced and deeply psychologically ingrained. It is via its relentless,
unthinking and repetitive citation that gender is effectively naturalised.
As David Gauntlett explains, what Butler points out is that “certain cultural
configurations of gender have seized a hegemonic hold — but, she suggests, it
doesn’t have to be that way” (9). Her response is to incite what she refers to as
“gender trouble” — “the mobilisation, subversive confusion, and proliferation of
15

genders — and therefore identity” (Gauntlett 9). Butler recommends that
gender constraints be undermined through parody, and cites drag as a specific
exemplary subversive strategy. Drag’s inherent, transparent theatricality,
argues Butler adherent Esther Godfrey, “works to dislodge essentialised
notions of gender identity and sexual difference” (3). According to Butler
scholars Rivkin and Ryan:
Drag is not an imitation or a copy of some prior and true gender [N] Drag enacts the
very structure of impersonation by which any gender is assumed. Drag is not the
putting on of a gender that belongs properly to some other group [for] there is no
“proper” gender (722).

“If the inner truth of gender is a fabrication [N] instituted and inscribed on the
surface of bodies”, writes Butler, “then it seems that genders [N] are only
produced as the truth effects of a discourse” (“Gender Trouble, Feminist
Theory, and Psychoanalytic Discourse” 327). Butler’s work epitomizes
constructivist feminism and its inherent problematic. Like essentialist feminism,
constructivist feminism is an imperfect version of feminism that ironically
threatens to endanger feminism by emptying it of its very premise — woman.
The problematic implications of this post-structural take on feminism have been
well documented by some of feminist theory’s leading scholars. Whelehan
clarifies the quandary nicely:
All political movements that focus on a particular identity as the basis for political action,
effectively presuppose that particular properties define such groups, implying that there
is an essence within identity which is fixed and can be unearthed through the
discussion of an oppressed group’s experiences of subjectivity (Modern Feminist
Thought 205).

As a species of identity politics, the very fact of feminism’s existence presumes
that women are definable and unified, that there is something universally
common to all, something essential that facilitates their subordination and thus
motivates their solidarity and mobilisation. Constructivist feminism rejects this
notion and thereby arguably undermines the efficacy of the feminist movement
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by negating that which necessitates and incites it. Feminism’s perceived
endangerment at the hands of post-structuralism has angered the likes of
Modleski, who accuses post-structuralists of “yield[ing] the ground on which to
make a stand against their oppression” (Feminism Without Women 15), as well
as Teresa de Lauretis, who, as neatly paraphrased by Ann Brooks, is
concerned that, “if the concept of woman is a fiction, then the very concept of
women’s oppression is obsolete” (Brooks 23). De Lauretis goes so far as to
posit gender as “mark[ing] the limit of deconstruction” (48).
In light of their common interest in and subversions of sexual binarity, it is ironic
that, as both Whelehan and Fuss point out,
Essentialism and [N] constructionism take on the appearance of binary opposites; the
former celebrating the fixity of female difference, and a revaluation of its social
meanings; and the latter expressing a concrete denial of the innateness of sexual
difference” (Whelehan, Modern Feminist Thought 205).

The challenge this then poses is the location of a middle ground, a stance —
itself perhaps an undecidable — that retains elements of each of these
extremes and thereby negotiates what is largely considered an insurmountable
disparity. Not all feminists believe this dissension is necessarily problematic,
however. Given her status as one of the more zealous proponents of
constructivist feminism, Butler’s work has attracted a great deal of criticism
regarding its perceived anti-feminist feminism. Her response is
characteristically deconstructive:
The loss of [the binary] reification of gender relations ought not to be lamented as the
failure of feminist political theory, but, rather, affirmed as the promise of the possibility
of complex and generative subject positions as well as coalitional strategies that neither
presuppose nor fix [N] their constitutive subjects in their place (“Gender Trouble,
Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic Discourse” 339).

Butler does not perceive either the constructivist version of feminism nor the
essentialist/constructivist split as fatal to feminism, but rather as conducive to
theoretical rigour and nuanced complexity. “Resisting the desire to resolve this
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dissension into unity”, she argues, “”is precisely what keeps the movement
alive” (“The End of Sexual Difference?” 416). She is supported in this
evaluation by Whelehan, who believes that feminism “can thrive upon such a
diversity of approaches, moving towards a celebration of heterogeneity”
(Modern Feminist Thought 146), and Denise Riley, who suggests that
“feminism is the site of the systematic fighting-out of [the unstable category of
woman] — which need not worry us” (5).
Others, like Alcoff, are more anxious about feminism’s inner dissension, and
are thus intent on forging a way out of this seeming impasse:
If gender is simply a social construct, the need and even the possibility of a feminist
politics becomes immediately problematic. What can we demand in the name of
women if ‘women’ do not exist and demands in their name simply reinforce the myth
that they do? [N] We cannot simply embrace the paradox. In order to avoid the
serious disadvantages of [essentialist and constructivist feminisms], feminism needs to
transcend the dilemma by developing a third course, an alternative theory (420-1).

One suggested means of negotiating the divide is via the concept of coalition
politics. Both Butler (“Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic
Discourse” 339) and Iris Marion Young endorse Bernice Reagon’s proposal that
feminism be re-envisioned accordingly:
For feminists to make good on the promise to accept differences among women means
to understand feminist politics [N] as coalition politics. The desire for a unified
community among women is a dangerous illusion (quoted in Young, Throwing Like A
Girl 10).

Coalitional feminism works in that it allows for the alliance of disparate
positions, yet it is the very conceding of disparity that also threatens to render
feminism meaningless: if those who are termed women share no authentic
commonality, then why coalesce at all? As Young points out, “without
conceptualising women as a group in some sense, it is not possible to
conceptualise oppression as a systematic, structured, institutional process”

18

(“Gender as Seriality” 718). She suggests an appropriation of Jean-Paul
Sartre’s theory of seriality as an alternative approach:
Unlike a group, which forms around actively shared objectives, a series is a social
collective whose members are unified passively by the objects around which their
actions are oriented or by the objectified results of the material effects of the actions of
others (“Gender as Seriality” 724).

Sartre uses a number of everyday examples to demonstrate what is a fairly
complicated concept. People waiting for a bus constitute one such series.
They are collective insofar as they minimally relate to one another and follow the rules
of bus waiting. As a collective they are brought together by their relation to a material
object, the bus, and the social practices of public transportation (Young, “Gender as
Seriality” 724).

Another exemplary series is made up of radio listeners, another of commuters,
and, yet another, of farmers (725-6). What is significant is that “the unity of the
series is amorphous, without determinate limits, attributes, or intentions” (726).
As Young explains, “there is no concept of the series within attributes that
clearly demarcate what about individuals makes them belong” (728). She
argues that women also constitute a series, in that they are linked only, and
passively, via their relations to particular objects and structures — such as the
specific biological process of menstruation, as well as its accompanying social
rules, along with “the material objects associated with menstrual practices” and
the “enforced heterosexuality” that defines such bodily practices (728-9).
Young rejects the notion that there is a recognisable and definitive collection of
qualities that are shared by all women in favour of the notion that it is the fact
that individual women “move and act in relation to practico-inert objects [such
as the feminised body] that position[s] them as women” (730).
Alison Stone, however, considers Young’s thesis a revivification of
essentialism, given her argument that, “although women have no common
features, there are common features — common expectations — organising all
the social realities that constrain women’s lives” (145). Although she denies
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any inherent gendered commonality, in Stone’s opinion Young reinscribes
essentialism via her claim that there are “certain universal norms”, such as
menstruation and menstrual practices, “that constitute all women as women
(even though women do not share a common experience of those norms)”
(145). The problem is not that Young’s thesis is flawed in and of itself, perhaps,
but that is fails to do what Young claims it does: to eradicate essentialism
entirely.
Perhaps, then, a limited degree of essentialism, such as that detectable in
Young’s thesis, must be admitted into post-structuralist accounts of feminism in
order to render the latter workable. Such a concession is not equivalent to an
embracing or endorsing of essentialism; rather, it is an acknowledgement of the
benefits and quandaries of each side of the essentialist/constructivist
opposition, and thereby a deconstructive practice in itself. Gayatri Spivak, yet
another leading feminist scholar who has confronted the predicament of poststructuralism’s potentially potent collision with feminism, argues for a strategic
and “self-conscious” deployment of essentialist feminism (3). Of the dilemma,
she writes:
One is left with the useful yet semimournful position of the unavoidable usefulness of
something that is dangerous [N T]he critique of essentialism [must] be understood not
as an exposure of an error [N] but as an acknowledgement of the dangerousness of
something one cannot not use (5).

Whether the result of choice or force, the one thing all women do have in
common is the label itself — women are those individuals who are referred to
and/or refer to themselves as such. This basic commonality cannot be
contested. The very act of one’s labelling as a woman incurs some kind of
engagement — be it variously ambivalent, subversive or conservative, akin to
Butler’s notion of citation — with an array of normative womanish concerns,
such as responding to the complexities of feminine physicality. A woman may
have heavy, globular breasts that she tries to stifle under restrictive underwear
or bulky layers of clothing. Another may have small breasts that she enlarges
surgically, enhances with padding, or accepts with pride, or with indifference.
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Yet another may have no breasts at all after a mastectomy or due to her
chromosomal classification as male. Each, however, responds to the identifier
‘woman’ and, subsequently, engages with its normative associations. Even
where this engagement is unintended and unthinking or, conversely, resistant,
she is construed in relation to such norms as a result of her identification as
woman. Women are linked, at minimum, semantically and discursively. As
Riley argues, each woman suffers from the variable and endless “effects of the
designation, ‘woman’” (111); this is the only sense in which their oppression is
truly shared. Indeed, Butler herself argues that feminism needs to “rely upon a
very minimal conception of the subject” (Digeser 661). Christine Di Stefano
similarly condones a limited definition of woman:
The subject of feminism N consists of those subjects who are culturally and politically
positioned and constituted as ‘women’. We need make no other substantive claims in
order to invoke such a subject” (96).

Feminism, then, can safely be said to represent those who identify with, or are
identified by, the term ‘woman’. According to the philosophy that not only
underpins, but necessitates, feminism, those who identify as such are
accordingly conventionally situated in opposition to the norm that is ‘man’, and
it is this antagonism that leads to a variety of sex-based assumptions. This
identification is, admittedly, bordering on the definitive, and, as Mary Poovey
points out, is consequently faintly essentialist:
To maintain that all women necessarily occupy the position of ‘other’ to man and that
their social oppression follows from this binary split is to risk reducing position to
essence, because it retains both the concept of unified identity and the oppositional
logic that currently dictates our ‘knowledge’ of sex difference and the nature of woman
(52).

However, this conception of woman is also a basic, workable, pragmatic means
of categorising women whilst retaining their individuality and multiplicity and
upholding the motivation for a feminist politics. Poovey’s claim that an
acknowledgement of woman’s discursive subordination within the sexed binary
would itself revivify such binarity is difficult to comprehend. The man/woman
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binary is one of the bases of the feminist movement — it is a fact of dominant
discourse that feminism is at pains to unseat. In order to renegotiate the
dichotomy, feminism must first acknowledge its presence. To say that woman is
positioned in opposition to man is not to endorse such opposition, but merely to
recognise it prior to overturning it. Riley is the author of what is arguably one of
the most commonsensical statements relating to this phenomenon:
I’d argue that it is compatible to suggest that ‘women’ don’t exist — while maintaining a
politics of ‘as if they existed’ — since the world behaves as if they unambiguously did.
So that official suppositions and conservative popular convictions will need to be
countered constantly by redefinitions of ‘women’. Such challenges to ‘how women are’
can throw sand in the eyes of the founding categorisations and attributions, ideally
disorienting them (112).

It is because the “world behaves as if” women were the inferior opposites of
men that feminism is required. Until and unless this changes, feminism will
have relevance and will continue to work for such change. If the binary does
buckle, surely this will indicate that feminism has entered the mainstream. One
of the ironies of the feminist movement is that it ultimately aims to effect a
degree of change that would warrant its demise. This thesis, then, favours a
pragmatic constructivist feminism: a modified take on a strand of feminism that
occasionally threatens to render feminism itself obsolete.

FEMINISM AND THE POPULAR
Another of the features of this thesis requiring an introductory address is its
focus on the popular as opposed to the conventionally literary. This binaric split
— conceived variably as high culture/popular culture, literature/popular fiction,
classic/trash — has been complicated by popular culture’s increasing visibility
within academia. The study of popular texts has gradually become almost de
rigueur rather than rebellious, although it was originally (and in some corners,
continues to be) met with resistance.
One of the problems encountered by theorists and critics of the popular is the
plethora of meanings attributed to the label. As Joanne Hollows points out, “the
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ways in which the ‘popular’ is conceptualised shapes the ways it is studied and
analysed” (25). The universal pull of popular culture is but one conception of
the term. Leslie G. Roman and K. Linda Christian-Smith suggest that it is quite
simply “anything addressed to or well-liked by a large number of people” (8-9).
This definitive approach is difficult to contest, given that the prefix ‘popular’ has
a fairly fixed meaning, implying widespread appeal. Dominic Strinati makes the
further claim that popular cultural products are those “produced by the industrial
techniques of mass production, and marketed for profit to a mass public of
consumers” (10), thus introducing capitalist consumption into the equation.
Another suggested meaning is facilitated by Strinati’s definition — the
somewhat elitist notion that popular culture is that which is “imposed on a
passive mass of ‘cultural dopes’” (Hollows 26). As Hollows correctly contends,
“from such a perspective not only is commercially-produced popular culture
debased”, but so are those who “consume and enjoy” it (26). This definition,
despite its valuable Frankfurt School-style critique of capitalist production, is
problematic in its elitism, as it denies those who choose to engage with popular
texts any sense of agency.
Foundational cultural theorist Stuart Hall sees popular culture as a “site of
struggle” (280) wherein “hegemony arises, and where it is secured” (71) — a
location in which, significantly, ideologies are disseminated, and their
normativity thereby enabled. Strinati adds to this significantly by pointing to
popular culture’s reification of normative gender ideologies, noting that
femininity and masculinity, for instance, “are not identities which exist
unambiguously elsewhere, and then come to be distorted by popular culture.
They are, in part at least, constructed and reproduced through popular culture”
(174). This take on the popular motivates this thesis — indeed, is one of its
foundational presuppositions — and informs its analysis of popular forms.
Popular culture, in this particular project, is, put simply, that which both appeals
to and is accessible by mainstream audiences. Popular cultural texts are those
that are beloved and best selling. They are also easily accessed by the
masses — both in terms of being widely available and, unlike the otherwise
popular works of the likes of William Shakespeare for instance, readily
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comprehensible to modern mass audiences — and thereby identifiably
intended for bulk consumption.
Like woman, the popular is conventionally and problematically defined against
what it (apparently) is not — that is, as high culture’s opposite. It is not elite or
superior, it is not challenging, it is not exclusive or obscure, it is not a marker of
prestige. Its binaric situation is noted by Roman and Christian-Smith, who
claim that popular culture has “usually been meant to imply a distinction from
cultural practices, ways of life, and knowledge of those associated with high [or]
learned culture” (8). The very fact of scholarly interest in popular culture,
however, undermines this binaric structure, refusing any disparity between the
two poles by treating the popular with the rigour and seriousness traditionally
reserved for classic, canonical works. Roman and Christian-Smith speak, in
fact, of the “canonisation of [N] popular culture within academic institutions”
(11) — thus, popular culture has disarmingly become associated with the very
thing it, definitionally, is not, thereby undoing its binaric opposition to high
culture. Rather than being approached as frivolous and flippant, popular texts
are now considered to be ripe with political significance and hegemonic force,
and fraught with polysemy. This change has, of course, come about in part as
a result of the advent of the post-modern era, which is, as Jameson contends,
characterised by the “erosion of the [N] distinction between high culture and
so-called mass or popular culture” (4).
This thesis contributes to this deconstructive process by way of according
popular texts the scholarly reverence with which conventionally literary texts are
critiqued. The collision of feminist thought and popular culture enacted herein is
more than simply a coincidence. Women have been traditionally associated
with ‘trash’ (think, magazines, soap operas and romance novels); moreover,
feminist scholars, such as Tania Modleski, Angela McRobbie and Janice
Radway, were among the first to critically attend to popular texts and figure
amongst the most prominent and groundbreaking practitioners of popular
cultural criticism. Cosmopolitan Magazine, 1980s soap operas Dynasty and
Dallas, famed chick-flicks Thelma & Louise and Steel Magnolias,
advertisements for sanitary pads and tampons, the Harlequin Mills & Boon
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romance, cult television program Buffy the Vampire Slayer and the more recent
reality television products The Bachelor, Extreme Makeover and Wife Swap —
an extensive array of popular, women-centred texts have been subjected to
feminist critique since the women’s movement first infiltrated academia in the
1970s.
In “Mass Culture as Woman: Modernism’s Other”, Andreas Huyssen explores
the conventional gendering of popular culture as feminine, a phenomenon
neatly encapsulated in an extract from Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary:
Emma Bovary, whose temperament was, in the narrator’s words, ‘more sentimental
than artistic’, loved to read romances [N] One aspect of the difference that is important
to my argument about the gender inscriptions in the mass culture debate is that woman
(Madame Bovary) is positioned as reader of inferior literature — subjective, emotional,
passive — while man (Flaubert) emerges as writer of genuine, authentic literature —
objective, ironic, and in control of his aesthetic means (Huyssen 46).

Thus, to claim that women have a particular affinity with the popular is, as
Huyssen points out, to risk, yet again, essentialising the character of woman.
What, then, is one to make of the persistent feminist interest in popular texts?
Is this linkage not problematic for feminism? Essentialist feminists, of course,
have worked to re-value popular cultural products — “formerly devalued forms”
such as informal correspondence and feminised domestic crafts such as
quilting and knitting (Huyssen 59) — along with the features that allegedly
characterise both these forms and the gender with which they are linked, so as
to invert the high/low binary. The problematics and pitfalls of such an approach
to binarity, however, should be readily apparent in light of the previous
examination of essentialist feminism. An alternative way of looking at the
feminist fascination with popular culture is to perceive it not as a verification of
woman’s innate sentimentality and frivolousness, but rather as part of a larger
feminist deconstructive project that aims to redress patriarchal binaric thought.
The fact of scholarly feminist interest in the popular effectively refutes its status
as the canon’s debased other. Alternatively, this thesis aims to disprove many
of the assumptions pertaining to popular cultural texts — such as their inherent
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emotional mawkishness — and thereby alleviate some of the anxiety
engendered by feminism’s use of and attention to popular fiction.
Feminists have adopted varying approaches to popular texts. Some have
perceived popular texts as conservative by default. As constituents of
dominant discourse, which is, by definition, conservative, popular texts
therefore must necessarily be automatically deemed retrograde. From this
perspective, popular culture is conceived of as “the enemy” of not only
feminism, but of any alternative ideology (Kirca, 101). This fairly simplistic
approach was favoured by early practitioners of analyses of the popular —
Hollows observes that “it was common for feminists to claim that a whole range
of popular forms and practices locked women into feminine identities which
made them blind to, and collude in, their own oppression” (20). There are
some problems with this style of critique. To begin with, to pre-empt one’s
analytical findings on the basis of a text’s status as popular is questionable
scholarship, in that it is unnecessarily anticipatory and thereby proscriptive and
delimiting. The second problem is that determining a text’s feminist potential, or
lack thereof, based largely on its location within dominant discourse constitutes
a rejection of the possibility of change within that discourse, of the progression
and alteration of dominant thought. The preclusion of such change, of
feminism’s entry into the mainstream, equates to surrender. The belief that
dominant discourse is fatalistically fixed suggests that feminism itself is
pointless, its efforts to bring about authentic change doomed to fail.
A slightly more complex approach exists in the concept of co-option. A number
of feminists have questioned whether, “in order to enter the mainstream,
feminism is co-opted by being harnessed to other discourses [N] which
neutralise [its] radical potential” (Gamman and Marshment 3). Hollows
explains this at some length:
Some commentators argue that images of ‘liberation’, ‘freedom’ and ‘independence’ for
women now populate many media forms because they sell, but, in the process,
become detached from [the] feminist discourses which gave them [N] ‘radical’
meaning. According to this argument, in advertising, the liberating effects of tampons
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and sanitary towels are sold to a post-feminist generation but have lost any connection
to feminist understandings of ‘liberation’. The co-option line tends to stress the
downside of feminism’s entry into the popular, emphasising how feminism in the
process has supposedly been ‘made safe’ (194-5).

The theory of co-option maintains that dominant discourse is inherently
conservative by way of its alignment with capitalism, and thus, that its
engagement with ideas that are otherwise subversive works inevitably to empty
those ideas of their dissident and unorthodox meaning by removing them from
their original, radical contextualisation. Feminism is then arguably
compromised or watered-down via its manifestation within the popular. This
take on feminism in popular culture works to compartmentalise and limit access
to feminism by insisting upon locating it in opposition to the popular, and, by
extension, to the masses. Indeed, feminism suffers from its seemingly anxietyinduced efforts to match the pure intellectualism and high theory that
characterises well-established, academy-sanctioned philosophies such as
psychoanalysis and post-structuralism. As a consequence it can appear
inaccessible and exclusive. A more pragmatic approach would welcome
feminism’s inclusion within popular culture as a means of disseminating
feminist awareness and normalising feminist thought.
It is an indisputable fact that feminist ideas will be imparted to a greater number
of people if they can be found in popular texts as opposed to, or as well as,
those that are more exclusive and intellectually demanding — in the pages of
works by Maeve Binchy rather than only those written by the relatively less
accessible Jeanette Winterson, for example. Only a minority of women are
armed with the inclination to read, let alone the necessary skill and preparation
required to deconstruct the feminist meanings generated by, texts such as
Margaret Atwood’s Surfacing, for instance, or Virginia Woolf’s Orlando. Millions
more are equipped to interpret, even if only at the most superficial of levels, the
feminism apparent in Helen Reddy’s “I Am Woman”, or, perhaps, an episode of
Medium. It is also problematic to suggest that those women who are equipped
to analyse and negotiate the complex feminist messages located in literary
offerings are inevitably uninterested in popular forms. Women who are so
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trained are likely to bring the same set of skills and recognition of nuances and
codes to their consumption of Bridget Jones’s Diary as they are to their
readings of Jane Austen’s oeuvre.
Lorraine Gamman and Margaret Marshment offer an excellent defence of
popular culture’s engagement with feminism in their edited collection The
Female Gaze: Women as Viewers of Popular Culture. They note the ironically
restricting ramifications of feminism’s reliance on the radical:
As strategies of resistance [N] radical texts do suffer from an element of pessimism:
brilliant at uncovering our oppression and rewriting women into the history of creativity
they have, for the most part, effectively remained ‘alternative’, outside the mainstream”
(2).

Hollows makes a similar observation:
In some forms of feminism, ‘a distinction is drawn between a ‘bad’ patriarchal popular
or mass culture and a feminist avant-garde culture [N] This kind of feminist ‘alternative’
is doomed to remain marginal because its appeal is not so much based on a
recognition of gendered experience [N] but more on a possession of cultural codes
and competencies which are the product of a particularly privileged class position” (289).

If feminism’s aim is to infiltrate the mainstream, then, clearly, strictly relegating
it to texts that are obscure and demanding is problematic, in that such a
restriction will inexorably prevent such change. As an alternative site, popular
culture not only “allows ways of disseminating feminist ideas and theories”, it
does so “without placing them in total opposition” to dominant discourses,
thereby enabling their accessibility and undoing the binaric opposition of the
feminist intellectual elite versus the uneducated anti-feminist masses (Kirca
102). As Suheyla Kirca explains,
Feminist intervention in popular culture might offer feminist politics a pragmatic strategy
to shift the balance of power and prepare the ground for change, and thus help
transform society [N] It is crucial to intervene in the mainstream to make feminist
meanings a part of everyday common sense (107).

28

Although a necessary prerequisite to the social transformation feminism seeks,
the belief that feminism needs to become common sense is not without
controversy. Gamman and Marshment, for instance, are interested in “how
feminists can intervene in the mainstream to make [its] meanings part of
‘commonsense’ — [N] to convert commonsense into ‘good sense’” (2). Yet, as
Hollows points out, this take on feminism and the popular “reproduces the
figure of the feminist as the woman ‘in the know’” (196) and thus the
feminist/non-feminist binary. However, if feminism does away with this
opposition entirely, it does away with its impetus — its aim to improve
awareness of women’s subjection. If all women are already aware of and
mobilised around feminist ideals, then feminism has already largely succeeded.
Despite some of the problems with feminism’s scholarly engagement with and
location within the popular, as canvassed above, it remains evident that popular
culture is an important site for feminist struggle and, as such, it is imperative
that the feminist analysis of such forms continues. Popular texts have the
potential to both proffer alternative, subversive thought, and to penetrate an
audience of significant size. This thesis does not simply hope to provide a
defence of popular culture per se, however. It also seeks to engage with and
ideologically assess popular cultural forms on the basis of their functioning as
influential sources of normative, mainstream notions of gender. For, as
Gamman and Marshment explain, “it is here [N] that most people in our society
get their entertainment and their information” (2). It is also the site wherein
“women (and men) are offered their culture’s dominant definitions of
themselves” (2).
Reception, or reader-response theory, a critical phenomenon of particular
relevance to the study of popular culture, developed in response to the
perceived simplicity of early, universally damning, critiques of the popular. In
her pioneering, reception-based study of Jackie Magazine, McRobbie argues
that readers do not necessarily “swallow” a text’s axioms unquestioningly
(Storey 285). As a practitioner of this post-modern critical approach, McRobbie
restores a sense of agency and control to those who choose to engage with
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popular forms, rejecting the stereotype of the “cultural dope” that has plagued
and problematised scholarly analyses of the popular. Indeed, reception theory
developed in direct response to the elitist belief that consumers of popular
culture indiscriminately accept its often regressive messages.
Reception theory draws on the post-structural contention that no single text
generates a singular, fixed meaning. Instead, consumers bring their own
unique experiences to their readings of any given text, which necessarily
impinge upon their textual engagement, resulting in an interpretation that is
intertextual and highly individual. “All texts are inherently polysemic”, Hollows
explains. “Although a text might have a preferred reading, it does not follow
that it will be decoded in the same way by everyone” (24). Evidence for
assertions such as this is usually proffered in the form of ethnographic,
interview-based research, in which scholars are interested in the actual
responses to texts as experienced by real, specific individuals.
Feminist practitioners of this approach can thus argue that women actively
negotiate a text’s potential meanings, rather than blithely accepting, at surface
level, its apparently patriarchal axioms. Radway’s Reading the Romance, for
instance, aptly demonstrates the ways in which consumers of popular fiction
keenly and subversively engage with such texts. The popularity of this
approach has also resulted, however, in the publication of some poorly-argued
apologias for a range of undeniably sexist popular texts. Whilst there is
certainly a place for this type of scholarship, it has ultimately facilitated some
absurd analyses, in that many of the claims practitioners of this approach make
are hyperbolic in the extreme. In response to one such defence of the
Harlequin Mills & Boon romance — the bizarre assertion that “reading and
writing a romance may be among the most subversive acts a woman can
engage in when it comes to challenging patriarchal culture” (Modleski, Old
Wives’ Tales and Other Women’s Stories 66) — Modleski retorts, tongue-incheek:
Right up there, I guess, with struggling for effective sexual harassment policies,
working at rape crisis centres, and protecting abortion clinics (OWT 66).
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It is really a matter of degree. It is one thing to acknowledge a text’s
inconsistencies and pluralities, yet it is entirely another to suggest that a text
generates readings that are inherently unknowable and indeterminate,
dependant entirely upon the individual reader, completely contingent. Although
multiplicity of meaning is undoubtedly a fact of each and every text, it is difficult
to accept that any given text can support an endless, unbounded, infinite range
of meanings and, moreover, that this somehow makes it subversive. If this
somewhat extreme supposition were to be allowed, it would negate years of
scholarly work, of close, text-based analyses, and would ultimately render texts,
in their abject multiplicity of meaning, meaningless. This approach also sidesteps the issue of many popular texts’ undeniably complicit engagement with at
least some normative discourses, attempting to neutralise this normativity
through an appeal to individual meaning-making. Perhaps the qualification
‘within reason’ needs to be applied here. Reception theory is useful in that it
acknowledges resistant, subversive readings of and responses to popular texts,
yet is dangerous and dubious in terms of the insistence of some of its
adherents upon the absolutely endlessly open and thus always potentially
transgressive status of such texts. Such insistence is in danger of entirely
evacuating texts of any potential political pertinence. It would seem appropriate
to draw the line at some of the more extreme and poorly supported examples of
this type of analytical approach.
Raymond Williams argued in the 1980s, in the wake of the development of
critical approaches that focus on a text’s readership, that, as paraphrased by
Modleski, “the study of texts is the most neglected aspect of mass culture”
(Modleski, Studies in Entertainment xiii). This thesis, then, marks a twenty-first
century return to the textual analysis of popular forms, and as such is limited to
interpretation of the texts themselves, the women and men that inhabit their
pages, or screened scenes, and the gendered attributes they appear to
recommend, in an effort to “avoid the pitfalls of approaches which [N]
exaggerate the freedom of the consumer in creating his or her own meanings”
(Modleski xvi).
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OUTLINE
This thesis covers a particularly wide variety of critical approaches and bodies
of theory, before engaging closely with a set of specific popular novels and their
respective screen adaptations. It is in these later chapters, which together
constitute Part Two, that feminist theory, post-structural theory, novel-into-film
adaptation theory, and approaches to the popular are brought together.
Part One of this thesis sets up the theoretical framework for the textual
analyses that follow. Chapter One explores the critically slandered, yet
rampantly read, emergent genre of chick-lit. Here the genre is defined against
its precursor, the Harlequin Mills & Boon romance, and is ultimately assessed,
by way of the axioms and approaches of constructivist feminist criticism, as
sitting somewhere between the pre-feminist paradigms promoted by this brand,
and an unqualified, radical feminist renunciation of the same. Chick-lit’s
polysemy proffers an exciting, contested ideological space that is open to plural
interpretations, and, importantly, to adaptations.
Chapter Two provides a detailed summary and appraisal of adaptation theory
and criticism, seeking to offer a new means of critiquing novel-into-film
adaptations, one that departs from the stale, static and problematic focus on
fidelity that has so constricted adaptation scholarship to date. Chapter Two
maintains the thesis’ post-structural slant, employing Derridean deconstruction
so as to complicate notions of filmic fidelity. It then explores the art of feminist
revision, harnessing this as a potential way out of adaptation theory’s fidelityplagued mire.
Part Two comprises close textual analyses of three specific, foundational
chick-lit novels, along with their respective filmic and televisual renderings.
Here, the differences between the source texts and their adaptations are
explored, not with the aim of celebrating seeming fidelity, or condemning
change, but, rather, so as to offer an analysis of these adaptations as valid,
ideologically driven interpretations. Chapter Three looks at Laura Zigman’s
quirky Animal Husbandry, and Someone Like You, its cinematic version,
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Chapter Four, Helen Fielding’s infamous Bridget Jones’s Diary, and the
adaptation of the same name, and, finally, Chapter Five is devoted to the Sex
and the City franchise.
Chapter Three focuses largely on its pair of texts’ respective presentations of
biological essentialism, a concept that is of particular significance to both, as
well as being a characteristic preoccupation of the chick-lit genre. It ultimately
reads the adaptation as having revised Zigman’s debut chick-lit offering via the
tropes of the Harlequin Mills & Boon romance – an appraisal that is provided
particular evidence in the film’s final scenes.
Chapter Four’s analysis of Bridget Jones offers a more complicated critique of
the choices made in the adaptation process – the film version of Fielding’s
iconic novel vacillates between a post-structurally-skewed feminist
interpretation of her work, and a more straightforwardly romantic take on the
same. The respective texts’ approaches to the female body inspire the bulk of
this constructivist feminist reading.
Chapter Five, which assesses the meaning made in the transformative process
of adapting Bushnell’s Sex and the City to the screen, ultimately deems the
HBO production a feminist adaptation, in that it largely enhances and enlarges
the constructivist feminism evident in the source text. The foregrounding of
fashion, a feature of all three texts, provides much of the evidence for this
reading.
The Conclusion reflects on the thesis’ multiple aims and agendas, and offers a
number of suggestions for further scholarship. Its more controversial and
potentially problematic elements are herein reiterated and acknowledged, in the
hope that they will generate more work, particularly in relation to the somewhat
scholastically bereft genre of chick-lit.
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Part One
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Chapter One

CHICK-LIT: REVISION OR REMNANT
OF THE HARLEQUIN MILLS & BOON
ROMANCE?
What do you think this is? A [Harlequin] Mills and Boon3 story?
I’m sorry but if that’s the type of scenario you’re interested in then I suggest that you read a different
book.

Marian Keyes
Watermelon

CHICK-WHAT?
Chick-lit, the ubiquitous, both beloved and bemoaned twenty-first century
literary genre, notoriously eludes easy definition. As well as eliciting feministflavoured outrage — Jenny Colgan, author of Amanda’s Wedding, laments, “if
they called it slut-lit it couldn't be more insulting" (Razden 6) — the genre’s
moniker provides some helpful clues as to its content and characteristics.
“Chick” refers both colloquially to a young woman and to a living, evolving thing
still in its developmental stages, whereas “lit” is of course an abbreviated form
of literature, perhaps indicative of the genre’s accessibility and irreverent
sensibility.

3

London publishing house Mills & Boon began publishing romantic fiction in the 1920s. In
1951, Harlequin bought the rights to publish paperback versions of Mills & Boon in North
America. In 1971, Mills & Boon was sold to Harlequin, Harlequin thereby becoming the parent
company. Three years later, Mills & Boon Australia was established and in the 1990s, the
Harlequin brand was added to the Mills & Boon name (eHarlequin.com.au). In the pursuit of
uniformity and clarity, Harlequin, Mills & Boon, and Harlequin Mills & Boon will be referred to as
‘Harlequin Mills & Boon’ throughout. Research and commentary pertaining to either applies
equally to both, as there is little to distinguish the publications coming out of these initially
separate entities.
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Definitions of chick-lit abound, yet few manage to accurately capture the
conventions essential to and typical of the genre. Journalist Carol Memmott’s
summation — “frothy tales of twentysomethings and thirtysomethings looking
for weight loss, Mr Right and the perfect job” (1) — is not only unfairly reductive
and poorly informed, it also manifestly excludes a number of the genre’s classic
texts. On the other hand, chick-lit author Jennifer Weiner’s broader claim that
in order to be considered chick-lit a novel need only feature “a smart-yetwounded [N] heroine, who’s young(ish), accomplished, but insecure, [N] trying
to find her way in life” (Waldrip 1), is perhaps too inclusive.
Anna Weinberg views this generic classification as somewhat empty and
contrived, the product of marketing as opposed to any genuinely shared
content:
So what would happen if a young woman did write a sharp, brilliant new novel — a
portrait of the artist as a young woman in the city? Its publishers would wrap it in pink,
slap a martini glass on the cover, and get Anna Maxted to blurb it (2).

Marketing has indeed been integral to the creation of chick-lit as an identifiable
literary category, underlining the links between novels, as well as — arguably
artificially and sometimes arbitrarily — constructing such connections, thereby
delineating the genre. Comparative quotes accompanying the books
themselves, words of praise from established chick-lit authors, and
standardised candy-coloured packaging combine to announce a chick-lit
novel’s generic classification. Candace Bushnell’s Sex and the City, for
example, is described by Helen Fielding, author of Bridget Jones’s Diary, as
“intriguing and highly entertaining”. Her words, emblazoned on the novel’s front
cover, at once reflect and construct similarities between the two texts,
encouraging comparisons. Maxted’s Being Committed is accompanied by
similarly authoritative book jacket praise — Keyes describes Maxted’s work as
“warm, poignant and very funny”, her comments suggestive of a supportive
solidarity, a sisterhood of chick-lit novelists.
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However, there is usually more to a chick-lit novel’s generic identity than this
type of conspicuous labelling. Although many of the authors themselves
perceive their respective texts as decidedly unique — Amy Sohn, author of Run
Catch Kiss, for example, “fought hard with [her] publisher not to have Bridget
Jones comparisons on the book jacket” (Zeisler 4) — novels that are marketed,
read and reviewed as chick-lit generally share a number of recognisable traits.
The following conglomeration of numerous deficient attempts to define chick-lit
aims to provide a more studied and rigorous description of this popular literary
4

form , and is informed by an extensive survey of the genre, including randomly
selected, lesser-known but appropriately marketed novels — such as Still
Thinking of You, by Adele Parks and The Baby Trail by Sinead Moriarty — as
well as popularly and critically “canonised” chick-lit classics like Keyes’s
Rachel’s Holiday and Weiner’s Good In Bed.
Imelda Whelehan argues that “the main requirement [for a text] to qualify as
chick-lit is that the [book be] about young women [N] and that this period of a
woman’s life be treated as a special category of concern” (The Feminist
Bestseller (‘TFB’) 214). As Jennie Bristow adds, chick-lit novels are “written by
young women, for young women” (52). The majority of chick-lit heroines are in
their early-to-mid-thirties, although they range in age from around twenty — the
eponymous heroine of Caren Lissner’s Carrie Pilby, for instance is only
nineteen — to almost forty, like Melissa Banks’s The Wonder Spot’s protagonist
Sophie. Writers of chick-lit generally belong to a similar age bracket, although
some of the genre’s most revered authors, such as Fielding, Keyes and
Bushnell, are still producing chick-lit well into their forties.
Chick-lit novels are characterised by an “immediate, informal [narrative] style”
(Wells 67) and employs accessible, colloquial language. That they are rapid,
undemanding reads is no doubt a significant part of the popular appeal of these
texts. Many, although not all, chick-lit novels “employ first-person narration to
craft the impression that the protagonist is speaking directly to readers” (Ferriss
and Young 4). This impression is only heightened by the fact that numerous
4

The genre’s popularity cannot be overstated: in 2002 alone chick-lit sales in the United States
“grossed 71 million dollars” (Gormley 1).

37

chick-lit texts are styled as diaries (Bridget Jones’s Diary is the prime example),
email exchanges (such as The Boy Next Door by Meg Cabot) or
autobiographies (like Laurie Notaro’s Autobiography of a Fat Bride). Some
novels take this one step further by featuring narrators who directly address
their readers, thereby essentially enacting a unilateral conversation, mimicking
the kind of intimate confessional dialogue that occurs between friends:
Hang on, the doorbell’s ringing. God, I hate people dropping in unexpectedly [N] It’s
OK though, it’s Andy [N] You may as well join us, sit down, kick your shoes off and
don’t worry, it’s a smoker’s flat. Beer or Chardonnay, which would you prefer? (Green,
Straight Talking 9).

Notable exceptions to this include novels that feature numerous protagonists,
as opposed to just the one, such as Weiner’s In Her Shoes, Green’s Babyville
and Keyes’s Last Chance Saloon and Sushi For Beginners, all of which feature
third-person narration that allows for unencumbered movement between the
lives and perspectives of multiple heroines.
One indispensable feature of the genre that definitions surprisingly often ignore
is the specific tone employed, which is frequently cynical, always irreverent,
self-conscious and witty. As Whelehan notes, chick-lit novels are uniformly
“written with self-deprecating humour and even at times physical comedy” (TFB
176). Rebecca Vnuk agrees, maintaining that “regular women’s fiction [N]
takes life just a bit more seriously” (3). The difference is largely a question of
tone – “chick-lit [N] is distinguished by its humour” (3). Such humour is
significant in that it “not only entertains but also leads readers to believe [the
genre’s protagonists] are fallible” (Ferriss and Young 4).
As Bitch Magazine’s Andi Zeisler explains, as well as being fallible and flawed,
chick-lit heroines are “educated, self-aware, and quick with a snarky retort or a
wise aside” (3). Although they are stereotypically employed in publishing or
advertising, the range of professions is actually virtually limitless — chick-lit’s
heroines are chefs (Becky in Little Earthquakes), florists (Talking to Addison’s
Holly), journalists (Cannie of Good In Bed), stay-at-home mothers (Babyville’s
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Maeve), magazine editors (Lisa of Sushi For Beginners), television producers
(Tasha in Straight Talking) and private investigators (Being Committed’s
Hannah). The novels are dominantly Anglophone, and hence set in a
contemporary, usually urban, occasionally suburban Anglophone space —
more often than not London or New York, sometimes Dublin, Los Angeles,
Philadelphia, Connecticut, or Melbourne. References to real, specific locations,
such as Philadelphia’s Le Bus Bakery and Restaurant (featured in Good In
Bed) and Camden Town Sainsbury’s (mentioned in Babyville), enhance the
genre’s trademark realism, a realism that is largely achieved via detailed
cataloguing of the ins and outs of these particular women’s daily lives.
“That many of the novels are written in the form of diaries, or are styled as
autobiographies”, writes journalist Hanne Blank, “should only make clearer that
these books are defiantly about minutiae” (8). As Whelehan observes, chick-lit
“might be construed as dwelling on the trivial and the quotidian” (TFB 200) —
Weinberg finds frustrating the fact that its heroines feel “compelled to report
every maddening step of every single action they perform” (2):
Crossly I retreat into my own flat, close the door and pick up the phone. I speed-dial
the local wood-fired pizza company and order my usual: a capricciosa and a bag of
Kettle Chips. I pour myself a glass of wine-box wine out of the fridge, then head back
into the sitting room and flick on the telly (Kinsella, The Undomestic Goddess 43).

Another of chick-lit’s definitive characteristics is its notable foregrounding of
female friendship. As Weiner puts it, chick-lit heroines spend much of their time
in the company of their “cadre of eccentric friends” (Gladstone 1). These
friends are not exclusively female, but usually share a feminine sensibility —
Bridget Jones herself considers Tom, her gay male confidante, one of her
closest friends, and Cath of Jane Green’s Bookends is best friends with the
fabulously camp Si, who “loves [her] more than anyone else in the world” (29).
A chick-lit protagonist’s friends are particularly, incredibly important in her life —
they constitute her constructed, urban family:
I stand in the kitchen [N] looking at Lucy’s puffy face, turning so I can just see, through
`the doorway, Si and Josh sitting together on the sofa, talking softly, and I feel an
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incredible peace come over me. In the heart of — as Si would put it — my family of
choice (Green, Bookends 394).

Aside from platonic relationships with friends, chick-lit also frequently focuses
on romantic relationships and the challenges of being single in a society that
endorses coupling as the norm. One need look no further than the titles of
some of the genre’s flagship novels — Sex and the City, Good In Bed, Mr
Maybe, Lucy Sullivan Is Getting Married, See Jane Date — to get a sense of
this generic preoccupation with romance. However, although romance
uniformly features in chick-lit texts, it does so to varying degrees. I Don’t Know
How She Does It’s Kate is more concerned with the difficult task of balancing
motherhood and her demanding career than she is with her marriage, whereas
the relationship that is given most attention in The Nanny Diaries is that
between Nan and her four-year-old charge, Grayer. In fact, romance is often
merely peripheral. Notwithstanding Curtis Sittenfeld’s claim — a claim that
reflects widely-held misconceptions about chick-lit — that a heroine ultimately
finding herself “manless” would constitute a “violation of the genre’s most basic
tenet” (7), romantic happy-ever-after conclusions are by no means guaranteed.
The Devil Wears Prada’s Andy winds up sans boyfriend as a result of her
zealous commitment to her job, and the final pages of Animal Husbandry see
Jane contentedly single, “get[ting] on with [her] life” (300).
Whether it is ostensibly the story of a single woman’s search for love, or of
newly-wedded life, of infidelity, infertility, an impending birth, the ups and downs
of motherhood, a career crisis, addiction, betrayal or grief, a chick-lit novel’s
narrative trajectory is always essentially one of self-discovery and personal
development, a journey of emotional maturation. As Lissner points out, there is
“one thing [chick-lit heroines] all have in common [—] they’ve got something to
learn” (14). To this end, chick-lit novels always end on a high note; their
heroines are hopeful, if not ecstatically happy.

THE GENESIS OF A GENRE
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Suzanne Ferriss and Mallory Young, editors of Chick-Lit: The New Woman’s
Fiction, discuss the genre’s beginnings:
When we consider the origins of chick-lit, a single urtext clearly presents itself: Helen
Fielding’s Bridget Jones’s Diary [N] The entire chick-lit phenomenon is invariably
traced back to this single novel. But [N] the genesis of chick-lit may not be so simple
(4).

Bridget Jones’s Diary, published in the UK in 1996 and subsequently in the US
in 1998, is indeed almost universally considered “the defining” and original
chick-lit text (Whelehan, TFB 191). As Whelehan contends, “its significance
moves far beyond the context of bestselling fiction and Bridget Jones the
character is notorious as the definitive single girl” (TFB 173). However, the
largely unquestioned progenitory status of Fielding’s phenomenally popular
novel is, as Ferriss and Young signal, actually somewhat dubious. For instance,
as Keyes tellingly observes, she and Fielding, “both comic writers who cover
‘ordinary’ women’s issues [N] started writing around the same time”
(“Biographical Sketch” 7) — in fact, their respective debut chick-lit offerings,
Fielding’s Bridget and Keyes’s Watermelon, were published in the very same
year, and on the same side of the Atlantic. The prolific Keyes immediately
consolidated the success of Watermelon with her sophomore effort, Lucy
Sullivan Is Getting Married, which, along with Green’s first novel, Straight
Talking, was published in 1997. Green herself contests the singularity of
Fielding’s contribution to the genre, claiming, “Straight Talking [N] became a
huge bestseller and together with Bridget Jones’s Diary launched the
phenomenon that came to be known as ‘chick-lit’” (The Book Show 3).5
Published in the US in 1996, and the UK in 1997, Sex and the City is generally
considered “a second major source along with Bridget Jones’s Diary” (Ferriss
and Young 6).
Perhaps, as Colgan argues, the fact that multiple, similarly themed and
constructed novels suddenly, simultaneously began being published in the late
1990s suggests a general dissatisfaction with the types of popular novels that
5

Emphasis added.
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were being written by and for women in the preceding period. The early works
of Fielding, Keyes, Green and Bushnell are, then, arguably manifestations of
this dissatisfaction, offering realistic responses to the Jackie Collins-esque
“thick, shiny brick novels covered in gold foil in which women with long blonde
hair built up business empires from harsh beginnings using only their
extraordinary beauty” (Colgan in Whelehan, TFB 203), as well as to the equally
fanciful, ever popular Harlequin Mills & Boon romances, wherein reside
extreme and inhuman images of femininity. Whelehan considers the women
who inhabit the pages of chick-lit to be the “rebellious daughter[s] of the
bonkbuster heroine[s]” (TFB 175). Weinberg also considers chick-lit something
of a literary backlash, calling Bridget Jones’s Diary “a breath of fresh air after
the riches-and-romance titles that [previously] dominated bestseller lists [N],
like Danielle Steel’s The Ranch” (3).
These initial texts, now considered chick-lit classics, share a great deal, in that
they are primarily the stories of educated, financially independent single women
— or, singletons, as Fielding famously (re)named them — awkwardly balancing
the demands of friendships, family, career and, of course, the urban dating
scene. Most of the genre’s earliest offerings share this focus on their
protagonist’s single status, and, as such, can be aptly described as “singletonlit”. Examples include Laura Zigman’s Animal Husbandry, which was published
in 1998, along with Bank’s The Girls’ Guide to Hunting and Fishing, Fielding’s
follow-up, Bridget Jones: The Edge of Reason, Keyes’s Last Chance Saloon,
and Green’s second novel, Mr Maybe, all published in 1999.
The turn of the century saw the evolution of chick-lit, with a number of distinct
sub-genres emerging, each of which conformed to chick-lit’s definitive
conventions yet complicated or departed from the genre’s original and
customary focus. Perhaps the most successful and recognisable of these is
that colloquially known as “assistant-lit” — stories of young, downtrodden
career women, struggling daily with the unreasonable demands of their
dictatorial bosses and the injustices of an overtly patriarchal corporate world.
Emma McLaughlin and Nicola Kraus’s The Nanny Diaries (2002) was the first
of these, and together with Lauren Weisberger’s The Devil Wears Prada (2003)
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established this recognisable generic offshoot. These authors have continued
to dominate this particular sub-genre via their respective subsequent offerings,
Citizen Girl (2004) and Everyone Worth Knowing (2005).
Green’s Babyville (2001) heralded an alternative sub-generic direction for
chick-lit. “Mummy-lit”, as it has come to be known — “mom-lit” in the US — is
centrally concerned with the plethoric perils of parenting:
The mother and baby group is a last resort. Sam thought she was prepared for
motherhood. She thought she’d be happy strolling around the streets with her
OshKosh B’Gosh-clad child, smiling benevolently at all she passed. The perfect
mother with the perfect child. [N] Sure, she had expected exhaustion and sleepdeprivation, and she knew she wouldn’t have any more time for herself [N], but nothing
had prepared her for the loneliness and the boredom (Green, Babyville 325).

The heroines of these stories variously encounter failed attempts to conceive,
accidental pregnancy, the uncomfortable physical realities of pregnancy and
childbirth, the loneliness of new motherhood, the isolation of stay-at-home
mothering, and the challenges of balancing commitments to children, partners,
friends, and employers. Weiner’s Little Earthquakes (2004) and Goodnight
Nobody (2005) also exemplify this sub-genre. Both Green and Weiner
diversified into mummy-lit after becoming mothers themselves, a fact that adds
weight to claims that chick-lit is often at least partially autobiographical.
In “Hip Lit For Hip Chicks”, Vnuk claims that “chick-lit comes in plenty of
flavours” (7), before going on to list numerous sub-generic categories, such as
“Christian-lit” — dubbed “Bridget Jones goes to church” — and “bride-lit” —
tales of marriage proposals and the various crises that occur in their wake,
exemplified by titles such as Green’s The Other Woman and Kinsella’s
Shopaholic Ties the Knot. Some of the sub-generic variations Vnuk refers to
arguably depart too far from chick-lit’s essential and prescriptive hallmarks to
be accurately labelled as such. However, if chick-lit is first and foremost a
genre written by, for and about women, “lad-lit”, stories of young urban men
authored by the likes of Nick Hornby and Mike Gayle, arguably constitutes a
digression so drastic it comprises an entirely separate genre. As John G.
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Cawelti explains, each genre “has its own set of limits that determine what kind
of new and unique elements are possible without straining the formula to
breaking point” (10). In order for chick-lit to continue to have a generic identity,
and in order to meaningfully explore and analyse the genre, it must at the very
least retain those elements that help to distinguish it from other literary forms.
“Looking at the diversity of chick-lit available today”, Whelehan observes, “it
would be fair to say that it becomes more difficult to identify the core formula
and claim that the women depicted are all latter-day Bridget Joneses” (TFB 17).
Chick-lit’s current assortment of plot developments and ostensible thematic
concerns also annul claims such as those of Scarlett Thomas, who derides
what she terms the genre’s “join-the-dots plots” (5), and Whitney Otto, who
claims the generic requirements are so specific that “to be considered chick-lit
[N] enormous similarities to previous books within the genre are almost
inevitable” (12).

CHICK-LIT’S POLARISED RECEPTION
In April, 2006, Kaavya Viswanathan’s literary debut, How Opal Mehta Got
Kissed, Got Wild, and Got a Life, was pulled from the market after the author
“acknowledged mimicking portions of another writer’s work” (McNamara 1).
Following Viswanathan’s admission that she had “unintentional[ly]” and
“unconscious[ly]” (Strauss 7) borrowed — verbatim — from the oeuvre of chicklit novelist Megan McCafferty, The New York Times discovered that she had
also blatantly plagiarised Kinsella’s Can You Keep A Secret? This incident has
provided chick-lit’s detractors with ammunition. They claim that Opal Mehta
neatly demonstrates the degree to which the genre is formulaic and prescribed.
In their coverage of fellow student Viswanathan’s demise, David Zhou and
Paras D. Bhayani, of The Harvard Crimson, note:
Few — if any — “chick-lit” works have ever received the level of intense scrutiny that
6

Opal Mehta is now enduring. And it is not clear whether the new allegations suggest
6

The extremity of Viswanathan’s borrowing clearly exceeds conformity to generic conventions.
The Sydney Morning Herald provides the following example — one of numerous:
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further plagiarism, or whether Viswanathan is simply employing tropes that are widelyused in the genre (3).

Otto’s diatribe, condemning the genre for its predictability, was also inspired by
the discovery of Viswanathan’s racketeering. “If the recent rash of novels
classified as chick-lit were laid end to end”, she claims, “you would have the
equivalent of a tract-house development” (1). She also refers to chick-lit’s
“paint-by-numbers” approach (8), a dig at what she perceives as the genre’s
inherent lack of creativity and originality.
Criticism of the genre for being generic is almost as old and ubiquitous as the
genre itself. Jessica Jernigan of Bitch Magazine, for example, is perturbed by
what she sees as chick-lit’s “cloying sameness” (Ferriss and Young 7). Another
repetitive and derisive claim critics make is that the novels are simply and
uniformly “poorly written” (Blank 4). The writing is repeatedly labelled
“hackneyed and boring and bad” (Anonymous), usually without evidence or
explanation. Such claims are arguably misguided, given that, in most cases,
chick-lit novels “in their content, packaging and promotion do not claim to be
literary rather than popular fiction” (Wells 64).
The most vociferous and divergent reactions to chick-lit, however, are
ideologically rather than aesthetically based. Given its primacy, Bridget Jones’s
Diary is often singled out as a representative of the genre. Ms. Magazine,
arguably one of the more authoritative popular purveyors of feminism,
published a fulsome review of Fielding’s infamous tome subsequent to its US
release, declaring it “an endearing and welcome addition to modern feminist
literature” (Michaels 91). Michiko Kakutani of the New York Times, however,
espoused a contrary reading of the novel, labelling its eponymous heroine a
“pre-feminist throwback” (10). Despite Fielding’s protestations that Bridget
Jones’s Diary was written with the simple intent of “mak[ing] people laugh”

“In one scene in Can You Keep A Secret [N] the main character, Emma, comes upon
two friends ‘in a full-scale argument about animal rights,” and one says, “The mink liked
being made into coats.’ In Kaavya Viswanathan’s book, Opal encounters two girls
having ‘a full-fledged debate over animal rights’. ‘The foxes want to be made into
scarves,’ one of them says.”
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(Applewhite 14), the novel’s frequent and explicit references to feminism —
Bridget pretends to be reading Susan Faludi’s “five-hundred-page feminist
treatise” (14), for instance — set intriguingly alongside a boy-meets-girl
narrative arc, warrant feminist critique.
Inciting both the ire and approval of feminists, chick-lit is perhaps most notable
for the striking polarity of its ideological interpretations. Literary critics and
reviewers alike have generally advocated one of two conflicting feminist
appraisals of the genre — it is either celebrated as being “genuine[ly]
subversive” (Daum 158) and progressive in its often parodic engagement with
issues of gender and sex, or is criticised for its rehashing of the traditional
mass-market romance plot, labelled “fluffy find-your-man fiction” (Bristow 52), a
retrograde rebuff of what Bridget Jones herself refers to as “strident” feminism
(20). Penny Dick, for one, concurs with the latter:
It seems to me that [N] what [these books confirm] is that the female identity continues
to be largely constituted through a discourse that puts the pursuit of a meaningful
heterosexual relationship as the be-and-end-all of a woman’s existence (485).

Germaine Greer famously dismissed Bridget Jones’s Diary as “an updated
version of the old [Harlequin] Mills & Boon scenario” (The Whole Woman 247).
Whelehan likewise observes the novel’s “compelling similarities to the low-brow
mass-market romance formula” (Helen Fielding’s Bridget Jones’s Diary
(‘HFBJD’) 20). She extends this comparison to the genre at large, perceiving
chick-lit as little more than a “repackag[ing]”, and later, a “reprise” of the “classic
formula found in [Harlequin Mills & Boon]” (TFB 6, 210). Others find chick-lit’s
departure from the conventions of the typical romance novel more noteworthy.
As Zeisler observes, for instance, “only a very small number of [chick-lit]
heroines ask us to believe that they’re walking off into the sunset, ring on finger,
in the last paragraph” (8). Kathryn Robinson similarly notes that “the exotic
locations”, the “dashing but brooding tycoon” and the “ever-so-genteel heroine”
— all hallmarks of the Harlequin Mills & Boon format — are each absent from
the pages of chick-lit (12). Chick-lit is variously considered to be conventional
romance’s “offshoot” (Rapping in Millard 17), polar opposite or satiric progeny –
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feminist responses to the genre frequently discuss it in terms of its relationship
to Harlequin Mills & Boon.
Underscoring this persistent tendency — both journalistic and scholarly — to
compare chick-lit to the mass-produced Harlequin Mills & Boon novel is the fact
that a number of chick-lit novelists began their careers as practitioners of the
Harlequin Mills & Boon romance. Jennifer Crusie, the prolific author of chick-lit
titles such as Faking It (2002) and Bet Me (2004), had a total of eight romance
novels published by Harlequin Mills & Boon, before making the generic switch
in the late 1990s. Prior to her success as the author of the best-selling Bridget,
Fielding wrote and submitted conventional romance to Harlequin Mills & Boon,
only to be brusquely rejected. One only has to imagine the incongruous
prospect of Bridget Jones masquerading as a perfect, prudish and petite
Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine to realise that Greer’s cursory summation of the
novel is perhaps somewhat simplistic and skewed.
Another fact that has encouraged the linkage of these two arguably disparate
genres is the existence of Red Dress Ink. Established in 2001 in response to
chick-lit’s ascendant popularity, Red Dress Ink is an imprint of Harlequin Mills &
Boon that specialises in chick-lit. As Natalie Danford explains, its creation
“fuelled speculation that chick-lit was pecking away” at the Harlequin Mills &
Boon audience (1). Lissner admits that she “swears” to people that, although
her “publisher is an imprint of Harlequin [Mills & Boon]”, her novel, Carrie Pilby,
is “not a romance” (6). This seemingly casual confession exemplifies the
unsettling anxiety that is produced by claims of generic parallelism.
The Harlequin Mills & Boon novel has long been the subject of feminist
analysis, perceived as a “potent [and pervasive] ideological tool” that
“validat[es] and recommend[s] a specific social order” (Krzyszycha). Merja
Makinen describes the Harlequin Mills & Boon novel as “one of the last
bastions against feminism” (30), given that it is premised on what Anne CrannyFrancis argues is a discursive “naturalisation” of a “particular” and restrictive
“kind of male and female subject” (203). Most feminist evaluations of the genre
firmly concur. A number of feminist critiques of the Harlequin Mills & Boon
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novel, however, have employed an ethnographic, reader-response approach so
as to enable arguments for its feminist potential. Alison Light, for instance,
focuses on the ways in which these texts figure in the lives of their readers,
ultimately arguing that “though not progressive, the reading of romantic fictions
may be transgressive — a forbidden pleasure, like cream cakes” (Taylor 65).
This construal of transgression is questionable insofar as it indirectly endorses
and perpetuates the status quo by way of functioning as a quasi-liberating,
fantastical escape for housewives who are unhappy due to their own domestic
servitude.
The following commentary, then, moves away from this critical trend. It marks a
twenty-first century return to textual analysis of the mass-market romance, and
as such is limited to interpretation of the texts themselves, the women and men
that inhabit their pages and the gendered attributes they appear to recommend.
This chapter ultimately endeavours to demonstrate that, textually, even the
most recent incarnations of the Harlequin Mills & Boon brand fail to withstand
feminist scrutiny. It also aims to demonstrate that chick-lit, via its flagship,
singleton-lit titles, explicitly counters these failings. In offering this argument,
this thesis aims to respond to Cranny-Francis’s rallying claim that “feminist
rewritings of the romance are not easy to find” (178).
In the chick-lit debate, the Harlequin Mills & Boon novel unvaryingly operates
as a signifier of pre-feminism, an ideological barometer. Parallels drawn
between chick-lit and the supermarket romance are used to further the
argument for chick-lit’s regressive gender politics, whereas instances of
seeming resistance to the trappings of the Harlequin Mills & Boon novel are
cited by those wishing to dissociate chick-lit from its alleged literary
antecedents. The following comparative feminist analysis of chick-lit and the
Harlequin Mills & Boon romance seeks to investigate and complicate their
controversial association.

A NOTE ON THE SELECTION OF SPECIFIC TEXTS
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In order to meaningfully address chick-lit’s controversial “repackag[ing]”
(Whelehan, TFB 6) of the conventional romance, the following comparative
ideological appraisal will be limited to examples of singleton-lit, which, much
like the Harlequin Mills & Boon novel, have matters of the heart at their heart
and almost always end in romantic resolution. This chapter will demonstrate
that even those chick-lit novels that foreground the romantic entanglements of
their respective heroines succeed in departing quite dramatically from the
conventions of the Harlequin Mills & Boon romance — that chick-lit is more
than a “souped-up, sexed-up” (Whelehan, TFB 16) rehashing of its alleged
generic predecessor.
Similarly, the Harlequin Mills & Boon novel will be solely represented by Sexy
titles, given their proliferation — eight are issued per month, as opposed to only
six Desire and four Temptation, for instance — and that they are selfdeclaredly sexually progressive, “sophisticated” takes on romance
(eharlequin.com.au). It would be unfair to cite Sweet titles given that they are
the brand’s most openly conservative examples. In order to counter claims that
chick-lit is simply a twenty-first century incarnation of the popular romance, the
following comparison will solely refer to twenty-first century Harlequin Mills &
Boon publications, which are quite literally contemporary manifestations of the
genre. This chapter will demonstrate that, within these novels, much of what
Greer terms “the paraphernalia of romance” has endured intact (The Female
Eunuch (‘TFE’) 200).
Alison Scott complains that, unlike “other areas of popular fiction, such as
mystery, science fiction, and adventure, the entire genre of romance is typically
understood by reference to its worst examples” (216). To prevent such
charges, I have specifically consulted the oeuvre of Emma Darcy7 — romance
novelist extraordinaire, author of hundreds of Harlequin Mills & Boon titles,
founder of the Emma Darcy Award Contest, which assists aspiring authors to
complete their manuscripts, and writer of industry guide, The Secrets of

7

Emma Darcy is actually the pen name of the Australian husband-wife writing team, Frank and
Wendy Brennan.
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Successful Romance Writing — along with numerous other exemplary titles.

HARLEQUIN MILLS & BOON IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Given the extensiveness of Greer’s critical engagement with the Harlequin Mills
& Boon novel, along with her famed participation in the chick-lit debate, it is
perhaps appropriate to begin with her musings on the figure of the romantic
hero. In 1970, Greer described him as “a man of masterful ways, clearly
superior to his beloved in at least one respect, usually in several, being older or
of higher social rank and attainment or more intelligent” (TFE 196). He is often
quite literally his lover’s superior: Nathan, Tommy and Jared King, the heroes of
Darcy’s twenty-first century Kings of the Outback trilogy, are each the
employers of their respective heroines, who are thereby necessarily beholden
and subordinate to their men. In every instance — the title of Sara Wood’s In
The Billionaire’s Bed is particularly telling — the romantic hero is wildly wealthy,
a detail that functions as a marker of his suitability for the position of husband,
father and provider, and as a signifier of masculine clout.
As Ann Rosalind Jones adds, the Harlequin Mills & Boon hero is also “saturnine
in appearance” and “sexually expert” (Radford 198). Rafe Santini, the hero of
Chantelle Shaw’s 2006 novel His Private Mistress, is described in typically
phallic and threatening terms:
His hard features were schooled into a mask of polite interest, the chiselled perfection
of his bone structure, the aquiline nose and heavy black brows from beneath which
gleamed eyes the colour of polished jet [N] He was taller than any man in the room but
it wasn’t just his height and the breadth of his shoulders that drew attention, it was his
air of authority, his power and magnificent arrogance (7, 34).

Nathan King, the hero of The Cattle King’s Mistress (2000), is similarly
physically menacing:
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His face could have been carved out of brown granite — all hard, sharp planes. Even
the curves of his mouth seemed carved, defined emphatically, as though to deny any
softness (18).

This hardness is triply significant. To begin with, it “bespeaks [the hero’s]
capacity to satisfy a woman” (Larcombe 45): Mitch Tyler of Darcy’s The
Outback Wedding Takeover (2004), for example, makes love with customary
“knowing sensuality” (125). As Ann Barr Snitow observes, the Harlequin Mills &
Boon novel is replete with “phallic worship” (144). Given the genre’s requisite
coded, shadowy descriptions of genitalia and sexual interaction, however,
penile rigidity is conveyed metonymically via oblique references to the hero’s
“hard, sculpted” facial features (Mortimer 5) and “rock-hard” thighs (Darcy, The
Pleasure King’s Bride 49). Such hardness also denotes an unbridled,
elemental, extreme masculinity — Sheikh Rashid of The Sheikh’s Virgin Bride
is surrounded by a “testosterone-laden aura” (Jordan 7). Perhaps most
significant, however, is the “barely suppressed violence” it suggests (CrannyFrancis 182).
In The Secrets of Successful Romance Writing, Darcy dictates that a Harlequin
Mills & Boon hero should never be “violent” (59), yet each of her own heroic
creations share a worrying “propensity to physically restrain” their heroines
(Modleski, OWT 77). Luc Peretti, the hero of Darcy’s 2005 novel, The Italian’s
Stolen Bride, is particularly guilty of this. At one point, he winds “a long tress of
[Skye’s] hair around his hand to hold her there” (58); later “he grab[s] her hand,
squeezing it so hard she [cries] out his name in protest” (155). The language
employed in Harlequin Mills & Boon publications is replete with barely disguised
sexual aggression: women are routinely “pinn[ed]”, “still[ed]” (Darcy, The Cattle
King’s Mistress 43, 70), and “imprisoned” (Wood 98) even, quite literally,
“bruise[d]” (Shaw, His Secretary Mistress 94) by their suitors.
Feminists have taken particular exception to the undisguised brutality of the
hero’s sexual advances, depicted as a corollary of his heightened manliness.
As David Margolies explains:
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Because the hero’s unpleasant characteristics, his violence and bad behaviour are
made inseparable from his desired qualities — his physical strength and force of
personality — they become signs of the desired qualities and are therefore validated
(7).

Sex is frequently portrayed in strikingly violent terms:
Her first instinct was to resist, and it was a desperate attempt at self-preservation that
had her beating her fists against his shoulders [N] In reply, he merely tightened his grip
and hauled her up close against his chest while his hand at her nape angled her head,
so that there was no escape from his mouth, which seemed intent on taking everything
she was so unwilling to give (Shaw, His Private Mistress 73).

There is nothing understated or suggestive about this rape scene. This sexual
scenario is an incontrovertible instance of violence as denotative of virility —
albeit, violence masquerading as passion, brutality ostensibly functioning “as a
manifestation, not of contempt, but of love” (Modleski, “The Disappearing Act”
439). Modleski contends that it is “the function of [the Harlequin Mills & Boon
novel] to explain” — and thereby endorse — masculine aggression (Loving
With A Vengeance 40). These texts quite blatantly eroticise and romanticise
sexual violence:
She closed her eyes and focused on feeling him inside her, no longer caring what it
meant for him, wanting to recapture all the sensations she had forgotten, the rippling
pleasures of the rhythm, the build-up of intense physical excitement. And Luc delivered.
He had always delivered. Not usually as roughly as this. But it had its exciting edge,
too, knowing control had been sabotaged by need (Darcy, The Italian’s Stolen Bride
55).

Harlequin Mills & Boon heroines are rarely given the chance to refuse sex; they
tend to have their desires dictated to them:
“Let’s do something about those urges, shall we?” he breathed against her throat, but
as she shook her head, murmuring a despairing protest, his fingers tightened in her
hair.
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“Don’t even try to tell me you don’t want this,” he hissed (Shaw, His Private Mistress
155).

When these women do attempt to verbally protest, they are often silenced:
He leaned across the bed and her cry of outraged denial was muffled beneath the force
of his lips as he initiated a kiss that was a flagrant assault of her senses (Shaw, His
Private Mistress 113).

The Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine is always significantly younger than her
lover — her relative youth emphasises his dominance and authority, as do
instances wherein she is explicitly likened to a child. The following passage
from Lindsay Armstrong’s The Rich Man’s Virgin (2005), for instance, has quite
startling paedophilic undertones:
He gazed at her. She was still pale, but her eyes were clear and she’d brushed her
hair into two ponytails tied with green bobbles.
She could have been about sixteen, he thought, a lovely, volatile child. Yet a brave
one who’d matched his ardour in anything but a childlike way until she’d made herself
sick (105-6).

The Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine is also classically, naturally, effortlessly
beautiful, and, as exemplified by Catherine Leigh of In The Billionaire’s Bed, is
“graceful in every movement”, projecting an easy “elegan[ce]” (94). These
qualities both denote and constitute her “perfect femininity” (Darcy, The
Pleasure King’s Bride 18), as do her “high” breasts (Wood 105). Miranda, The
Cattle King’s Mistress, is breathtakingly gorgeous, with soft hair that “gleam[s]”,
offset by silky “honey gold skin” that “glow[s]”, a “classical[ly perfect] face” and
a “lushly curved figure” (20). Likewise, Jenna Deane, the heroine of Shaw’s
2006 novel His Secretary Mistress, is described as being “exquisitely” beautiful,
“slender” and “petite”, her mouth “soft and full”, her eyes “velvet grey [N]
fringed by gold-tipped lashes” (6-7). Her natural beauty requires no cosmetic
enhancement — the most she ever applies is a “pale pink gloss” (7). As poststructuralist Chris Weedon observes, the Harlequin Mills & Boon romance
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offers women “modes of femininity [N] which deny their own [constructedness
and proclaim] themselves to be natural” (Feminism, Theory and the Politics of
Difference 165). As if to underscore Jenna’s connection to nature, her organic
femininity, she is said to smell “of lemons and rain, an earthy combination”
(Shaw, His Secretary Mistress 7). Samantha Connelly, the heroine of Darcy’s
The Playboy King’s Wife (2000) and possessor of naturally glossy “copper
curls” (7), is preferred to her nemesis, Janice Findlay, whose “auburn hair”
comes “out of a bottle” (39).
As Linda Alcoff explains, “women have always been defined as a subjugated
difference within a binary opposition. To assert essential gender difference [N]
is to reinvoke this oppositional structure”, since there is “never any pure
difference without domination” (415, 417). This is precisely what occurs in the
Harlequin Mills & Boon romance, which is premised on this very dichotomy.
The heroine’s inflated femininity matches the hero’s overstated masculinity,
thereby exaggerating the demarcation of the sexes and enacting the
“dichotomising break” (Rivkin and Ryan 572) upon which binaric notions of
gender, long lamented by feminists, depend. Nowhere is this polarised
construction of gender more explicitly apparent than in The Cattle King’s
Mistress, wherein the hero’s excessive manliness is repeatedly, literally
proclaimed:
She wished he wasn’t quite so big, so overwhelmingly male. It made her ridiculously
conscious of being female [...] Everything about him seemed to shout elemental male
(24, 66).

The Rich Man’s Virgin similarly literalises this construction. Jack McKinnon is
said to be “so essentially masculine it [is] impossible to be in his company
without a sense of man versus woman coming into the equation” (25).
Harlequin Mills & Boon’s essentialised approach to gender difference is
constructed and compounded via a series of binary oppositions. Whilst the
specifics do vary from text to text, what is uniform is the enactment of sharply
delineated gender-based differences — what Darcy refers to as “dynamic
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contrasts” (Successful Romance Writing 66). For instance, the hero is
frequently depicted as excessively tall and imposing, whereas his bride-to-be is
often notably small in stature, and slender. Kathryn of The Outback Wedding
Takeover is suitably tiny, with the top of her head just reaching Mitch’s chin
(22). The disparate bodies of slim-figured Skye and “broad-shouldered [N],
muscular” Luc (Darcy, The Italian’s Stolen Bride 22) delineate their gendered
polarity. Given that numerous Harlequin Mills & Boon heroes are of
Mediterranean descent, they are often dark-haired and olive-skinned. In
contrast to Alex Morrell, who is typically swarthy, Jenna has skin so pale it is
“almost translucent” (Shaw, His Secretary Mistress 7). This particular disparity
also figures in Lynne Graham’s The Italian Boss’s Mistress (2003), where
Andreo D’Alessio has “sleek bronzed skin”, whereas Pippa Stevenson’s skin is
likened to “porcelain” (49-50). A disproportionate number of Harlequin Mills &
Boon heroines are fair-skinned redheads, thereby visually marked as dissimilar
to their men.
An exaggeratedly steely, sculpted physicality is, as mentioned above, a
requisite characteristic of the Harlequin Mills & Boon hero. So as to underline
their gendered polarity, the heroine is contrastingly physically pliant. “The
softness” of March Calendar’s body, for example, “curve[s] into Will’s as if it
were the other half of the hard contours of his” (Mortimer 46). Where Jared is
angular and “hard”, with a “strongly boned face” (10), The Pleasure King’s
Bride, Christabel Valdez, is “lush[ly] curve[d]”, her flesh “soft” and “yielding” (72,
122).
Another oft-featured discrepancy exists in the differing degrees to which the
hero and his heroine are sexually skilled. As is immediately apparent in their
titles, novels such as The Rich Man’s Virgin and Penny Jordan’s The Sheikh’s
Virgin Bride (2003) feature virginal female protagonists who are deflowered by
their respective husbands-to-be. Even those Harlequin Mills & Boon heroines
who have had some sexual experience almost always profess to that
experience being somewhat limited or lacking. Both Catherine of In The
Billionaire’s Bed and Jenna of His Secretary Mistress admit, post-coitus, to
having had only one previous lover — and as Jenna adds, “it was never like
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that with [him]” (142). The fact that these women are sexually inexpert is only
made more apparent by the obviously experience-enhanced sexual prowess of
their lovers. Reminiscing about the first, youthful instalment of their relationship,
Eden recalls that Rafe had been her “first and only lover, but to him she had
been just another notch on the bedpost” (Shaw, His Private Mistress 35).
Frequent conspicuous allusions to Adam and Eve and their Garden of Eden, a
story that originated in Genesis and is famously depicted and revised in John
Milton’s epic poem, Paradise Lost, underscore Harlequin Mills & Boon’s binaric
construction of gender. Greg Smith explores at length the “rigid separateness
implicit in the patriarchal system of binary opposites advocated in Paradise
Lost” (?). Via numerous, gendered oppositions — Adam is associated with
“autoritie” and “absolute rule”, Eve with “subjection” and “submission”, he with
culture, “contemplation” and “wisdom” (“Book IV”), she with nature, “inferiour, in
the mind” (“Book VIII”) — Milton succeeds in “reinforcing the idea that men and
women are not different but opposite” (Greg Smith 340). Smith notes that “the
pair are invariably referred to as ‘Adam and Eve’, and not ‘Eve and Adam’” —
“again, the first term occupies the privileged position” (344). Darcy’s Kings of
the Outback trilogy, encompassing The Cattle King’s Mistress, The Playboy
King’s Wife and The Pleasure King’s Bride, is a twenty-first century
reincarnation of this paradigmatic construction of gender. The action takes
place at King’s Eden, a fictional cattle station and tourist resort whose name
and stunning landscape facilitates repeated references to the Garden of Eden,
references which highlight the similarities between these romances and what is
generally considered the first romance — the story of Adam and Eve. In The
Billionaire’s Bed similarly engages intertextually with Paradise Lost. Catherine
physically resembles Milton’s Eve — her “pre-Raphaelite hair” (5) is said to
“cascade in thick waves down her lissom back from an imprisoning twist of [N]
ivy” (17), from which it routinely escapes, reminiscent of Eve’s “dissheveld [N]
wanton ringlets” (“Book IV”). The action occurs against the backdrop of fictional
Tresanton Island, a paradisaical space in which Edenic, gendered binary
oppositions are enacted.
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Margolies notes that another of feminism’s grievances against Harlequin Mills &
Boon is that the heroine is almost unvaryingly solitary; “there is no sisterhood”
(9). Jones also observes this absence, claiming, “woman-to-woman
relationships are [invariably] tangential or fraught” (214). She is, as Mairead
Owen remarks, “curiously socially isolated” (541):
Skye herself had been an only child of an only child — no aunts or uncles or cousins.
Her pregnancy, having the baby, caring for her mother through the bouts of
chemotherapy that had proved useless in the end N the friendships she’d made at
university had just dwindled away. Then setting up her massage business N no time
for making social contacts [N] It had been a very closeted life those past few years. A
lonely life (Darcy, The Italian’s Stolen Bride 12).

The heroine’s solitude is a necessary prelude to and consequence of the
absolute primacy and singularity of the relationship between the heroine and
her hero, which is indicative of the genre’s basic premise that “the greatest goal
and pleasure in a woman’s life is the love of a good man” (Jones 211). This
goal is inevitably realised in the final few pages, wherein we witness the hero
professing his monogamous intentions:
“Marry me?” he asked huskily as he trailed a line of kisses down her neck to the pulse
that beat frantically at its base [N] “I love you, [Eden], always, for the rest of my life”
(Shaw, His Private Mistress 186-7).

“In a [Harlequin Mills & Boon] romance”, Darcy declares, “there is a man.
There is a woman. There is a relationship. Nothing else matters. Nothing else
is of any consequence” (Successful Romance Writing 2). The last lines of In
The Billionaire’s Bed echo this statement:
She exchanged a loving smile with Zach. She felt free from her troubles at last. She
had everything she could want in the world [N] Nothing else mattered.
Just love. Pure and simple (186).

The majority of Harlequin Mills & Boon publications are named so as to
immediately indicate their singular concern. His Private Mistress, The Playboy
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King’s Wife, The Rich Man’s Virgin, The Italian’s Stolen Bride — each of these
semantically position the hero as the subject, the heroine as the object. In the
Harlequin Mills & Boon novel, the heroine exists only in relation to her hero. Its
depiction of her life is ultimately limited to her interaction with him.

RESPONDING TO THE HARLEQUIN MILLS & BOON ROMANCE
Chick-lit is in dialogue with both the Harlequin Mills & Boon formula and the
feminist commentaries pertaining to that formula, which is arguably the reason
for its complex reception. Via feminism, these novels recast a number of
Harlequin Mills & Boon’s most problematic pre-feminist components, whilst
largely remaining bound by its conventional narrative trajectory. Blatant
instances of intertextuality simultaneously announce the reactive link between
chick-lit and Harlequin Mills & Boon and invite comparisons between the newer
genre and its generic precursor. Bridget Jones’s Diary, for instance, selfconsciously appropriates Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice — the plot is lifted
in toto from Austen’s canonical novel, while Bridget diarises her viewing of the
acclaimed 1995 BBC televisual adaptation. Given that Austen’s novel is
widely8 “held to be one of the models for the modern [Harlequin] Mills & Boon
style romance” (Whelehan, HFBJD 31), these overt allusions explicitly
encourage readers to interpret the text as a renegotiation of the romance’s rigid
conventions. Bridget Jones: The Edge of Reason also engages intertextually
with Austen’s oeuvre; this time, Persuasion figures both as a basis for the plot
and as a chapter title.
Numerous chick-lit titles refer explicitly to the Harlequin Mills & Boon romance,
at once acknowledging their generic heredity and asserting their difference.
Holly of Behaving Like Adults recalls the damaging effect her exposure to
fanciful romantic heroes had on her own relationship:
I started out as a tea girl and made enough nuisance of myself to end up editing
romantic novels. I spent days with the likes of the Count Von Sarsparillo, his craggy
8

Modleski, for one, concurs, claiming, “Harlequin [Mills & Boon novels] can be traced back
through the work of Charlotte Bronte and Jane Austen (LWAV 15).
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jaw, his dark flashing eyes, his brooding castle in Monte Carlo, his Lamborghini Diablo,
his throbbing manhood, his fiery Latin temper [N] — no wonder coming home to Nick
became a bit of a let-down (93).

Watermelon’s Claire routinely and self-consciously employs the coded
language common to the supermarket romance:
I can’t describe what was going on below Adam’s waist because I can’t think of a word
that I feel comfortable with to describe his, well, you know, his [N] Well, in the absence
of a moniker that I like I’m going to resort to the language of Mills & Boon and call it his
Throbbing Manhood (381).

Tasha of Straight Talking likewise derides herself for sounding “like a romantic
novel” (29) — meaning, clichéd and sentimental, whereas Getting Over It’s
Helen confesses to having had an adolescent obsession with the brand:
When I was fifteen and never been kissed [N] I fed the hunger on a gluttonous diet of
pre-1970s Mills & Boons. The willowy innocence of these paperback heroines was as
far removed from my fat chastity as a diamond from a lump of coal, but nonetheless
gave me hope that one day I’d swoon at the sight of — ooh let’s say a gunfight, and a
powerful, masterful aquiline-nosed businessman would spring from his immaculate car,
gather up my flaccid form, and spirit me away to a life of love, happiness and endless
passion (10).

This passage depicts the Harlequin Mills & Boon novel as dangerously farcical,
positioning chick-lit as an antidote to such fancy. Indeed, chick-lit can be seen
to offer alternative, authentic exemplars of femininity and masculinity.

MODERATE MASCULINITY
The romantic hero is perhaps chick-lit’s most complex site of feminist revision.
Chick-lit texts challenge the extreme and hostile version of masculinity favoured
by Harlequin Mills & Boon in three distinct ways. The first and simplest of these
strategies sees the chick-lit heroine ultimately coupled with a man who
embodies a more moderate masculinity, positing as desirable a reduced,
dissident model of manliness. Whereas the Harlequin Mills & Boon hero has a
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taut, tanned, metonymically priapic physique, Simon of In Her Shoes has a
belly that “gentl[y] swell[s]” (257) and skin as “pale as skim milk” (36). A “good
three inches shorter” than Rose, he also fails to match the requisite
domineering height of the standard romantic hero — Nathan King of The Cattle
King’s Mistress, for instance, is “well over six foot” tall (17). Daniel, the love of
Lucy Sullivan’s life, similarly embodies a modified masculinity — Lucy
describes his body as “beautiful” in its dissimilarity to “those muscular
elaborately patterned ones that Chippendales seem to have” (730). The
unbridled image of manliness sanctioned by Harlequin Mills & Boon holds little
appeal for the chick-lit heroine, as typified Lucy:
“Oh listen, here’s a good one,” squeaked Charlotte. “Tall, muscular, hirsute N”
“Yuk,” I squirmed. “That’s not my type at all.” I was horrified by men [N] with big thighs
and hairy chests and huge unshaven jaws [N] (258, 413).

Manliness is equated with — literal — maturity in the Harlequin Mills & Boon
romance. Conversely, although actually five years Cath’s senior, James, of
Bookends, is described as “a child” (91), his youthful looks and boyishness
repeatedly observed, offer an inversion of Harlequin Mills & Boon’s tendency to
infantilise its heroines:
In his weekend gear again, he looks like the boy next door. These clothes suit him far
more than the suits. In the suits he somehow appears slightly uncomfortable, almost
like a little boy playing at being an adult (125).

Adam, of Watermelon, is six years younger than Claire. That he is also a
financially struggling student only serves to compound his transgression. Mr
Maybe’s Nick constitutes an even greater subversion. He is unemployed and
“doesn’t earn a penny” and for this reason is not, according to the dictates of
Harlequin Mills & Boon, “supposed to be The One” (1).
A second technique sees Mr Wrong, the chick-lit hero’s foil, in possession of
conventionally masculine qualities overplayed to such an extent they render
him grotesque. Body hair figures in the Harlequin Mills & Boon novel as a
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signifier of male potency — Luc Peretti, for example, has a “thick matt” of hair
on his chest (Darcy, The Italian’s Stolen Bride 53). Parodically, in Maxted’s
Getting Over It, the egotistical Marcus, on whom Helen has had a long term
and ultimately ill-advised “unrequited crush” (Maxted, Getting Over It 43), is so
hirsute she describes him as “scarily hairy” (218), which makes his excessive
masculinity repellent rather than appealing. Many months after uncovering the
infidelity of her former lover and boss, Jim Danvers, Rose, the heroine of
Weiner’s In Her Shoes, bumps into him:
He looked exactly the same. But what had she expected? That he’d wither up and die
without her? That hair would sprout out of his ears?
Come to think of it, she saw, he did have hair coming out of his ears. Not much, really,
not the kind of disgusting bristly growth she’d noticed coming out of other men’s ears,
but still N there it was. Ear hair (Weiner, In Her Shoes 345).

Lucy Sullivan’s description of her date Chuck certainly begins promisingly —
“medium height, tanned, dark hair, dark eyes, nice bones, a strong face” (419)
— but he is ultimately depicted as another grossly amplified manifestation of
masculinity, overly tanned, overly hard:
You know, now that I looked at him properly, he wasn’t so much bronzed as orange.
Not so much tanned, as tangerine [N] The face that looked so strong on first meeting
was actually immobile, unmoving, rigid (424-5).

In its quest to challenge Harlequin Mills & Boon’s overstated rendering of
masculinity, chick-lit also employs a third, double strategy, frequently depicting
its male lead as a hyperbolic version of the standard romantic hero, yet refusing
the essentialist implications of such a construction. Note, for instance, that is
with “heavy irony”, that Rachel of Keyes’s Rachel’s Holiday refers to her
boyfriend Luke as a “Real M[a]n” (34). The chick-lit hero’s explicit and
exaggerated mimicry of the archetypal romantic figure allows readers to readily
identify him as an ultimately subversive response to the Harlequin Mills & Boon
hero. Good In Bed is one of a number of novels that successfully deploy this
device.
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Good In Bed’s Dr K is “extremely tall” (39) and, being a doctor, is suitably
professionally successful. He has what Cannie describes as “an absurdly deep
voice” — a booming bass so exaggeratedly manly that Cannie likens it to that
of Barry White (39). Dr K’s qualifications for the role of romantic hero are
expressly established, only to be subsequently undermined — the reader’s
expectations, informed by exposure to the Harlequin Mills & Boon model of
masculinity, are likewise ultimately subverted. It turns out that the at-firstglance paradigmatic Dr K is in fact prematurely greying, and in possession of a
strikingly slender physique and a feminised, “gentle” nature (352). “I’m
probably not exactly what you had in mind”, he says to Cannie. “I’m not
glamorous or quick on my feet [N] I’m kind of a plodder, I guess” (373). These
novels endorse a mild, modified and thereby dissident model of manliness, so
as to undermine the man/woman dualism reliant upon the rigid opposition of
acute articulations of gender. Bushnell herself believes that the “idea of the
very masculine male is a myth that men desperately want to protect” (Levy 3).
Neither she, nor the genre she helped to establish, “buy into that whole idea
that there are huge differences between men and women” (Levy 36).

FICTIONAL FEMININITY AND JUDITH BUTLER’S THEORY OF
PERFORMATIVITY
In the Harlequin Mills & Boon romance, gender is denoted physically and
visually, inscribed on and via the body. The Sicilian’s Marriage Arrangement,
for instance, quite literally constructs gender as physically polarised:
Wearing only their swimsuits, masculine hair covered limbs slid against feminine
softness. The sensitive flesh of her inner thighs thrilled to the press of hard, sculpted
muscles (106).

These differences are visual markers of the hero/heroine, man/woman binary
so blatantly endorsed by the brand. As Asia Friedman explains, “the female
body and its differences from the male body have historically been stressed
primarily in order to serve as the grounds for naturalising social differences
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between men and women” (23). Chick-lit foregrounds the constructedness of
what is a seemingly natural physical disparity, portraying the female body as
contrived and gender classification — along with the hierarchised dichotomy
such categorisation enables — as consequently potentially contestable.
As discussed at some length in the Introduction, in her influential post-structural
text, Gender Trouble, Butler exposes the performative and, as such, illusory
quality of gender so as to challenge the man/woman binary. Via its
characteristically cynical and knowing depiction of femininity as forced, chick-lit
appears to share Butler’s sensibility. By repeatedly diarising her enactment of
gender, Bridget Jones herself, for instance, conveys Butler’s contention that
“being a woman” (Fielding, Bridget Jones’s Diary (‘BJD’) 30) in fact involves
conscious, concerted effort. Ashling of Sushi For Beginners similarly bemoans
beautification as burdensome:
Hair. On legs. Too much of it [N] Ashling repaired to the bathroom to stand in the
bath, her legs fizzing with noxious white stuff as she waited for the hairs to burn off.
She sighed. Sometimes it’s hard to be a woman (277-8).

9

Although both Bridget and Ashling claim to simply “be” women, they each
contradict this with detailed accounts of the feminising processes they
participate in, the articulations of gender they both practice and self-consciously
create. The chick-lit heroine’s knowing construction of her sexed body is at
odds with the effortless, organic femininity of the Harlequin Mills & Boon
heroine. Feminising processes such as depilation, cosmetic application and
exercise are entirely absent from the mass-market romance — the heroine’s
exaggeratedly feminine physique is an apparently natural manifestation of her
gender. The chick-lit heroine’s relentless and frequently futile struggle to effect
the trappings of femininity exposes the artificiality of those trappings. Her
comically flawed performance of femininity bespeaks the performativity of
gender. Rather than manufacturing an illusory image of essential femininity,
her awkward attempts to enact gender ultimately foreground its artifice. His

9

Emphasis added.
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Inherited Bride, Julia, exemplifies the standard hourglass figure of the
homogenous Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine:
His gaze roamed with heated masculine appreciation down the length of her body [N]
Noting [N] the long shapeliness of her legs, then travelling upwards again in a slow,
lingering appraisal of the smooth curve of her hips, and the upper swell of her high
proud breasts (Baird 43).

In The Edge of Reason, Bridget, “practising in outfit” (53), openly “rehears[es
the] particular movements, postures and configurations” (Potts 162) that
comprise her femininity prior to attending a function on the arm of Mark Darcy.
She manipulates her body, literally creating an hourglass physique with the
assistance of a “black rubber-like sheath” (51). Despite her careful
preparations, her portrayal of femininity is disastrous:
Unfortunately, in the dark of taxi, I had applied dark grey Mac eyeshadow to my cheeks
instead of blusher: the sort of thing that could happen to anyone, obviously, as
packaging identical (54).

And later:
We said our goodbyes, and set off across the room. “Er N Bridget,” he said, “I don’t
want to worry you. But you’ve got something slightly odd looking round your waist.”
Shot my hand down to check. Scary corset had somehow unravelled itself from both
ends turning into bulging roll round my waist like giant spare tyre (59).

By transparently wearing corsetry so as to fashion a distinctly feminine body,
Bridget exposes the fictionality of not only femininity, but of gender. She also
engages in the blatancy and artifice for which gender troubling drag has
become known and academically feted.
Camp features fairly consistently in chick-lit, usually embodied in the fabulous
figure of the heroine’s feminised gay friend. The deliciously camp Si of
Bookends dresses in drag to audition for a production of Cabaret. Although his
poor singing voice renders him unsuitable for the starring role of Sally Bowles,
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his shapely legs are the envy of the other — female — auditionees (2). Si
bequeaths his knowledge to Cath, expertly advising her how to best “do”
femininity. Cath, however, struggles to effectively adopt the practices he
dictates. Her refusal to even attempt to mimic the flawless femininity of the
Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine is downright subversive, particularly in contrast
to Si’s overt effeminacy. Au naturel, she is decidedly unlike her more
conventional counterparts, such as Christabel, The Pleasure King’s Bride,
whose femininity is signified by “glorious” hair that is apparently effortlessly
“silky” and “readily touchable” (18, 33):
[My hair] is a frizzy mess that [circles] my head rather like a fuzzy halo [N] I have a
bathroom cabinet stacked with various de-frizzing, smoothing products that Si keeps
accidentally-on-purpose leaving at my house, saying that he didn’t really need them
and I should keep them, but I just can’t be bothered. Occasionally I read the labels, but
invariably I forget to use them (Green, Bookends 30-1).

Rose Feller of In Her Shoes is another chick-lit heroine who struggles to
successfully enact femininity. In Her Shoes literalises the Butlerite claim that
gender is ultimately “a kind of impersonation” (Gender Trouble xxviii) — albeit
an impersonation of an impersonation of “idea of the natural” (31). With
characteristic stoic determination and attention to detail, teenage Rose, who
considers herself “inadequate, unfeminine, not pretty enough and way too big”
makes “careful notations of what women d[o]” (63):
“Nails curved, not straight!” she would write [N] She would watch her teachers,
neighbours, her sister, even the hair-netted ladies in the cafeteria, and try to figure out
10

how girls and women were supposed to be

(63-4).

As Watermelon’s Claire laments, the Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine always
looks “absolutely beautiful in a totally innocent and natural way” (586). Green is
particularly cognisant of the irony in attempting to achieve natural beauty via
the heavy-handed application of cosmetics. Portia of Bookends and Tasha of
Straight Talking each give the immediate impression of flawless organic
feminine splendour, yet a closer inspection reveals the truth:
10

Emphasis added.
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There is something about [Portia’s] appearance that looks effortless. If you look closely
you will see that she is wearing make-up, and quite a lot of it at that, but unless you are
standing nose to nose, she looks naturally beautiful, as if she has just fallen out of bed,
brushed her hair, slicked on some lip gloss and run out of the door (204).

A number of chick-lit heroines perform feminine aesthetics both openly and
successfully. Far from being repugnant by way of their candidly artificial
beauty, Maggie of In Her Shoes and Lisa of Sushi For Beginners are ultimately
appealing and uneasily celebrated. The sacrifice, toil and drastic physical
manipulation required to so fully effect what is an otherwise impossible-to-attain
image of femininity is foregrounded in each of these texts. Maggie is quite
literally her own creation — “tanning-bed basted, toned, plucked, waxed,
moisturised, deodorised, perfumed, perfect” (4). Her D-cup breasts are “made
of saline and plastic”, her thighs are “firmed from hours on the treadmill, smooth
as plastic from a recent waxing” (4-5). The repeated reference to plastic
underscores the actual plasticity of seemingly essential gender. Lisa’s
performance of femininity is revealed to be dangerously injurious:
In her natural state — not that she’d been in that for a very long time — she was a
pretty enough girl. But with huge amounts of effort she’d upgraded herself [N] As well
as the usual attention to hair, nails, skin, make-up and clothes, she popped huge
amounts of vitamins, drank sixteen glasses of water a day [N] and every six months
had a botulism injection in her forehead [N] For the past ten years she’d been
constantly hungry (95).

Feminine beauty, then, is shown to be a fiction only achievable via constant
upkeep, requiring a repetitive engagement in gendered practices. Again, chicklit reveals gender to be “constructed, and thus contestable” (Young, “Gender as
Seriality” 715). This is an important feminist intervention, given that, as Joshua
Gamson articulates, “it is exactly through the fixed, dichotomous categorisation
into apparently distinct species of [N] male and female that [sexist] oppression
is perpetuated” (327-8).

SUBVERSIVE STRAIGHT SEX
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Like its generic precursor, chick-lit is unabashedly heterosexist. Homosexuality
does feature: the gay best friend is one of the genre’s more recognisable
conventions, and both Portia of Bookends and Claudia of Behaving Like Adults
shock the heroines of their respective stories by entering into lesbian
relationships. But the chick-lit heroine herself is unwaveringly sexually straight.
Nonetheless, the (hetero)sex she engages in is subversive in that it is overtly
consensual. She is an unashamedly proactive, experienced and willing
participant:
I lead him out of the bathroom and into bed.
I slip a condom on his cock that is jerking with anticipation, and I push him onto his
back and straddle him, positioning myself so I can ease him inside me, and when he’s
about an inch in I gasp because I really had forgotten how good this feels [N] I love
that feeling of power, being on top, being in control, and I love watching his face as he
finally gives into orgasm (Green, Mr Maybe 39).

Unlike the Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine, whose virginal apprehension is
offset by her lover’s sexual aptitude, the chick-lit heroine is just as sexually
practised and assertive as her hero, thereby undermining the active and
knowing male/passive and naive female gendered binary opposition subscribed
to by the mass-market romance.
Sex is, furthermore, frequently explicitly consensual, in that consent is verbally
requested and given, rather than simply assumed or disregarded. James of
Bookends obtains Cath’s unequivocal go-ahead at numerous intervals during
their first sexual encounter:
“Is this okay?” James whispers, and I nod, wondering whether it’s the champagne or
the kiss that’s keeping this dopey grin on my face, but then not wondering too much
longer as he kisses me again (361).

And later:
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It’s so lovely that just after James has entered me (condom-encased of course), just
after he’s whispered, “Is this okay?”, just as he’s starting to move inside me, I start to
cry (362).

Instances of non-consensual sex are neither eroticised nor trivialised. They are
appropriately labelled as rape and shown to produce acute emotional trauma.
Holly of Behaving Like Adults reports Stuart to the police after he assaults her:
I felt myself being kissed before I had agreed to it. Stuart’s hands were hard
everywhere, plucking at my clothes. You don’t think a man is that much stronger than
you, until he is. My arms and legs felt weak and light, my heart was racing [N] I tried
to pick off his hands. Imagine trying to remove a wheel clamp with your fingers. I said,
“It’s too soon” [N] But he didn’t respond, he just kept kissing me, pinchily dragging off
my clothes like he hadn’t heard. He pushed me flat on the floor, his shoulder was
pinning down my neck. Then he prised apart my legs with his knee (40-1).

This passage notably features language similar to that employed by Harlequin
Mills & Boon — Stuart’s hands are “hard”, Holly is “pinn[ed]” by his shoulder.
Yet rather than being conveyed as desirable markers of masculine vigour,
these terms operate to signify unwelcome sexual aggression, to denote
violence, and to demonise Stuart’s reprehensible sense of masculine
entitlement. The circumstances of this encounter are virtually identical to those
of the rape that features in Shaw’s His Private Mistress yet is never named as
such.
Unlike their hypermasculine Harlequin Mills & Boon counterparts, chick-lit
heroes are frequently — albeit only temporarily — sexually incompetent. The
flaccid penis is a signifier of a restrained, less menacing masculinity:
When I sped back from the bathroom, I found Nick’s penis asleep. The wretched thing
was as limp as if it were lounging by the pool on a sunshine holiday. All attempts at
resuscitation were useless (Maxted, Behaving Like Adults 54).

Similarly, sex that is “tender” (Green, Bookends 362) and “gentle” (361) is
generally preferred, and it is often his proffering of this type of sexual
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experience that sets the chick-lit hero apart from his nemeses and marks him
as The One.

SUBVERSIVE SISTERHOOD AND ALTERNATIVE FAMILIES

Another characteristic component of the Harlequin Mills & Boon narrative that
chick-lit expressly refutes is the heroine’s isolation. Chick-lit heroines
customarily and explicitly select and appoint their own chosen families:
It’s funny, isn’t it, how your true family are not your flesh and blood? They are the
people you meet throughout your life who prove themselves to you. The people who
you grow to love, who love you equally in return, who are always there for you.
Mel is my family, Emma and Andy are my family (Green, Straight Talking 164).

This alternative familial vision implicitly questions the necessity, and thereby
unseats the primacy, of heterosexual coupling, upon which the traditional
nuclear family so depends. In The Edge of Reason, Bridget’s best friends
Shazzer and Jude perform the parental role in lieu of her actual parents.
During her stint in a Thai jail, Bridget receives two distinctly different pieces of
correspondence: a letter from her self-absorbed holidaying mother, asking her
to “call Una and check that she’s put the timer on”, and one from Shazzer and
Jude, reminding her how very loved she is and assuring her that they are
working on “get[ting] her out of there” (317-8). Once freed from prison, Bridget
is met at the airport, but not by Mr and Mrs Jones:
Crowd of photographers and journalists with flashguns. Mind went completely blank
and could not think of what to say or do except parrot “no comment”, [N] and keep
walking, pushing trolley, thinking my legs were going to collapse under me. Then
suddenly the trolley was taken away, and someone put their arm round me saying, “It’s
all right, Bridge, we’re here, we’ve got you, it’s all right”.

It was Jude and Shazzer (323).
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Louise Bernikow argues for the inherent subversiveness of intimate female
friendship, given that, “in friendship, women do for each other what culture
expects them to do for men” (144). As Whelehan explains, in chick-lit novels
“women’s lives are [uniformly] depicted [N] as being supported and nurtured by
an army of other women, whether it be [N] mothers, colleagues or old friends”
(TFB 178), a pointed rejoinder to the isolation of the Harlequin Mills & Boon
heroine. Good In Bed’s Cannie recalls the round-the-clock support she was
proffered in the wake of the traumatic premature birth of her unplanned baby:
Maxi showed up every morning for a week and sat beside me and read from People, In
Style and Entertainment Weekly magazines [N] My mother and sister stayed with me
in the daytime, making conversation, trying not to linger too long at the pauses that
came where I would normally be saying something smart-ass. Samantha came every
night after work and regaled me with Philadelphia gossip (327).

Chick-lit situates female friendship at the fore, celebrated as both an “emblem
of female self-sufficiency” (Auerbach 5) and a viable alternative source of
companionship. As Rochelle Mabry points out, in these novels friendships are
portrayed as being “equally as important as the central romantic relationship —
sometimes arguably more important” (202). The final pages of Edge of Reason,
for example, suggest that:
the urban family — and indeed the woman’s life outside the romantic relationship —
can be such an attractive alternative that it can, at least momentarily, place question
marks around the happy romantic conclusion. When [N] Mark asks Bridget to move to
Los Angeles with him, her initial response is atypical of the traditional romantic heroine
(Mabry 202-3).

Bridget is ultimately forced to choose between her life in London with Shazzer
and Jude and a temporary relocation with recently reinstated beau, Mark Darcy.
Despite her love for Mark and her longing to be with him long-term, it is a
difficult choice for Bridget to make. “I thought hard”, she writes. “I thought
about Jude and Shazzer, and Agnes B on Westbourne Grove, and cappuccinos
in Coins, and Oxford Street” (421). Although Bridget goes on to accept Mark’s
invitation, it is doubtful whether the move will actually go ahead. The novel
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ends with Bridget ambivalent, in a contemplative state, deciding to “have a little
glass of wine and a cigarette” (422).
Bookends situates platonic female friendships similarly: the pleasure such
relationships produce threatens to negate any desire for heterosexual romance.
Lucy observes Cath’s subversive satisfaction with her steadfastly single status:
“I just don’t understand why you haven’t got anyone. Josh doesn’t understand it
either.”
“I’m not really that interested”, I say, slightly disturbed that she and Josh have spoken
about this, although I’m not surprised. “I’m quite happy with you [N] and Si.”
“I know”, she says with a smile. “That’s what worries me” (102-3).

The intensity of these friendships frequently matches that of romantic
relationships, mimicking and thereby displacing the central romance:
Relationship does sum it up far better than friendship: I remember feeling, at times, that
Portia and I were locked into such an incredibly intense relationship, that it wasn’t
unusual for us to joke that we felt like lovers, except we didn’t want to sleep together
[N] There were occasions when I felt quite simply overwhelmed with love for Portia.
She was like the sister I never had (98).

Chick-lit elevates female companionship, presenting female friendships as
being necessary and sustaining — equally, if not more so, than romantic
relationships — constituting an overt departure from the conventions of
Harlequin Mills & Boon. Far from existing only in relation to men, the heroine’s
of these novels exist primarily within communities of women.

YOU CAN JUDGE A BOOK BY ITS COVER — AND TITLE
Given that they almost always feature neon, candy colours and exaggerated
cartoonish illustrations, chick-lit’s covers have been cursorily condemned by the
genre’s detractors as childish, ridiculed as denotative of simplicity and frivolity,
“an indication of what to expect inside: fiction-lite” (Hunt 7). The multiple
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feminist meanings conveyed by the images that accompany chick-lit novels
have been unfortunately ignored in the wake of widespread critical derision of
the genre’s homogenous and blatant branding. Like the narrative content such
packaging encases, the covers of chick-lit novels defy the pre-feminist ideology
endorsed by the Harlequin Mills & Boon brand via their radical departure from
the quasi-photographic images of couples that uniformly adorn Harlequin Mills
& Boon publications.
As Krzyszycha observes, “the typical front cover of a [Harlequin Mills & Boon]
novel shows the handsome couple in an amorous pose” (6). That the woman is
prone and often restrained by the man serves to indicate her submission
(Margolies 6). The image swathed across the cover of The Cattle King’s
Mistress is a wonderfully typical example. As is the norm, the male figure here
is positioned above his female counterpart, looking down at her and thereby
signifying his authority. The novel’s binaric construction of gender is here
visually conveyed: he is dark, and olive skinned, she is light, pale and blonde.
His face is partially obscured, his body fully-clothed. Her face closely
resembles that of Hollywood star Scarlett Johansson — rosy cheeked and
seductively full-lipped, eyes closed in ecstasy, a picture of idealised femininity.
She wears a barely-there dress that skims her perfectly proportioned curves.
He holds her tightly to him, firmly grasping her slender arm and clutching her
tiny waist, imprisoning her in manly, muscular arms from which ropes of
popping veins protrude. The cover illustration is an accurate visual introduction
to the novel’s conservative portrayal of gender difference.
Anna Maxted’s Running In Heels is packaged in archetypal chick-lit style. A
simple caricature of a woman — standing front-on, grinning, dressed in black,
grasping a handbag, well-heeled in requisite stilettos — is set against a banana
yellow background. She stands alone, independent, ready to take on the world.
Most of these books similarly feature images of women: women standing
defiantly alone, so as to signify their single status and self-sufficiency, or,
occasionally, in the company of other women, as exemplified by Straight
Talking — always with stilettos firmly in place. What is significant is that there

72

is not a man in sight. Stamped with images of women sans men, chick-lit
novels visually announce their difference.
It is not only the content of these images that is of significance. The divergent
illustrative styles preferred by the respective genres is also telling. The current
crop of Harlequin Mills & Boon covers favour hyperrealism — the illustrations
are so “detailed” they appear “almost photographic” (Krzyszycha 7), portraying
a fictive, airbrushed perfection. Just as Harlequin Mills & Boon’s artificial
approach to gender is obscured by its pretence to realism, so too the images of
men and women embracing on its covers are illustrations that masquerade as
photographs, contrivances presented as actualities.
The cover of Straight Talking nicely demonstrates the exaggerated, cartoonish
graphic style favoured by publishers of chick-lit. A group of women are seated
on and around a sofa, drinking white wine and nibbling on chips. Each of these
women has a tiny, nipped waist, pronounced breasts and ridiculously slender
limbs. Their faces are overtly made-up, their cheeks accentuated by clown-like
fluorescent pink spots, their eyelids shaded a bright blue. This is an image of
overstated femininity, of gender blatantly performed, and physically inscribed —
its excesses draw attention to the inherent constructedness of gender. Set
against the purported realism of the images of women that brand the Harlequin
Mills & Boon product, the camp cartoons that accompany chick-lit novels
declare the genre’s deviance, mirroring the subversion occurring between the
covers.
The titles of chick-lit publications are equally significant in flagging their
departure from the Harlequin Mills & Boon brand. That Bridget Jones’s Diary is
thus entitled — rather than The Barrister’s Bedmate, for instance — is no mere
coincidence. Titles that specifically name the heroine — Lucy Sullivan Is
Getting Married is another example — reflect chick-lit’s heroine-centricity. Most
titles, however, such as Watermelon and Bookends, are fairly abstract, and are
significant in that, unlike the Harlequin Mills & Boon novel, they do not
grammatically situate the heroine in relation to her hero, as his possession.

73

That the titles of chick-lit novels rarely directly refer to a specific man mirrors
their comparatively wider scope.

REINSTATING ROMANCE
The Harlequin Mills & Boon brand has been taken to task by feminist critics not
simply for its “articulation” of the “desire for a loving relationship” (La’Brooy 2),
which in itself is arguably unproblematic, but rather for its rendering of romance
as a woman’s singular and supreme source of pleasure. As Whelehan notes,
the “perception of the incompatibility of feminism with having a meaningful
heterosexual relationship has unfortunately been perpetuated beyond reason”
(TFB 190). Heterosexual love per se is not the issue here, and the intention of
this critique is certainly not to reductively suggest that a longing for romantic
companionship denotes a dedication to pre-feminist politics.
In the Harlequin Mills & Boon novel, every single page — every paragraph —
pertains to the pursuit of love. The Harlequin Mills & Boon hero’s profession of
love, punctuated by his proposal of marriage, is climactically situated, inevitably
located in the final few pages, the product of all preceding action. As Stephanie
Herzewski argues, chick-lit, on the other hand, “de-emphasise[s] the central
romance” (Ferriss and Young 10). Its focus is instead on the personal
development of an autonomous heroine whose attentions are split between a
number of competing demands.
Indeed, chick-lit is collectively concerned with the emotional maturation of its
protagonists, and their overcoming of a plethora of personal demons. Although
somewhat obscured by the genre’s characteristically comedic tone, the fact is
that “there are few chick[-lit] novels narrated free of any sense of emotional
pain” (Whelehan, TFB 208). Whelehan mentions the work of Keyes, whose
every chick-lit offering palpably tells of serious psychological trauma —
variously the result of mental illness, grief, divorce and drug addiction — that is
distinct from the everyday woes of Bridget Jones and the like. Maxted’s oeuvre
similarly depicts acute suffering: her heroines miscarry, are the victims of rape,
and are sufferers of anorexia nervosa. Although Bridget Jones’s anguish is
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moderate and manageable by comparison, her conquering of the self-doubt
that plagues her is noteworthy, as is the romantic — and thereby arguably
regressive — conclusion to her diarised year.
The final pages of Good In Bed reinstate the primacy of romance. Its heroine,
Cannie, struggles to accept herself bodily. She is initially deeply troubled by her
hefty physique. Ultimately, however, Cannie comes to accept her robust figure,
comes to appreciate her body for what it can do, eventually loving herself
because she is “sturdy” and “strong” (365). Tellingly, however, Dr K’s kiss acts
as a catalyst, convincing Cannie of her worth. As is typical of chick-lit
narratives, the romantic Harlequin Mills & Boon conclusion — albeit lacking an
actual marriage proposal — problematically persists:
“You don’t mind that I’m a larger woman?”
“I think you look like a queen”, he said with such intensity that I was startled [N] “I think
you’re the most amazing, exciting woman I’ve ever met” (374).

The problematic coinciding of male approbation with the advent of the chick-lit
heroine’s self-acceptance is a standardised generic feature. The hero’s
profession of love both marks and elicits the heroine’s awakening. Joseph
Boone sees this narrative quandary as reflecting a wider trend apparent in
women’s literature, wherein “the growth of the female protagonist” is
“synonymous with the action of courtship” (Felski 100). The issue is only
compounded by the omnipresent generic suggestion that correctly identifying
The One and successfully securing his affections is itself an indicator of the
chick-lit protagonist’s maturation. Conversely, her initial single status thereby
signals her immaturity: the singleton’s development is arrested, her existence
rendered rudimentary.
“Life, to these women”, Bristow claims, “is not about finding a man. Rather,
finding the right man is a route to finding yourself” (53). Shanna Swendson
offers a similar synopsis of the chick-lit heroine’s story:
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[Her] story is about how she interacts with her world and the people in it. She may
have a romance, but the story is more about how she has to grow and change in order
to open to that romance when it comes along than it is about the relationship itself (65).

Herein lies the dilemma: that romance is celebrated, not simply for its own sake
nor as an end in itself, but as an indicator of the heroine’s awakening, is at once
both regressive and progressive.

CONCLUSIONS
Harlequin Mills & Boon and feminism have historically been situated in
opposition to one another. Chick-lit, however, constitutes a successful
disruption of this dichotomy, given that it is a site wherein romance and
feminism collide and coincide. In order to explicitly and recognisably respond
to feminist critiques of the conventions of the supermarket romance, chick-lit
necessarily retains its basic trajectory. The genre successfully rewrites
Harlequin Mills & Boon’s most worryingly pre-feminist conventions from within
this familiar narrative arc, depicting an alternative world wherein femininity is a
performance, masculinity, mild and female friendship vital, thereby undermining
the binaric approach to gender that enables the subordination of women. In an
effort to correct what Daphne Watson refers to as Harlequin Mills & Boon’s
“distorted picture of the world” (94), chick-lit problematises the didactic and
naturalised construction of gender difference that is so conspicuous a feature of
the Harlequin Mills & Boon brand.
The singleton chick-lit novel arguably constitutes a partial, mitigated feminist
revision of the conventional romance, given that it problematically retains
Harlequin Mills & Boon’s romantic ending as an indicator of its protagonist’s
growth. Chick-lit undoes the most rigid and pernicious conventions of the massproduced romance only to restore its romantic conclusion, thereby conveying
plural and conflicting meanings. It is this polysemy that arguably accounts for its
disparate critical reception, and positions it as particularly prone to multiple and
oppositional interpretations, thereby neatly problematising the very possibility of
singularly faithful adaptations.
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Chapter Two
FLOUNDERING UNDER FIDELITY
Flounder \Floun”der\, v. i. [imp. & p. p. Floundered; p. pr. & vb. N. Floundering.]
[Cf. D. flodderen to flap, splash through mire, E. flounce, v.i., and flounder the fish.]
To fling the limbs and body, as in making efforts to move; to struggle, as a horse in the mire, or as fish on
land; to roll, toss, and tumble; to flounce.

Just as the previous chapter looked at the chick-lit genre’s reaction to and
transformation of the tropes of the Harlequin Mills & Boon brand, this chapter
also seeks to interrogate the complexities of a specific mode of transformation
and revision, one that is crucial to this thesis – the process of novel-into-film
adaptation. This chapter provides a theoretical backdrop for the unique critical
work this thesis eventually offers – an appraisal of cinematic and televisual
adaptations of a selection of chick-lit texts, adaptations that serve to complicate
the current paradigmatic approach to analyses of adaptations. Together with
the work of the previous chapter, by way of assessing the cultural, creative and
ideological value of screen adaptations of chick-lit novels, the feminist strategy
outlined herein offers a new approach to novel-into-film adaptation. This
chapter ultimately theorises a new way of appraising adaptations — an
approach that is intended to avoid entirely the strictures of fidelity-based
assessment. It proffers a feminist theory of adaptation as an alternative
framework for scholarly commentary on the intentions and results of the
adaptation process, a methodology that encourages and finds meaning in
intentionally unfaithful instances of adaptation. In order to illustrate the pitfalls
that this new theory overcomes, the chapter first provides a review of
adaptation scholarship to date.

THE CORRELATION OF CRITICAL AND POPULAR APPROACHES TO
ADAPTATION
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From Bladerunner to Bridget Jones’s Diary, Hamlet to Harry Potter, adaptations
consistently generate passionate yet predictable responses from audiences as
to the degree of their fidelity to their respective literary origins. What is perhaps
surprising is that many contemporary adaptation theorists evince this same
preoccupation in the pages of their decidedly scholarly offerings, albeit phrased
in sophisticated language, disguised by academic jargon and despite genuine
attempts to curtail the fixation. As theorist Brian McFarlane puts it, adaptation
is “a subject on which everyone feels able to have an opinion, and most
opinions, from the casually conversational to exegeses in learned journals, still
tend to foreground the criterion of fidelity, whether in explicit terms or by tacit
assumption” (“It wasn’t like that in the book” 165). Donald F. Larsson concurs:
Comparison of films and novels, especially in the examination of the process of
adaptation, has long been a subject for family talks, after-movie barroom
conversations, reviewers’ tirades, authors’ laments, and learned conferences and
publications. Yet too often these comparisons, whether on the personal, the popular,
or the professional level, have returned to the same old [N] clichés (70).

In response to the perceived inadequacies of critical approaches to adaptation,
Robert B. Ray claims that the discipline remains in a “pre-paradigmatic state”
(44). One could argue, however, that a rather obvious disciplinary paradigm
exists in the relentless – and often unintentional – scholarly reinscription of
fidelity as adaptation’s “Holy Grail” (Stam, A Companion to Literature and Film
262). Fidelity is the prevailing paradigm, a fixed feature of critical and
theoretical approaches to adaptation. Recent works by theorists such as James
Naremore (9), Sarah Cardwell (9), and Robert Stam (Literature and Film 14)
uniformly acknowledge its continued domination of the discourse. Despite the
fact that most contemporary adaptation theorists are clearly conscious of both
the impossibility and undesirability of absolute fidelity – in fact, the majority
unequivocally decry this fixation – many continue to be informed by this
somewhat limiting approach to comparative analysis, denouncing fidelity as a
means of critical assessment, yet persistently scrutinising the degree to which it
is achieved. Adaptation theory is characterised by a strange contradiction
where, on the one hand, an awareness of the dangers of fidelity is apparent,
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but on the other hand, there exists an often-unconscious unwillingness to move
beyond the issue of fidelity.

WHAT’S WRONG WITH FIDELITY?
Christopher Orr claims, “there is nothing intrinsically wrong” with the abiding
academic interest in fidelity (72). However, the existence of a scholarly
campaign to challenge this mode of assessment suggests that the opposite is
true – that fidelity criticism is inherently flawed. As Thomas Leitch notes, “the
attack on fidelity as a criterion of value [is so pervasive as to be] virtually a
trope” of the discourse of adaptation (“Everything You Always Wanted to Know
about Adaptation” 234). R. Barton Palmer explains fidelity criticism thus:
The better [an] adaptation is, the less it can be differentiated from what, in its
otherness, it must replace. The most faithful adaptation would simply be the
reinstantiation of the source text (Stam, A Companion to Literature and Film 262).

Over the years, theorists have readily offered a plethora of justifications for their
disdain for fidelity criticism. Fidelity is frequently and primarily dismissed as
“literally impossible” given the movement between media and the differing
conventions of each (Stam, Literature and Film 17). The notion of a faithful
filmic rendition of a novel is also perceived as innately problematic given that
every adaptation is but one of many possible interpretations of a source text.
As Joy Gould Boyum observes:
In assessing an adaptation, we are never really comparing book with film, but an
interpretation with an interpretation – the novel that we ourselves have re-created in our
imaginations, out of which we have constructed our own individualised “movie,” and the
novel on which the filmmaker has worked a parallel transformation (61).

Underlying the insistence on fidelity, furthermore, is the “mistaken assumption”
that fidelity is the singular aim of the adaptation process (Orr 73). As Cardwell
explains, “to adapt is [erroneously] understood as an intention to render the
source-text author’s intentions” (23). In instances where such a goal is absent,
fidelity-based assessment is rendered entirely redundant.
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An alternative, post-structuralist vindication of the anti-fidelity campaign sees
fidelity as problematic in that it artificially invokes a hierarchy. Fidelity-based
assessment unfairly positions the film as inevitably inferior to the novel since,
as Leitch points out, “whatever their faults, [N] source texts will always be
better at being themselves” (“Twelve Fallacies in Contemporary Adaptation
Theory” 161). It is impossible, then, for a film to be considered on par with – let
alone superior to – the novel on which it is based when it is assessed according
to the degree to which it accurately replicates its source. Analyses of
adaptations that invoke fidelity as a means of evaluation are therefore tediously
and relentlessly predictable, and as such, futile. As McFarlane suggests, “if you
want the same experience [N] that you had in reading the novel, why not
simply re-read the novel? It’s much more likely to produce the desired effect”
(“It wasn’t like that in the book” 165).
It is evident, then, that adaptation theorists are generally scornful of the
demand for fidelity that figures as a dominant presence in most lay reflections
on – and many academic evaluations of – the adaptation process. Yet such
disdain for the fidelity paradigm is rarely effectively mobilised. Cardwell explains
adaptation scholarship’s current quandary:
From the earliest to the most recent writing on adaptation, there has existed a widely
shared desire to undermine the tendency for comparison to lapse into fidelity criticism
that unfairly assess an adaptation on the grounds of its fidelity to the book [N] Yet [N]
this project has been mostly unsuccessful in practice (23-4).

The majority of adaptation scholars fall into one of two camps. There are those
who overtly identify themselves as practitioners of fidelity criticism,
unashamedly bemoaning unfaithful – read, all – adaptations as failures, and
those who invoke fidelity more covertly, at first glance seeming to comply with
the theoretically correct anti-fidelity stance, yet actually – and perhaps
unintentionally – reinscribing fidelity as paradigmatic in the discourse of
adaptation. Kamilla Elliott’s notion of “theoretical correctness” (134) is of
particular import here, suggesting as it does a type of empty, forced
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subscription to an approach that is considered theoretically trendy. Superficial
adherence to the anti-fidelity campaign has rendered contradiction a dominant
feature of adaptation theory.
In order to move both overtly and covertly beyond fidelity-focused evaluations
and thereby enliven a “moribund field” (Naremore 11), it is necessary and
methodologically logical to consult and interrogate the source of the prevailing
and resistant paradoxical approach to adaptation.

GEORGE BLUESTONE, ESSENTIALISM AND THE NOVEL/FILM BINARY
The study of adaptation officially dates back to 1957, the year George
Bluestone’s pioneering and influential text, Novels Into Film: The
Metamorphosis of Fiction Into Cinema, was published. Rather than simply
comparing specific film adaptations to their respective literary origins, a limited
task which had been taken on by numerous film critics and scholars previously,
Bluestone’s work, the first sustained examination of the adaptation
phenomenon, offered a larger, broader critique – an interrogation of the
allegedly innate differences between the two media, as well as an appraisal of
the purposes and results of the process of filmic adaptation. This treatment
cemented adaptation theory as a new and potentially dynamic area of study,
only hinting at its many possibilities.
The pioneering status of Bluestone’s Novels Into Film indicated that the
discourse it established was necessarily a prelude to further study, to the
gradual emergence of new and varying approaches to adaptation and open to
challenge and revision. Bluestone himself states, “the conclusions reached [N]
are [N] tentative and speculative rather than definitive or exhaustive” (IX).
Ironically, despite its promise, adaptation theory has in fact failed to venture
very far from its origins, with Bluestone’s admittedly “speculative” text
continuing to be referenced by many as an authority on adaptation some fifty
years post-publication. As recently as 2003, Elliott observed, “novel and film
studies have maintained Bluestone’s taxonomy without demur” (12). Leitch
takes particular exception to Bluestone’s prolonged dominance of the field,
81

lamenting the fact that “recent commentators [N] have largely allowed him to
frame the terms of the debate” (“Twelve Fallacies in Contemporary Adaptation
Theory” 149). The progenitor of contemporary adaptation theory, then,
Bluestone’s approach continues to be replicated and revered, his assumptions
and essentialisms remaining largely unquestioned. It is arguable the
contradictions inherent in Bluestone’s thesis instituted adaptation scholarship’s
current paradoxical quandary. Bluestone’s indelible influence warrants a
rigorous critique of his theoretical approach.
Bluestone opens his analysis of the “limits” of the two media – commonly
referred to as the “medium-specific approach” (Cardwell 43) – with a reference
to two tellingly similar remarks, one made by a novelist, the other by a
filmmaker. In the preface to Nigger of the Narcissus, Joseph Conrad states
that his aim is, “by the power of the written word, to make you hear, to make
you feel – it is, before all, to make you see” (Bluestone 1). Cinematic pioneer
D. W. Griffith echoed Conrad in a comment regarding his intentions as a
filmmaker, claiming that his task was “above all to make you see” (Bluestone
1). Bluestone ultimately interprets this striking similarity not as a testament to
what is shared by the two media, but, rather, as an indication of their intrinsic
disparity. His misreading of the Conrad-Griffith coincidence anticipates the
problematic argument that is to follow and is the first indication that his thesis is
somewhat flawed. Despite acknowledging that the coincidence is “remarkable
in suggesting the points at which novel and film both join and part company”
(1), Bluestone eventually insists that the “seeming concurrence of Griffith and
Conrad splits apart under analysis, and the two arts turn in opposite directions”
(2).
It is undeniably true that there are significant dissimilarities between the two
media. As Bluestone observes, that Conrad and Griffith “meet [N] in common
intention” (1) belies the fact that the novel relies on the imagination, whereas
film provides an actual, visual image. However, Bluestone’s resistant reading
of a syntactical coincidence that so powerfully indicates a merging of media
appears somewhat forced and artificial. Bluestone reveals that his aim is to
demonstrate “that the two media are marked by [N] essentially different traits”
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(VIII), an aim that is evidently effected by his recurrent and concerted
overstatement of the differences between novel and film. Bluestone’s strained
interpretation of these coinciding claims allows him to establish a dichotomy
that he is clearly at pains to prove, a bifurcated approach to novel and film that
continues to figure throughout his argument.
Following this opening reference, Bluestone examines what he perceives to be
the innate differences between the “hostile” modes of novel and film (2). His
examination of the adaptation phenomenon seemingly renders absolute
faithfulness impossible, given that he posits novel and film as innately at odds.
However, rather than revealing the problematic nature of the argument for
fidelity, his exposition ironically results in the preservation of this ideal.
Bluestone claims, “at times, the differences [between novel and film] tempt one
to argue that film-makers ought to abandon adaptations entirely in favour of
writing directly for the screen” (218). This remark is at the heart of the paradox
at work in Bluestone’s argument – it suggests that the impossibility of achieving
fidelity is so lamentable as to warrant doing away with adaptation altogether,
that, resistant to fidelity, adaptation is a pointless endeavour, “a theoretical
impossibility” (Elliott, 2). Adaptation, then, is equated with faithful adaptation –
for Bluestone there is no other kind. Fidelity is posited as a contradiction – the
intrinsically unreachable, “eternally elusive” (Stam, A Companion to Literature
and Film 262), yet definitive aim of the adaptation process. Cinematic
adaptations are branded as attempts at mimicry, attempts that inevitably fail.
Bluestone’s repeated description of the adaptation process as “mutational” (5) –
he uses this word three times on one page – only serves to support this
interpretation of his thesis. With dubious connotations at best, this word is
arguably indicative of Bluestone’s perception of adaptation as something
distorted and deviant, in that it fails to achieve the very thing it necessarily sets
out to.
Stemming from the parallel claims made by Conrad and Griffith, Bluestone’s
first contention as to the innate and fatal disparity between novel and film
relates to the representation of metaphor and use of symbolism (19-27). The
binary opposition that pervades adaptation theory and positions literature as
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superior to film is immediately mobilised in this initial comparison – Bluestone
suggests that the novel is adept at the use of metaphor whereas film is largely
incapable of communicating with equal sophistication. Although he admits that
film’s “extraordinary power of suggestion” (24) allows for the creation of a
“special kind of trope” that – despite being somewhat plastic and strained – is
akin to literary metaphor (22), Bluestone ultimately believes that there is a
“photographic literalness in film which is inescapable and which makes
metaphor impossible except in a highly restricted sense” (20). The implication
here appears to be that the innate impossibility of fidelity is, in part, the
consequence of film’s alleged inability to effect literary metaphors.
Trevor Whittock’s Metaphor and Film refutes the essentialism that figures rather
relentlessly in Bluestone’s text. Whittock exposes the false polarity that is both
characteristic of and problematic for the discourse of adaptation by
demonstrating that metaphor, in its many guises, operates successfully in both
literature and film. Rather than exemplifying the incongruity of the two media,
metaphor is shown to be common to both: a symbol, one could say, of their
correspondence and compatibility. This is encapsulated by Whittock’s
observation that “a notion thought to be so central to artistic creativity in
language cannot be totally alien to artistic creativity elsewhere” (3). He goes on
to provide numerous examples, such as the metaphor of the caged bird that
features in Hitchcock’s The Birds. As Hitchcock explains:
At the beginning of the film we show Rod Taylor in the bird shop. He catches the canary
that has escaped from its cage, and after putting it back, he says to Tippi Hedren, “I’m
putting you back in your gilded cage, Melanie Daniels”NLater on, when the gulls attack the
village, Melanie Daniels takes refuge in a glass telephone booth and I show her as a bird in
a cage. This time it isn’t a gilded cage, but a cage of miseryN (Whittock 1).

Whittock is certainly not the only person to have detected metaphors in films –
he himself observes, “how rare it is to find a film critic who fails to note them”
(4). In his review of the David Lynch classic Blue Velvet, for example, Roger
Ebert notes, “the camera burrows into the green lawn and finds hungry insects
beneath – a metaphor for the surface and buried lives of the town” (6). Whittock
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asserts, “film critics and commentators take it for granted that films abound with
figurative constructions” (70), and refers to N. Roy Clifton’s The Figure in Film,
which contains close to two thousand examples of rhetorical devices used in
film, as proof “beyond a shadow of a doubt” (79) that metaphor figures
prominently and effectively in film.

It is apparent, then, that film critics are generally quite receptive to the concept
of filmic metaphor, certainly more so than advocates of the medium-specific
approach to adaptation, who commonly endeavour to dispel the idea –
Raymond Durgnat, for example, claims that film visuals “can’t match the writer’s
swift, deft way with metaphors” (Marcus 72). Bluestone’s contention that
metaphor and film cannot coexist is problematic in that it suggests that “fiction
is more complex than film” and is thus “another way of privileging [N] fiction”
(Whelehan, “Adaptations: The contemporary dilemmas” 6). The discourse of
adaptation theory, informed by the binary opposition that underlies Bluestone’s
approach, posits literature and film as innately different, diametrically opposed
and hierarchically positioned. Film, as literature’s other, cannot adopt its
narrative devices, for fear of disrupting the polarity through which the process of
adaptation is commonly understood.

Bluestone’s overstating of the differences between the novel and the film
continues in his discussion of sound in film. Although he acknowledges the
“new possibilities” heralded by the introduction of sound (29), for Bluestone, film
is primarily a sequence of images, and literature a sequence of words.
Bluestone again invokes an essentialist, binaric perception of the two media in
his conservative claim that sound – including music and effects, but, most
significantly, words – in film, is always “subsidiary to the moving image” (28).
Proponents of medium-specificity – by definition – essentialise the two media,
despite the fact that, as Elliott observes, “the designation of novels as ‘words’
and of films as ‘images’ is neither empirically nor logically sustainable” (14).
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The perception that film is chiefly a visual medium arises from its silent
beginnings. Before the advent of the ‘talkies’, films, though silent, were rarely
referred to as such (Devereaux 35). In fact, the term ‘silent film’ was,
historically, a tautology, as film was originally characterised by silence. When
sound and film finally merged, the results were, initially, far from artistically
impressive. Plagued by technical problems – for example, the consequences of
the immobility of microphones, and the fact that ‘accidental’ effects, such as a
cough or a loud gust of wind, could not simply be edited out – the first sound
films were contrived, stagey and largely unpalatable productions (Devereaux
36). Although these were quickly overcome by technological advancements,
the stigma attached to sound in film lingered.
Despite the great advances in technology, film continues to be considered at
least primarily visual. Contemporary film theorist James Monaco typifies this
pervasive attitude, claiming, “films have words, too, of course, but not usually in
such profusion and never with the concrete insistence of the printed page” (48).
This dismissive statement seems totally at odds with the cultural saturation of
film quotations. Television programs, advertisements, even the sacrosanct
novel, all frequently make meaning via the intertextual appropriation of famous
snippets of film dialogue. Wordy, dialogue-heavy films, such as Pulp Fiction
and Annie Hall, are not only cherished by film buffs and cult audiences, they
are also critically acclaimed and frequently successful at the box-office. Film
theorist Mary Devereaux affirms this fact, noting, “the history of cinema
provides copious evidence of good films in which words dominate” (45). It is a
rare movie-goer who is unfamiliar with, for instance, Clint Eastwood’s Sudden
Impact directive, “Go ahead, make my day”, or the phrase recently named by
the American Film Institute (AFI) as the best movie line of all time (Connley 1) –
Clark Gable’s Gone with the Wind disclosure, “Frankly my dear, I don’t give a
damn”, itself arguably an improvement on Margaret Mitchell’s original line,
which reads simply, “My dear, I don’t give a damn” (1010). In this case, the
novel’s words are forgotten, replaced by Gable’s utterance – undoubtedly one
of the most memorable in the history of cinema. Eastwood’s line is equally
significant in that it demonstrates that even those films that are light on dialogue
often provide memorable verbal moments. The very existence of and hype
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surrounding the AFI’s list only serves to confirm that films are remembered for
their dialogue as well as their visual elements. Think of Casablanca, The
Wizard of Oz, The Godfather – even those unfamiliar with such films are
usually acquainted with their more famous lines.
Indeed, the continued underestimation of the importance of words in film,
arising as it does from the pervasive belief that “when a motion picture is at its
best, it is long on action and short on dialogue” (Kozloff, Overhearing Film
Dialogue 4), is clearly problematic. Film, as a narrative medium, is
approximately one hundred years old, yet, of those one hundred years, only the
first thirty were characterised by silence. It seems rather regressive to
pigeonhole the medium according to its earliest qualities. As John Simon
notes, “the concept of film as a visual medium was formulated and accepted at
a time when it could not have been any other kind of medium, any more than a
carriage could have been horseless before the invention of the automobile”
(502-3). Rather than perceiving silence as a desirable and definitive cinematic
trait, it is possible, and, arguably, more reasonable, to view the silent film as a
precursory version of what is now, following the introduction of sound, a fully
realised medium. What was once, inevitably, a cinematic characteristic need
not and should not continue to be valorised as such. In defiance of purists and
the binary opposition that informs the medium-specific approach to adaptation,
film is an irrefutably audio-visual medium.
Although it is sound that silent film enthusiasts superficially decry, a closer look
reveals that it is actually the spoken word – dialogue in particular – that critics
and aficionados find most offensive. In 1991, decades after the introduction of
sound, David Mamet claimed, “basically, the perfect movie doesn’t have any
dialogue. So you should always be striving to make a silent movie” (Kozloff,
Overhearing Film Dialogue 8). In her investigation of what Sarah Kozloff coins
the “anti-sound prejudice” (Overhearing Film Dialogue 21), Devereaux
observes that “the objection to sound film [focuses] primarily, although not
exclusively, on talk, on words regarded as a separate category of sound” (37).
‘Talkie’, the rather flippant nickname given to early sound films, is indicative of
what was – and continues to be – an explicitly anti-word sentiment.
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Furthermore, there is arguably no filmic component more abhorred by critics
than voice-over narration. In her exploration and defence of the much-reviled
technique of voice-over, Kozloff refers to the film Adaptation. The film’s
protagonist, an aspiring screenwriter, attends a lecture on screenwriting given
by inimitable real-life authority, Robert McKee, who says:
And God help you if you use voice-over in your work, my friends. God help you. That’s
flaccid, sloppy writing. Any idiot can write a voice-over narration to explain the thoughts
of a character.

The fictionalised McKee’s emphatic denunciation of voice-over quite accurately
reflects the widespread dismissal of the technique. In Invisible Storytellers,
Kozloff explores what she perceives to be the reasons for the unanimously
vitriolic critical response to voice-over. The most telling of these objections to
voice-over is the belief that it is a “distinctly literary device”, that voice-over
narrators are merely “ludicrous stand-ins for the novelistic ‘I’” (17). Whether or
not such a claim is accurate is largely irrelevant here, although Kozloff goes to
great lengths to prove that it is a narrative rather than an essentially literary
device (17). What is significant is that, yet again, the merging of the novelistic
and the filmic is rejected, their points of correlation vehemently denied. Voiceover is rendered inappropriate, anathematised due to its literary overtones.
Kozloff’s argument that “even if voice-over were a literary device, it would be no
less valuable, no less valid a technique than any other” (17) subverts the
dominant discourse of adaptation, occurring in opposition to the dichotomous
framework through which adaptation is primarily understood and critiqued.
Of course, this evaluation of Bluestone’s paradigmatic medium-specific
approach to the practice of adaptation is not intended to suggest that novel and
film are so similar as to render fidelity easily achievable. Rather, it seeks to
demonstrate that Bluestone’s approach is based on an overstatement of these
differences, such that novel and film are falsely positioned as polar opposites.
As Cardwell observes, Bluestone’s approach “perpetuates an antagonistic
relationship between the word and the image that is not borne out by practice
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[N His] attitude to adaptations is founded upon a fundamental understanding of
film as a totally separate and different medium from the novel” (38, 45).
As Francesco Casetti observes, “the insistence on the nature of the cinematic
medium has, of course, always been present [and] has grown stronger in
recent years” (Stam, A Companion to Literature and Film 90), perhaps because
it is often mistakenly seen as a theoretical way around the fidelity paradigm.
John C. Tibbetts and James M. Welsh open their Encyclopedia of Novels Into
Film with the following endorsement of Bluestone’s approach, positing the novel
as both inherently dissimilar and artistically superior to film from the very outset
of their argument:
Literature & film: Is this a natural marriage or a shotgun wedding? Do the partners have
much in common? The conjunction is not necessarily conjugal and the ampersand is
deceptive, for it functions to link opposing elements and mentalities – art and
commerce, individual creativity and collaborative fabrication, culture and mass culture,
the verbal and the visual (XIII).

Finally, medium-specificity reappears – albeit in a somewhat diluted form – in
theorist H. Porter Abbot’s 2002 offering, wherein he endorses Bluestone’s
thesis and re-enacts his approach. Abbot’s understanding of the differences
between novel and film is far less emphatic and, consequently, less
dichotomous – he does for example, concede instances of intersection. Of
figurative language, Abbot writes, “it is a mistake [N] to think that stage and
screen are entirely without this resource” (112).
Beyond theory, Bluestone’s medium-specific approach is perhaps most
frequently employed in critical commentaries of specific instances of
adaptation. Susan Watkins’ 1998 feminist analysis of Sally Potter’s cinematic
take on Virginia Woolf’s Orlando is a case in point. Watkins’ endorsement of
Bluestone’s decidedly conservative approach is somewhat surprising given the
subversive and recurrently post-structuralist nature of her examination of the
differing treatments of gender identity in the two renderings of Orlando. But
medium-specificity is back with a vengeance here, figuring tirelessly throughout
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this piece. Potter’s Orlando is criticised for its portrayal of gender identity,
interpreted by Watkins as being fairly “conventional” in contrast to Woolf’s (42),
because the film “ultimately [fails] to cinematise the playfully oscillating sexual
and gender indeterminacy of its heroine”, and “the conventions of [novel and
film] are central in explaining that failure”(43). Watkins offers no recourse to the
implications of directorial intention and interpretation, instead simplistically
positing literature as complex and nuanced (47), in opposition to the visual
limitations of film and thereby reinscribing Bluestone’s medium-specific
approach to adaptation. Thus, this post-structuralist reading of this bifurcated
approach reveals it to be complicit with, rather than fatal to, the desire for
fidelity.

ADAPTATION AS AN UNDECIDABLE
In response to the persistent tendency of scholars to employ modes of enquiry
that ultimately uphold the fidelity paradigm, a post-structuralist approach to
adaptation theory has slowly begun to emerge. An awareness of the hierarchy
that underlies the discourse of adaptation has long existed, and is arguably
evident in the naming of the field’s foremost scholarly journal, Literature/Film
Quarterly. As the journal’s current editors, Elsie M. Walker and David T.
Johnson explain, an alternative title, Literature and Film Quarterly, was rejected
since “neither of the founding editors [N] wanted to suggest the status of
literature over film – hardly a radical idea today, but still very much on the
cutting edge in 1973” (Walker and Johnson 2). The title’s somewhat unusual
construction was thus a deliberate response to the hierarchy that framed
discussions of novel and film, and was intended to signal the journal’s aim to
redress the faults in the discourse. However, the construction of the title also
has some contradictory implications. Although the slash that separates the
terms is apparently intended to signify the “interdependence of literature and
film” (Walker and Johnson 2), it is also, ironically, explicitly suggestive of the
very binary opposition it intends to rewrite. The slant of the slash that
bifurcates every binaric pair is an effective visual means of marking the first
term as dominant. Thus, the paradoxical connotations of the title
Literature/Film Quarterly forecast the contradictions that have continued to
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plague adaptation scholarship in its attempt to rid itself of the strictures of
fidelity.
In his “Introduction” to 2000’s Film Adaptation, Naremore laments the curious
lack of interaction between post-structuralism and adaptation, noting,
“academic writing on the topic [of adaptation] tends to be [N] constitutive of a
series of binary oppositions that poststructuralist theory has taught us to
deconstruct” (2). In the very same volume, Ray highlights the inadequacy of
the comparative approach to adaptation — an approach that so often lapses
into a veneration of the source text, and thus, fidelity — declaring that it “rests
on a hierarchy or opposition of original and copy that Jacques Derrida has
repeatedly deconstructed” (45). In the “Introduction” to his recent anthology,
2005’s Literature and Film: A Guide to the Theory and Practice of Film
Adaptation, Stam takes up this same argument, noting that, in Derridean terms,
the “prestige of the original does not run counter to the copy; rather, the
prestige of the original is created by the copies, without which the idea of
originality has no meaning” (8).
Elliott’s Rethinking the Novel/Film Debate offers what is arguably the most
thorough and extensive examination of the novel/film binary to date. Her 2003
offering provides a deconstruction of what has ultimately proven to be a
decidedly tenuous dichotomy. Elliott cites silent film intertitles and illustrated
novels in order to question the rigid bifurcation of novel and film. “Novels and
films”, she asserts, “tend to unravel the very word and image divide they have
been conscripted to uphold, since novels contain pictures and undertake
pictorial effects and films contain words and undertake verbal effects” (14).
Overall, these post-structuralist interrogations of the discourse of adaptation
both acknowledge the existence of the novel/film dichotomy and operate to
dismantle it. The notion of the adaptation as an undecidable is yet another
means of deconstructing the hierarchical bifurcation that informs adaptation
theory. Scholars almost universally recognise that the privileging of novels over
films – akin to the privileging of man over woman – is one of adaptation theory’s
most pervasive and destructive tropes. As Rick Berg observes, the discourse of
adaptation “repeatedly reaffirms the binary hierarchy [N] between Hollywood
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and the written word” (101). In this particular discursive context, the film is
invariably positioned as the novel’s inferior antithesis.
The divisive, bifurcated quality of the novel/film binary could perhaps, at first
glance, be perceived as fatal to the fidelity obsession – indeed, this is what
practitioners of the approach profess. Similarly, Bluestone’s medium-specific
approach, an approach that serves to ratify the binary by insisting upon the
novel/film divide, could appear to be a successful means of discrediting the
fidelity fixation. If, as the binary demands, the novel and the film are so
staunchly at odds, fidelity is obviously an impossible ideal and should thereby
be excluded as a means of critical assessment. As two sides of a rigid binary,
novel and film can never equate – a filmic translation of a novel can thereby
never be absolutely faithful to its source. A closer look reveals, however, that
this binary paradoxically perpetuates the preoccupation with fidelity. The
novel/film binary simultaneously bifurcates and hierarchises the binaric pair,
locating the novel both as the superior, preferred locus and in direct opposition
to the film. Thus, to assert an essentialist difference between the media, as
Bluestone does, is simply to reinscribe “the oppositional structure” (Alcoff 417)
along with the hierarchy that necessarily accompanies it. The consequence of
this dichotomy, then, is the valorisation, rather than the rejection, of fidelity –
the film, positioned within the binary as the lesser of the two forms, must aspire
to match the novel upon which it is based; to mimic the original, more perfect,
preferred narrative as closely as possible, deviating “at its peril” (Bluestone 5).
Informed by this seemingly unshakable binary, adaptation theorists lament the
failure of adaptations to effect fidelity, inevitably and persistently comparing the
resulting works unfavourably to their novelistic counterparts.
Critics and theorists need a way out of this straitjacket, and Derrida supplies it.
Via the process of deconstruction, Derrida disrupts and disturbs binary
oppositions, exposing them as problematic and flawed – at once artificial,
essentialist and ideologically laden. One of the most significant features of
deconstruction is the undecidable. Derrida explains his concept of
undecidables thus:
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I have called, undecidables [N] ‘false’ verbal properties [N] that can no longer be
included within philosophical (binary) opposition, but which, however, inhabit
philosophical opposition, resisting and disorganising it, without ever constituting a third
term, without ever leaving room for a solution in the form of speculative dialectics. (43)

Undecidables refuse neatly to correspond to either side of a binary, thus
defying its strict, dichotomous division. Derrida provides numerous examples of
undecidables that operate to disrupt and problematise binary oppositions.
Plato’s pharmakon, for instance, is “neither remedy nor poison, neither good
nor evil”, the hymen “neither the inside nor the outside” (43), the zombie, neither
alive nor dead, and the androgyne, neither wholly woman nor man (Fogarty 1).
The undecidable simultaneously inhabits both sides of the binary – the ghost,
neither present nor absent, is, alternatively, at once present and absent
(Reynolds 46), the androgyne both man and woman. As Derridean scholar Jack
Reynolds explains, the undecidable is “one of Derrida’s most important attempts
to trouble dualisms, or, more accurately, to reveal how they are always already
troubled” (46). Undecidables indicate the fragility – and, ultimately, the failure –
of binary oppositions, demonstrating that “binary oppositions are a good deal
less oppositional than they would seem to be” (Bertens 129).
The undecidable figures usefully in the deconstruction of the novel/film binary,
the hallmark of the discourse of adaptation. Interestingly, it is the adaptation
itself that operates to destabilise the very opposition that informs adaptation
theory. Bluestone himself exhibits an unconscious awareness of the
undecidability of the adaptation when he describes the “filmed novel” as the
space where “both media apparently overlap” (VIII). Contemporary theorists
have also obliquely foreshadowed this deconstructive approach. Boyum alludes
to the in-between status of the adaptation, observing that it is “not literary
enough in that it proceeds through pictures, not cinematic enough in that it has
its origins in words” (15). The adaptation, she contends, “finds itself in a noman’s land, caught somewhere between a series of conflicting aesthetic claims
and rivalries” (15). Boyum’s deconstructive approach is perhaps most
compellingly evident in the title of her second chapter, “Film as Literature” (21)
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— a phrase that conflates, rather than bifurcates novel and film, collapsing the
binary. In keeping with the post-structuralist quality of her approach, Elliott also
hints at the undecidable status of the adaptation. In her discussion of a review
of the 1911 adaptation of Vanity Fair, she observes:
Three rather than two forms come under judgement here: the novel (a “masterpiece”),
the adaptation (some parts “inexcusable”, others pardoned “under the plea of ‘dramatic
license’”) and the film (“a singularly interesting picture”). The novel is unilaterally
praised; the film, moderately complimented, while adaptation once again emerges as
the [N] rake of the interart triad (140).

In this particular review, the adaptation is posited as separable from both the
novel in which it has its origins and the film in which it finds its form. Occupying
a third space, the adaptation complicates the novel/film binary. Thus, as an
undecidable, the adaptation — situated somewhere between the categories of
novel and film, simultaneously recognised as both and as neither — challenges
the novel/film binary, thereby refuting the hierarchy that situates the novel as
innately superior to the film, and thus rendering problematic the desire for
fidelity. As Derridean scholars Jeff Collins and Bill Mayblin note, “if the
categories [N] are disturbed, the hierarchy too might begin to lose its grip” (99).
An adaptation is a hybrid, an amalgam of media – at once a cinematised novel
and a literary film, bridging and rejecting the alleged discordance between page
and screen. Always inextricably linked to the novel it seeks to transform, the
adaptation is often referred to and understood as but a version of the novel,
rather than as a separate text. This means of referring to adaptations is
extraordinarily prevalent – the first line of an online review of the recent
adaptation of C. S. Lewis’ The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe, for example,
refers to it as the “film version of the children’s classic” (Honeycutt 1) – implying
that the filmed adaptation is but another rendering of the original text, a varying
manifestation of a singular story. As Cardwell claims, in the discourse of
adaptation, the term “version” is “commonly used to deny [the adaptation’s]
independence as a text” (21). The film version, “based on”, “derived from” or
“inspired by” the novel, is almost always understood and discussed in relation
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to its earlier manifestation. The adaptation and its source often conflate and
merge, the pair frequently perceived as interchangeable — the very opposite of
adverse.
The adaptation, in a sense, is the novel – albeit the novel in filmic guise.
Renee Zellweger’s Bridget, for example, somehow comes to inhabit not only
her cinematic world, but also the pages of the original text. As Caryn James
observes, “the literary version of Bridget [N] now has the movie-star face of
Renee Zellweger” (2). Scenes from the film and the novel interact and overlap
too, blurring the boundaries of the two discrete texts. Familiarity with one text
may even suggest an acquaintance with both. Indeed, the phenomenon of the
tie-in — the novel reissued and re-branded so as to coincide with and advertise
the adaptation’s release — literalises the interchangeability of a film and its
literary source, strengthening the sense of parallelism and overlap. The movie
tie-in constitutes a tangible conflation of the novel and its filmic counterpart, the
film’s visuals stamping the novel’s cover and, quite literally, permeating its very
pages. The tie-in, an increasingly common publishing practice, visually insists
upon the pair’s correspondence.
An adaptation is also simultaneously – and, certainly technically speaking – a
film – a “filmed novel” (Bluestone VIII), a novel “brought to life”, a novel “in
pictures”. On the other hand, an adaptation is never simply a film or a novel –
rather, it skims across both sides of the binary, refusing to completely align with
either. Reviews of filmic adaptations inevitably refer to their problematic, inbetween status; both a film and a novel, neither a film nor a novel – despite the
medium they inhabit, their ties to the novels from which they derive are never
really severed. As Boyum maintains, an adaptation “stands in indissoluble
relation” to its source (64). Alternatively, whilst an adaptation is often conceived
of as simply a novel in a new guise, a novel realised on screen, its filmic form
clearly undermines and denies its classification as (an approximation of) the
novel.
As an undecidable, adaptation suggests that the novel/film binary opposition is
false and fluid, rather than fixed, calling into question the discourse that finds its
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basis in this strict bifurcation. The fidelity fixation that pervades the discourse is
rendered unsuitable as a critical measure, reliant as it is on the binaric
approach to novel and film. Not only is the hierarchy of novel to film disputed by
the problematic in-between category of adaptation, but so to is the strict division
between the media relied upon and propagated by Bluestone and the later
proponents of the dominant medium-specific approach. Adaptation bridges the
gap, inhabits the overlap and embodies a common ground in defiance of the
binary that situates the novel as the film’s antithetical inferior.
The undecidability of adaptation is not the only means by which adaptation
upsets the very binary via which it is understood. The word itself – adaptation –
also has significant deconstructive implications – to adapt is to change, to bend,
to refuse boundaries. Adaptation can then be doubly read as a rejection of
binaries, a site of intersection and a conflation of media, the term a pointed
rebuttal of the polarity that has come to characterise the discourse in the wake
of Bluestone’s founding text.

UNABASHED SUBSCRIPTION TO THE FIDELITY PARADIGM
It is apparent that proponents of the medium-specific approach reinstate fidelity
inadvertently and ironically, given that this now dominant approach to
adaptation initially developed in direct response to frustrations with the
limitations of fidelity criticism. Not every reinscription of fidelity, however, is the
consequence of a theoretical misfire. Take Jean Mitry’s 1971 offering,
“Remarks on the Problem of Cinematic Adaptation”, for instance. In Mitry’s
mind, the deplorable infidelity of most – if not all – adaptations is problematic in
that he believes that the majority of adaptations do not warrant being referred to
as such. Of adaptations that ignore the fidelity imperative, he says, “to speak of
‘adaptation’ in such a case is beside the point, for the film, however interesting
it might be, no longer has anything to do with the original work which it is
supposed to reflect” (4). Mitry’s use of quotation marks here denotes his very
narrow definition of adaptation – like Bluestone, Mitry conflates the very
concept of adaptation with faithful adaptation. According to Mitry, a filmmaker
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who produces an unfaithful filmic rendition of novel “is in no position to boast of
what he [sic] has done on behalf of the novel” (4).
A blatant subscription to the fidelity paradigm continues amongst a minority of
contemporary scholars. In her introduction to the edited collection, The Classic
Novel: From Page to Screen, Erica Sheen makes no apologies for the fact that
“all the essays in [the] volume take the question of fidelity as their primary
critical point of reference” (2). Tibbetts and Welsh adopt a similarly unabashed
pro-fidelity stance. Tibbetts and Welsh assess adaptations according to the
degree to which they replicate their respective source texts – those that are
sufficiently faithful are deemed “agreeable” (XIX). Echoes of Mitry are apparent
in the claim that, due to its radical departure from its source text, the film
version of the novel of the same is not “qualified to be called The Witches of
Eastwick” (XVII).
Fidelity-based assessment is perhaps most prevalent in critical treatments of
specific instances of adaptation. One fairly recent example is Gene D. Phillips’
1998 comparative analysis of screen versions of Conrad’s Nostromo. He
contrasts two very different adaptations of the novel, ultimately preferring the
1997 television miniseries of the same name to the 1926 adaptation, The Silver
Treasure, on account of the former being a “faithful rendition of the book” and
thus a “fine example” of adaptation (294). A twenty-first century example of
frank fidelity criticism in practice is David L. Kranz’s “The English Patient:
Critics, Audiences and the Quality of Fidelity”. Kranz’s analysis is a
straightforward, meticulous evaluation of the degree to which Anthony
Minghella’s acclaimed adaptation is faithful to Michael Ondaatje’s novel. Whilst
Kranz stops short of praising the film simply on account of its apparently faithful
response to the novel, the affectionate tone of his discussion effectively implies
his approval of and preference for fidelity.

“MAKING EFFORTS TO MOVE”: EXPOSING THE PERSISTENCE OF
FIDELITY
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Without ever explicitly labelling it as such, Cardwell sets out her decidedly
deconstructive approach to adaptation theory early on in her recent offering,
Adaptation Revisited: Television and the Classic Novel, appropriating the words
of genre theorist Rick Altman:
The purpose here is to highlight the very claims that N theorists have failed to
recognise they were making, the constitutive assumptions that theoreticians have
neglected to acknowledge in their own work, the habits and positions that have been
silently passed on, often at cross-purposes with official positions and conscious desires
11

(9-10) .

Cardwell’s interest in the contradictions and inconsistencies that occur within
scholarly writing about adaptation closely mirrors Derrida’s critical approach to
the works of his fellow philosophers, and thus inhabits a post-structuralist
space. As Fred Orton explains, “Derrida’s forte is to apply his method to texts
which themselves take up a severely critical attitude to their own tradition and
to show that these texts [N] repeat the errors they criticise in a disguised way”
(36). Jonathan Culler explains Derrida’s agenda similarly – his practice is to
explicate instances wherein the logic of an argument “undoes itself and thus
involves a central paradox or self-contradiction which is a basic insight into the
matter under discussion” (Culler 159). The following analyses of seemingly
workable critiques of and alternatives to the fidelity paradigm invokes and
extends Cardwell’s deconstruction of adaptation theory, simultaneously
acknowledging the brilliant post-structuralist work she has done whilst also
undertaking a deconstructive reading of that very work.
As Culler explains, “deconstructive readings are often interpreted as attacks on
the authors they discuss, since they reveal a self-contradiction or selfdeconstruction and since we are accustomed to think that self-contradiction
invalidates any intellectual enterprise” (173). Self-contradiction features
particularly heavily in the discourse of adaptation theory – adaptation
scholarship thus specifically lends itself to deconstruction. Rather than
invalidating the work that has been done, the inconsistencies inherent in much
11

Emphasis added.
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adaptation scholarship simply operate to invite further, more post-structurally
rigorous contributions, and reveal the grip that the fidelity paradigm has on
even the most aware and progressive of adaptation theorists. This particular
contribution to adaptation theory will perhaps eventually be similarly prone to
deconstruction, and as such will hopefully help to propel adaptation scholarship
forward.
Many of the more prominent and contemporary adaptation theorists
acknowledge that fidelity criticism is problematic, and profess their intentions to
abandon the fidelity paradigm, to inscribe the discourse with new approaches to
adaptation. However, fidelity criticism reveals itself to be somewhat intractable
from the study of novel-into-film adaptation, in that continues to figure in much
of this work, work that is characterised by thwarted intent – for, as Stam
observes, “fidelity theory does not always name itself as such” (Literature and
Film 18).
A number of commentators have theorised various categories of adaptation in
an effort to encourage fairer critical analyses. Larsson, in 1983’s “Novel Into
Film: Some Preliminary Reconsiderations”, isolates “three varieties of
response” by a filmmaker to a source text (74). The first, he terms a desire to
reproduce the text, to “bring the novel to the screen” in what is usually called a
“faithful adaptation” (74). A second category Larsson defines as “a more or
less significant alteration to the work to fit the [filmmaker’s] own artistic
purposes” (74). Larsson’s third and final type of filmic response to a source text
is a “conscious effort to criticise, subvert, undercut or deconstruct the novel
itself, even to the point of altering it entirely” (74). The idea, then, is that
adaptations be assessed fairly, according to the category to which they belong.
In Larsson’s terms, an adaptation that seeks to criticise the text upon which it is
based cannot fairly be subjected to the same rigorous criterion as an adaptation
that attempts to reproduce its source – there is little point in assessing it in
terms of fidelity, given the apparent absence of any intent to effect fidelity.
McFarlane explains the aims of categorisation:
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Attempts [N] at classification [N] represent some heartening challenges to the primacy
of fidelity as a critical criterion. Further, they imply that, unless the kind of adaptation is
identified, critical evaluation may well be wide of the mark (11).
It does seem important in evaluating the film version of a novel to try to assess the kind
of adaptation the film aims to be. Such an assessment would at least preclude the
critical reflex that takes a film to task for not being something it does not aim to be (22).

Categorisation ultimately fails as a means of devaluing fidelity criticism,
however, since it essentially comprises a re-enactment of the “kind of critique to
which [practitioners of this approach] claim they are opposed” (Cardwell 62). As
Cardwell explains, “in order to judge the extent to which a filmmaker intended to
be ‘faithful’ [N] we must first undertake [N] analysis” to discover the extent to
which an adaptation is faithful (61). Once it is established that an adaptation is
the product of a filmmaker’s intention to faithfully reproduce a novel, “all that
can be done [N] is to pinpoint” the filmmaker’s failures to sufficiently,
completely enact fidelity (61). What this results in is blatant adherence to the
fidelity paradigm, a reinscription of fidelity criticism – “a list of the ways in which
the film fails to live up to the book” (62).
Like Larsson, McFarlane is but one of many whose work sets out to disturb, but
ultimately propagates, the popular and scholarly obsession with fidelity. An
important and innovative contribution to the ongoing critical dialogue,
McFarlane’s 1996 publication, Novel to Film: An Introduction to the Theory of
Adaptation, begins by explicitly denouncing the fidelity approach, variously
describing it as “pervasive” (8) and “unilluminating” (9), claiming that “no critical
line is in greater need of re-examination – and devaluation” (8).
However, a stark contradiction is evident in the contrast between McFarlane’s
apparent intention to resist the fidelity paradigm and what Naremore describes
as his “[obsessive concern] with problems of textual fidelity” (9). In order to
problematise the scholarly call for fidelity, McFarlane draws heavily on the work
of structuralist Roland Barthes, differentiating between the various narrative
functions that combine to tell a story – “functions proper” (including both
“cardinal functions” and “catalysers”), which essentially denote aspects of story
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content and accelerate story development, “informants”, largely comprised of
“’ready-made knowledge’, such as the names, ages and professions of
characters”, and “indices proper”, which relate to the more complex concepts of
“character and atmosphere” (13-14). McFarlane devotes much of his treatise to
demonstrating “how [cardinal functions, as well as catalysers and informants]
can be transposed intact to movies” (Naremore 9), an approach which has
contradictory consequences. On the one hand, McFarlane contends that the
quest for fidelity is fruitless, given that indices proper are open to interpretation
and “intransigently tied to the medium which displays them” (196), thus
hindering attempts to enact absolute faithfulness to the original text. However,
his focus on and belief in the transferability of the remaining narrative functions,
culminating in his claim that “informants may be seen as a first, small step
towards mimesis in novel and film” (15), belies his seemingly dissenting take on
fidelity. The implication of McFarlane’s classificatory approach is that those
narrative functions that are directly transferable should be so transferred. In his
follow-up piece, 2000’s “It wasn’t like that in the book”, McFarlane again insists
on fidelity, labelling Peter Bogdanovich’s Daisy Miller as the ideal adaptation
given that it “transfers all the major examples of what Roland Barthes would call
‘cardinal functions’; its characters are given to do what they do in the novel and
almost always where they do it in the novel” (166-7).
In his attempt to categorise narrative functions McFarlane essentially replicates
the very fixation that he sets out to reject. Although he succeeds in providing
alternatives to the “individual, impressionistic comparisons” (195) that litter
adaptation scholarship, McFarlane ultimately fails to successfully dispel the
fidelity fixation.
In his 1997 contribution, Adaptations as Imitations: Films from Novels, Griffith
harnesses diction in an attempt to move beyond the limitations of fidelity
criticism, only to ultimately reinscribe both fidelity and the binary to which it is
affixed. Griffith proposes a new way of looking at adaptation – adaptation as
imitation – as an alternative to dominant, fidelity-focused approaches to
adaptation. Griffith explains his approach:

101

An imitation tries to capture some qualities of [an] object without perversely trying to
capture them all. For instance, a still-life painting or a poem may pleasantly suggest
the colour and ripeness of an apple, but without tempting us to bite into the canvas or
page [N] (41).

Although Griffith sees imitation as something that is merely suggestive of and
therefore clearly separable from its source, dictionaries invariably define an
imitation as a copy, a counterfeit – think imitation leather, imitation vanilla
essence. The word carries with it unquestionably negative connotations in that
it is suggestive of a lesser, ‘cheaper’, faux form, a failed attempt to equate.
Thus the binaric structure of adaptation theory – original/copy, genuine/fake – is
perpetuated, and the fidelity paradigm, notwithstanding attempts to render it
problematic, is in fact once again reproduced.
In her editorial collaboration with Deborah Cartmell, Whelehan explicitly
announces her intention to pose a challenge to the fidelity paradigm. “What we
aim to offer here”, she contends, “is an extension of [the fidelity] debate, but
one which further destabilises the tendency to believe that the origin text is of
primary importance” (3). This is achieved – at least in part – by the decision to
“move away from a consideration of ‘literary’ adaptations (where the text is so
well known that a potential cinema audience would have an idea of the
‘authentic’ version regardless of whether they’d ever actually read it) to a focus
on adaptations more broadly” (3-4). The selection of exemplary texts – ranging
from Emma and Clueless to Trainspotting and 101 Dalmatians – flags a
genuine desire to unseat the hierarchy that underscores the discourse of
adaptation and, in so doing, debunk the fidelity paradigm:
For many people the comparison of a novel and its film version results in an almost
unconscious prioritising of the fictional origin over the resulting film, and so the main
purpose of comparison becomes the measurement of the success of the film in its
capacity to realise what are held to be the core meanings and values of the originary
12

text (3) .
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The irony here is that Whelehan seemingly subscribes to this very approach.
She calls for fidelity – albeit fidelity to the spirit of the source text, rather than to
the letter – in her suggestion that it “may be fruitful to investigate [N] whether
the ideological perspectives offered [in an adaptation] seem to echo those of
the literary narratorial perspective” (17). This statement undermines
Whelehan’s avowed anti-fidelity agenda, suggesting as it does that the search
for and assessment of the degree to which an adaptation upholds the values of
its source text is in fact a valid and useful scholarly project. Whelehan’s —
somewhat anomalous — suggested approach would only serve to warrant
dissatisfied responses to ideologically unfaithful adaptations. One type of
fidelity is simply replaced with another – the primacy of the source text/novel is
reinscribed.
Cardwell’s examination of adaptation theory is intriguing in that her meticulous
deconstruction of the work of her scholarly peers is intermittently undermined
by her own seemingly unwitting insistence on fidelity. Cardwell’s dissection of
adaptation scholarship is thorough and wide reaching, exposing the problems
posed by various analytical models. These problems are deemed as such
because they, in one way or another, operate to perpetuate the fidelity fixation.
For example, Cardwell points out that the medium-specific approach “could
encourage conclusions which postulate the ‘natural’ (intrinsic) superiority of the
literary text over its visual adaptation ([N] the valorisation of one medium over
another)” (44). She also deconstructs the work of specific theorists, noting the
“lack of fit” between Bluestone’s conceptual principles and intentions, and his
attempts to apply his theories to real case studies” (47).
It is within her analysis of Bluestonian medium-specificity that inconsistencies
become apparent. Cardwell cites – and concurs with – Andrew’s contention that
“medium-specificity disallows even the possibility of ‘adaptation’ in any sense in
which the term is commonly understood” (52). An earlier claim – “if the gap
between the media concerned is ‘totally unbridgeable’ then there seems to be
no way forward” (49) – echoes Bluestone’s lament, similarly defining adaptation
in its narrowest sense. Medium-specificity does not problematise the concept of
faithless adaptation, or adaptation per se – it only poses a challenge to the
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concept of faithful adaptation, in that it implies that the differences between the
media disallow accurate filmic replications of source novels. Cardwell conflates
adaptation and faithful adaptation in her deconstruction of Bluestone’s mediumspecific approach, thereby preserving the fidelity fixation in conflict with her
purported stance, and exemplifying fidelity’s unconscious dominance of the
discourse.
In “Twelve Fallacies in Contemporary Adaptation Theory”, one of the more
pragmatic approaches to resolving the static quality of this field of study, Leitch
is markedly and explicitly critical of adaptation scholarship’s obsession with
fidelity. He rails against medium-specificity as well as more overt instances of
fidelity-based evaluation. Of the former, he argues, “though novels and films
may seem at any given moment in the history of narrative theory to have
essentially distinctive properties, those properties are functions of their
historical moments and not of the media themselves” (153). Leitch also refutes
what is perhaps the basic axiom of medium-specificity – the pervasive notion
that “literary texts are verbal, films visual” – labelling it “obviously untrue” yet
perplexingly “enduring” and “pernicious” (153). Leitch goes on to claim that
fidelity is “indefensible [N] as a criterion for the analysis of adaptations” (162).
He explains:
Fidelity to its source text – whether it is conceived as success in re-creating specific
textual details or the effect of the whole – is a hopelessly fallacious measure of a given
adaptation’s value because it is unattainable, undesirable, and theoretically possible
only in a trivial sense (161).

Leitch’s contribution is a gloomily accurate account of adaptation’s scholarly
quandary. What is missing here, however, is an alternative route, an approach
aimed at effectively superseding the fidelity paradigm. Leitch clearly favours an
intertextual approach to adaptation, but fails to take this opportunity to explain
how such an approach would respond to and dispel the academic interest in
fidelity criticism.

WORKABLE ALTERNATIVES TO FIDELITY
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Many critiques of adaptation theory, however, do replace fidelity criticism with
alternative analytical models. In fact, three distinct, workable alternatives to
fidelity criticism have emerged. These are alternatives in the truest sense, in
that they encompass an unambiguous rejection of fidelity and consequently
propel adaptation scholarship forward.

The Reader/Viewer-Response Model
The first of these can be found in Boyum’s Double Exposure: Fiction Into Film,
a self-described defence of the practice of adaptation, which employs readerresponse theory as a means of problematising the insistence on fidelity.
Although Boyum’s work ultimately – and somewhat perplexingly – upholds the
fidelity paradigm, limiting and qualifying reader-response theory so as to
maintain the discursive veneration of fidelity, her insistence on fidelity is
dubious, and is symptomatic of the general scholarly reluctance to abolish
fidelity as a critical measure. Reader-response theory, in its insistence on the
inherent multiplicity of meaning, could more logically be harnessed as a means
of debunking this fixation.
Reader-response theory, as Boyum explains, is based on the premise that “a
literary work has no mode of existence in itself – that it comes into being only
as a partner in a cooperative venture with a reader who inevitably brings to
bear an entire constellation of past experiences, personal associations, cultural
biases and aesthetic preconceptions” (xi). Also known as reception theory, this
approach complicates notions of fidelity via its suggestion of the inherent
instability of meaning.
A reception-based approach to adaptation works to obscure the demand for
fidelity in two distinct ways. Firstly, as Boyum contends, given the range in
“ages”, “past experiences”, “personal associations”, “aesthetic presuppositions”
and gender, “there is no possible way” that every member of an adaptation’s
viewing audience will “see” the same movie (44-5). She continues:
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A movie [N] has no life of its own, no meaningful mode of existence as an isolated
entity. It is only a parade of lights and shadows flickering on a screen, a mere series of
noises of varying intensity, until a viewer comes onto the scene to perceive those sights
and sounds, to organise and resolve them into symbolically charged patterns, to accord
them sense and significance [NT]o the extent that each of us is different, so will the
movie we each create individually be different too (45).

Fidelity is thus discredited by the very fact that a film has no singular import – if
a film has multiple meanings, if a film is created uniquely over and over by each
of its viewers and upon every viewing, how can fidelity ever be meaningfully
assessed?
The very possibility of fidelity is also challenged by the fact that it is dependant
upon a seeming convergence of the viewer’s interpretation of a source text and
the interpretation rendered on screen – the filmmaker’s interpretation. In the
same way that a single film renders multiple, limitless meanings, so too does a
single novel. Fidelity criticism therefore ultimately entails nothing more than a
comparison of “one resymbolisation with another” (50). The consequent
conclusion that an adaptation unfaithfully represents its source text, then, is but
an announcement of an “allegiance” to one’s own “imaginative re-creation” (50).
As Boyum points out, “given that every reader creates his own individualised
novel, and that every viewer brings into being his own particular film as well,
what can the notion of fidelity actually mean?” (67). A reader-response
approach to adaptation effectively exposes the meaninglessness of fidelity
criticism in that it reminds us that both the source novel and the film from which
it originates are inevitably unfixed, prone to a multitude of determinations of
meaning. Fidelity thus only ever occurs by chance, and as such, is an
inherently subjective – and therefore flawed – analytical criterion.
Scholastically, however, reader-response theory is problematic in its suggestion
that every text potentially generates unbounded, unfounded, and endless
meanings – it is an approach that, when applied with absolute abandon,
ultimately renders texts absent of meaning.
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The Intertextual Model
Adaptation is, essentially, an explicit case of intertextuality – “a permutation of
texts” (Kristeva 36). It is intertextuality in its truest, most self-conscious,
“underlined” (Orr 72) form. Thus the collision of theories of intertextuality and
adaptation makes absolute sense. The intertextual approach to adaptation is
perhaps the most rigorously and successfully theorised anti-fidelity analytical
model – not to mention currently the most trendy. Intertextuality successfully
problematises the demand for fidelity by relegating an adaptation’s source text
to the status of one of many competing intertexts. As Stam, one of numerous
practitioners of this approach, explains, “notions of intertextuality [N] help us
transcend the aporias of fidelity, and of a [N] source/adaptation model which
excludes [N] all sorts of supplementary texts” (Literature and Film 27). Orr
explains fidelity criticism in intertextual terms:
The discourse of fidelity is premised on the over-determination of [an adaptation’s
connection to its source text] at the expense of all others [NT]his discourse or critical
strategy thus reduces intertextual space to a single pre-text rather than attending to the
richness of that space (7).

Rather than considering the source text a single, sacred work that the
adaptation must slavishly and faithfully adhere to, an intertextual approach
encourages recognition of a multitude of intertexts, and thus, a multitude of
sources. If the source novel is not an adaptation’s singular source, it only
follows that the source need not be especially revered. An intertextual approach
to adaptation thus unseats the primacy of the source text, and thereby weakens
the demand for fidelity.

The Ideological Model
The ideological analytical model acknowledges and evaluates the political
implications of the differences between a source text and its adaptation. As Orr
explains, “the issue is not whether the adapted film is faithful to its source, but
rather how the choice of a specific source and how the approach to that source
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serve the film’s ideology” (7). An ideological approach to adaptation is based on
the premise that the source text is necessarily changed, manipulated and
revised so as to serve an ideology. This premise constitutes an inversion of
fidelity discourse wherein the adaptation is always subservient to its literary
antecedent. The ideological model, then, can be seen to encourage subversion
(or, at the very least, interpretation) of, rather than reverent, mindless
compliance with the source novel. In Julie Sanders’s recent work, Adaptation
and Appropriation, intertextuality and ideology collide. Ideology – be it feminist,
Marxist, queer or post-colonial – is posited as an alternative and equally
venerable source ‘text’:
Adaptations and appropriations are impacted upon by movements in, and readings
produced by, the theoretical and intellectual arena as much as by their so-called
sources. Many [adaptations] are produced as much by the tenets of feminism, poststructuralism, post-colonialism, queer theory and post-modernism as by the literary
canon per se (13).

Ideological criticism is frequently practiced, but rarely theorised. The following
section seeks to develop and encourage a specific strand of ideological
analysis – a feminist theory of adaptation that will extend upon the current body
of feminist critical commentaries and provide a framework for further such
offerings.

A FEMINIST THEORY OF ADAPTATION
An effectual alternative to the fidelity paradigm exists in the interpretation of
adaptations as revisions — as opposed to imitations — of their respective
literary sources. Whether blatantly or subconsciously, all adaptations inherently
rework, and as such, rewrite the literary texts from which they arise. The fidelity
fixation is undermined by the very recognition of the revisionary impulse as an
unavoidable transpositional truth, an intrinsic and definitive trait of every
adaptation.
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Rewriting also figures significantly in feminist literature. Feminist revisions of
problematic patriarchal narratives operate as correctives, highlighting moments
of feminist insubordination, providing voices for the otherwise silenced and
depicting events from alternative perspectives. Adaptations, then —
amendments by their very definition — are apt vehicles for feminist revision,
allowing feminist filmmakers to expose the patriarchal ideology that informs
their chosen source texts, to brazenly appropriate an already existing work for
overtly feminist purposes, or, alternatively, to reclaim the feminist potential of
texts that are viewed as ideologically ambiguous or suspect.
This particular contribution to the theory of adaptation draws upon and seeks to
extend the established practice of literary revision. Feminist writers, led by the
likes of Angela Carter, Sylvia Plath, Anne Sexton, Margaret Atwood, Gloria
Naylor, Jean Rhys and Jeanette Winterson, have responded, through their
revisionary offerings, to Judith Fetterley’s claim that
While women obviously cannot rewrite literary works so that they become ours by
virtue of reflecting our reality, we can accurately name the reality they do reflect [N]
The consequence [N] of this re-vision is that books will no longer be read as they have
been read and thus will lose their power to bind us unknowingly to their designs (Rivkin
and Ryan 568).

Women can and have quite literally rewritten literary works, correcting,
improving and bettering patriarchally-invested stories in accordance with the
varied axioms of feminism. Feminist literary revision is, intriguingly, a site
wherein art and criticism collide. It is, as Adrienne Rich famously put it, “the act
of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an old text from a new
critical direction” (18). The revised text can be read as both a new artistic
offering, and either a pointed critique or seditious celebration of its origin and
impetus. The practice of revision draws on one of reception theory’s more
commonsensical maxims — the belief that a text’s preferred or standard
reading can be resisted and reworked. Feminist revisions are at once both
rewritings and re-readings, which primarily work to expose, alternately or
simultaneously, a text’s hidden subversive potential or inherent anti-feminism.

109

Nancy A. Walker describes the process of feminist literary revision as beginning
with a “disobedient reading” which eventually results in “ a new text that
attempts to overturn [the original’s sexist] formulations while remaining
sufficiently referential to the original to make clear its point of origin” (3).
Feminist literary revisions are, for the most part, re-workings of classic, maleauthored texts — “women’s imaginative encounters with a literary tradition of
which they are not an obvious part” (Walker 3) — yet the practice need not, and
is not, strictly limited to such works. Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea, a postcolonial alternative to Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre, is perhaps the most
famous example of a feminist revisionary treatment of a female-authored — not
to mention, allegedly proto-feminist — novel. Revisions should arguably
respond not to a specific author and his/her respective sex, but, rather, to a
specific text’s problematic or potentially progressive configuration of gender.
“In any revision”, writes Sharon Friedman, be it feminist or otherwise, “the
original work hovers over its present incarnation” (133). In fact, as Anne
Cranny-Francis observes, each revision offers “two narratives — the revised
version of the traditional narrative and its discursive referent, the traditional
narrative” (89). If the revised piece is to impart its reformist message, the
original work must be palpable within the appropriation. It is via their
intertextual engagement that the two texts, together, in their differences and
their similarities, make meaning. If it is to be effective, a revision must recast
elements of its antecedent, “using just enough concrete detail from the [source
text] so that the reader can recognise the tale that’s being reworked” (Crusie
29), yet infusing it with enough difference so as to render the rewrite
meaningful.
The strategies available to revisionists are virtually limitless. One approach is
to “resist, revise and produce meanings in response to the text’s own
promptings” (Friedman 133). The (re)writer works with what is already there,
deconstructing and decoding, attending to symbology and suggestion, to a
text’s latent features — giving voice to the silenced, padding holes and filling
gaps, working with clues, favouring and bringing to light a reading that is
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critically unauthorised. That which is only hinted at in the source text is
unequivocal in its revision. For feminists, this often entails focusing on what is
sidelined in the original, working to “make explicit and central stories that were
formerly implicit and marginal” (Walker 5-6) — female friendships are thus often
foregrounded (Friedman 132) and female characters relocated, moved from the
periphery to the centre. Binaric oppositions such as good versus evil are
undercut and thereby questioned — an evil witch’s motivations are explained,
revealing her humanity, for instance, or a princess’s purity and innocence
exposed as imposed passivity.
Alternatively, revisionists approach their foundational texts with an aggressive
freedom, using the original story to loosely inspire rather than direct or bind the
resulting work. In such instances, the source text is audaciously altered without
recourse to any pre-existing subversive subtext, so as to unassailably serve
feminism. Changes are made brazenly, rather than being sourced from within
— a formerly simpering and passive female is portrayed instead as witty and
passionate (Friedman 132) for instance. Bold gender-bending also features
heavily in such unencumbered appropriations — an active, engaging prince
often becomes, instead, a princess. Blatant disparities of this type clearly
highlight the perceived ideological biases of the resulting text’s referent and
provide alternative constructions of gendered identity, challenging the primacy
of the original.
A text’s status as fact or folklore, its underpinning of societal — and specifically,
gendered — norms, is often what motivates feminist revisionists to re-conceive
it. Revered as depictions of ahistoric truths, fairy-tales, biblical stories and the
works of Shakespeare are among the most commonly revised source texts.
Walker explains the suitability of such works:
Because the Genesis story as popularly understood, with its establishment of the
woman as both secondary and sinfully disruptive, has acquired such authoritative force
[N] it is not surprising that a number of writers have turned their revisionary impulses
upon it (26).
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Aside from their hegemonic might, such texts also figure heavily as revisionary
referents due to their familiarity. For a text to have revisionary force, it must
engage with a source that is readily recognisable. Otherwise, the necessary
connections and comparisons between the two may be missed altogether and,
unless clearly stated at the outset, certainly cannot be assumed. Fairy tales,
which are almost unvaryingly critiqued for their misogynistic and restrictive
manifestations of gender, and — dangerously —imparted to children the world
over, fairy-tales are perhaps the most favoured fonts of feminist literary
revision. As Walker points out:
The qualities associated with the best known of the fairy-tale heroines — qualities such
as innocence, passivity, helplessness and vulnerability — make them [N] pernicious as
models for female [N] behaviour [N] It is possible to find active, heroic girls and
women who succeed by their wits [amongst the Grimm tales, yet] these are not the
tales that have the widest cultural dissemination [N] Whether such tales as
“Cinderella”, “Snow White” and “Sleeping Beauty” have achieved such wide popularity
by chance or because their plots endorse — and are endorsed by — prevailing cultural
assumptions about woman’s nature and role must remain a matter of speculation (46-7,
48).

There is a massive body of feminist commentary pertaining to fairy-tales. Their
findings, however, are fairly uniform — female heroines, for instance, are said
to be problematically rewarded, via marriage and subsequent wealth, for being
passive, pure and pretty. It is only males who, in enacting their binaric
superiority, are positively portrayed as being pursuant and proactive, while
females who exhibit such qualities invariably figure as witches or evil fairies,
inhuman and ultimately punished. Women are depicted as being in competition
with one another — camaraderie and companionship are absent from the
relations between mother and daughter, sister and (step)sister. Marriage is the
inevitable happy ending, the culmination of the heroine’s inert patience and
suffering.
Fairy-tales provide a particularly apt site for feminist revision given that “revision
is part of the very nature of the fairy-tale, as it is of other oral forms. Stories
told by one generation to the next are frequently [N] embellished” (Walker 49),
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and there is often no known ownership. As Patricia Brooke points out, fairytales were “once the venue of women”, told and retold by mothers to their
children, until they were “taken over by male chroniclers of culture [such as
Hans Christian Andersen, the Grimm brothers, and Charles Perrault] in
attempts to unify and totalise their belief systems” (67). Feminist revisionists
thus insert themselves into this cycle of appropriation.
Angela Carter is perhaps the most prolific and lauded practitioner of feminist
literary revision. Her 1979 collection of reworked fairy-tales, The Bloody
Chamber, perhaps her finest and most popular offering, is the product of her
desire to investigate regulatory fictions pertaining to gender (Walker 73). This
text appropriates, often more than once, some of the most beloved and
bemoaned of the fairy-tales — “Snow White” and “Sleeping Beauty” are each
recipients of her post-structural, post-modern attentions, yet she rewrites
“Beauty and the Beast” twice, and “Little Red Riding Hood” three times,
perhaps so as to comment on the flexibility, as opposed to the apparent fixity,
of the fairy-tale and its fallacious and fictitious constructions of gender. Her
dual rewrites of “Beauty and the Beast”, entitled “The Courtship of Mr. Lyon”
and “The Tiger’s Bride” respectively, together neatly exemplify her constructivist
feminist stance and strategies.
The most popular version of “Beauty and the Beast” was written by Marie Le
Prince de Beaumont in the mid-eighteenth century (68), and tells the tale of a
beauteous, chaste and servile maiden, who, as a result of her father’s theft and
trespass, is demanded, as chattel, in exchange for his life. She goes to live with
the so-named Beast, of whom she is afraid and disgusted, yet treats kindly. He
falls in love with her, and allows her to visit her sick father given that she
promise to return to him. Her conspiratorial sisters prevent her from returning
at first, but eventually, and tardily, she does so, only to find the Beast deathly ill.
Agreeing to marry him if he lives, Beauty is stunned to see the Beast transform
from animal to handsome man. They live, as such tales invariably contend,
“happily ever after”.
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That binaric oppositions underscore the original story is immediately apparent
in its title — Beauty is posited as the favourable opposite to the Beast. Not only
are they polarised by gender, they are also different species — human versus
animal — and possessed of disparate personas, she all innocence and
gentleness, he an imprisoning, imposing brute. These lesser antagonisms
analogise, sustain and exaggerate the sexed split. Carter’s primary
deconstructive tactic is to undo the binary by portraying an unnervingly kindred
pair.
In the first few pages of “The Courtship of Mr. Lyon”, the Beast’s “otherness” is
repeatedly, explicitly stated (55). Beauty finds “his bewildering difference from
herself almost intolerable; its presence choke[s] her” (55). This disparity is
diminished, as the couple begin to overlap, exhibiting shared features and
recognising themselves in one another. For instance, they are both revealed to
be shy, although his reticence is said to be “that of a wild creature” (57). At this
point, Beauty gazes into the Beast’s “green inscrutable eyes”, only to see “her
face repeated twice” (57). As the story progresses, Beauty becomes the Beast
— wearing furs, she is likened to an “expensive cat” (59).
In “The Tiger’s Bride”, Carter constructs a feminist subjectivity that is notably
active, evidenced particularly in the pair’s sexual interaction (Brooke 71).
Unlike the pathetically servile and acquiescent Beauty of Beaumont’s story,
this protagonist — in every sense of the word — “was a wild wee thing” who
could not be tamed “into submission” (68). Gambled by her father, she is
acutely aware of the injustices visited upon women in a patriarchal landscape
and actively harnesses her worth, negotiating the terms of the transaction
wherein she is traded. “My own skin”, she recounts, “was my sole capital in
the world” (69-70). Upon being told that the Beast wishes to see her naked,
intent on setting her own conditions, she responds:
“You may put me in a windowless room, sir, and I promise you I will pull my skirt up to
my waist, ready for you. But there must be a sheet over my face, to hide it; though the
sheet must be laid over me so lightly that it will not choke me. So I shall be covered
completely from the waist upwards, and no lights. There you can visit me once, sir,
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and only the once. After that I must be driven directly to the city and deposited in the
public square, in front of the church” (72).

Like all such revisions, Carter’s reworkings of “Beauty and the Beast” “expose
[its] fictive nature [N] and refuse to obey [its] authority by revising and
appropriating [it]” (Walker 83). A number of adaptation scholars have observed
similar revisionary effects in filmic adaptations of literary works, yet only a
select few have sought to actually theorise adaptation in terms of what the
practice can offer feminism.
Sisterhoods: Across the Literature/Media Divide, edited by Cartmell, Whelehan,
IQ Hunter and Heidi Kaye, is a collection of feminist critiques of specific
examples of novel-into-film adaptation. In their co-authored “Introduction”,
Cartmell and Whelehan primarily observe that “film adaptations of womencentred novels seem particularly rapacious of the original text” (3). They
essentially argue that, when operating as the bases of mainstream cinematic
products, feminist texts unavoidably inspire ideological infidelity, a result of
Hollywood’s regressive and persistent patriarchal predilection. Their take on
the future of feminist adaptation is at times delimiting and fatalistic in its
disillusionment — Hollywood, they claim, “inevitably sides with patriarchal
values no matter how thematically radical or technically experimental a film
might be” (4). Although there is much evidence to warrant this dismal
appraisal, it is unfortunate that the authors make no provision or suggestion for
alternatives to this, for progress within the mainstream, arguing that, “ultimately,
in the cinematic and televisual representations of sisterhood [N], there is a
literature/film divide” (13).
Inger Christensen, the author of Literary Women on the Screen, comes to a
similarly reductive, deterministic conclusion. Prior to citing a number of
examples so as to ostensibly prove her hypothesised phenomenon,
Christensen establishes her somewhat naïve take on the practice of adapting
feminist texts:
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Very often there is a shift of ideology from novel to film, that is, in films with male
directors, and this is not to the advantage of the portrayal of the female characters. In
adaptations directed by women, there is usually a change of ideology which is to the
advantage of the female characters (9).

It seems almost needless to point out that not all women, nor all female
filmmakers, are feminists, just as not all men, nor all male filmmakers, are
unsympathetic to or disengaged from the feminist movement. Whilst it is a
truism that female filmmakers are likely to be predisposed to amplifying the
feminist messages they uncover in the texts upon which their films are based,
sex cannot be said to automatically or crudely dictate one’s political agenda. In
addition, it is important to acknowledge that a film’s director is only one
individual amongst many who are invested in and in control of the end product.
As a result, his or her singular and personal political leanings will not
necessarily be evident in the film’s final cut.
Whilst this thesis is, evidently, by no means the first scholarly investigation of
adaptation as a potentially feminist practice, it does aim to join Christensen,
Cartmell and Whelehan in extending the parameters of established work by
doing more than simply critiquing select instances of feminist adaptation. This
thesis seeks to develop feminist adaptation criticism by theorising adaptation as
a filmic manifestation of the literary tradition of feminist revision, and by positing
chick-lit, an intrinsically politically-conflicted genre, as a potential conduit of
feminist meaning. Characteristically ambiguous, chick-lit provides an
appropriate literary base for deconstructive, ideologically-driven adaptation
practices that serve to unseat the primacy of the novel.
There are countless book chapters and journal articles devoted to the intriguing
and apt intersection of feminism and adaptation. These treatments of specific
adaptations largely fail to interrogate the premise of the adaptation project or
the assumptions that underpin both the practice itself and the proliferation of
critical appraisals of its products. Most of these, in fact, albeit in the guise of a
more progressive approach, reinstate the fidelity paradigm by actively
prescribing spiritual fidelity, frequently lamenting its apparent absence.
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Karen Hollinger has produced quite an abundant analytical oeuvre, having
critiqued an array of adaptations from a feminist perspective. She tends to
begin her analysis by ascertaining whether or not the original work does in fact
proffer feminist thought, followed by an examination of the differences between
the film and its literary source, ultimately producing an assessment of the extent
to which the adaptation loyally mimics the politics seemingly preferred by the
book upon which it is based. Hollinger’s practice is to condemn an adaptation
on account of its departure from its source’s allegedly feminist — or anti/prefeminist, as the case may be — dogma, thereby deploying feminist criticism as
a methodological mechanism that ultimately serves rather than subverts the
celebration of fidelity. Her assessment of Beaches, the cinematic appropriation
of Iris Rainer Dart’s novel of the same name, nicely exemplifies her critical
approach. The sentimental story of female solidarity in the face of career
crises, heartbreak, pregnancy and birth, and, ultimately, terminal illness,
Hollinger perceives the originary text as “symbolically enacting the demise of
the traditional homemaker”, replacing her with “a new type of woman”, one who
is “assertive” and “career-oriented” (In The Company of Women 72). Ironically
perhaps, it is the film’s ostensibly feminist modification of the Bertie/Hillary
character — from housewife and stay-at-home mother to successful lawyer —
that Hollinger considers constitutes an ideological travesty so significant as to
“eliminate” the novel’s figuratively-conveyed feminist sentiment (73):
As a result of this crucial change, Hillary loses her symbolic significance. In her illness,
she becomes only a pathetic victim of random misfortune, and her death no longer can
be interpreted as a symbolic portrayal of the contemporary woman’s progression from
unfulfilled homemaker to independent working mother (72).

Hollinger deems the film a failed adaptation, not because of its arguably
miscalculated efforts to denote feminism per se, but, ultimately, due to its
botched attempts to faithfully transfer the novel’s politics to the screen. She
has similar complaints about the screen versions — entitled respectively
Dangerous Liaisons and Valmont — of Choderlos de Laclos’s novel, Les
Liaisons Dangereuses. Hollinger claims that each of these adaptations
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significantly reduces “the original work’s openness to a feminist reading”
(“Losing the Feminist Drift” 293). Whilst conceding that the novel’s Madame de
Mertuil is by no means an unproblematic feminist heroine, Hollinger argues
that, as conceived by the novelist, Mertuil enacts feminist rage, “wag[ing] war
on a gender ideology that renders women subject to male oppression” (294),
whereas, each of the filmic Mertuils demonstrates an ambivalent attitude to
sexist subjugation.
Like so many other well-intentioned scholars of adaptation studies, Hollinger
quite unequivocally signals her distaste for and departure from the fidelity
fixation, observing that there is “undoubtedly no such thing as a faithful
adaptation” (295). Such a claim is, however, undermined by the statement that
immediately follows:
What is curious about the interpretations rendered by the contemporary filmic
adaptations of de Laclos’s novel is the way the politics of the feminine are played out
through the art of adaptation to reduce in both films the possibility of reading them as
critiques of sexual inequality and patriarchal privilege (295).

The films are considered lesser, reduced renderings of an ideologically superior
and sophisticated text, given that they “view the novel through the lens of
romantic love and as a result [N] reduce the original work’s examination of
sexual inequality” (295). Hollinger posits her feminist reading — granted, a
reading supported by a tradition of scholarly critiques — as the singular,
authoritative reading, and, consequently, the text’s feminism as fairly
indisputable. Whilst she refrains from criticising differences between the source
and its cinematic manifestations simply on the basis of such difference, her
rejection of the adaptations as impressionistic failures ultimately mimics more
straightforward fidelity-based assessments.
Elizabeth Atkins is another who argues for fidelity via feminism. She claims
that the 1943 cinematic rendering of Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre
unsuccessfully adapts its source, given that it allegedly “edit[s] out Bronte’s
entire purpose of demonstrating the ability of women to be psychologically

118

independent” (54). In its place, she finds a much-compromised version of Jane,
one who speaks in seductive “breathy whisper[s]” and frequently figures as “a
dizzy damsel in distress” (58). Atkins makes numerous presumptive and
thereby problematic assertions as to Bronte’s authorial intentions. In one such
example, she alleges that “Bronte’s whole purpose of sending Jane to Lowood
is to demonstrate the necessity of love and understanding in one’s search for
identity” (57). Atkins defers to Bronte’s purpose time and time again, as if it
were something tangible and unequivocal. Perhaps such certainty is to be
expected to pertain to interpretations of a text as classic and as heavily studied
as this. Atkins clearly draws upon more than a century’s worth of somewhat
homogenous scholarly attention, as well as feminism’s celebration of Jane Eyre
as a proto-feminist work.
This piece also employs the emotive language characteristic of the fidelityfixated discourse of adaptation. The film’s omission of Jane’s life postThornfield is described as a “crushing blow” (59) — a blow not only to feminism,
but, also, to Bronte’s ideological intent. The film is deemed an adaptational
misfire, given that it seems to “deliberate[ly] move away from Bronte’s
precocious Victorian feminism” (60).
An important aside needs to be made here before anything more on feminist
criticism of adaptation is said. This thesis does not seek to negate feminist
criticism of adaptations per se. Like feminist criticism of literature, film and
television, condemning an adaptation as lacking by way of its patriarchal
politics is a valid and important process. What is being contested here,
however, is the harnessing feminist criticism as an underhanded means of once
again insisting on fidelity. Frustration with a filmic adaptation’s lack of feminist
sentiment is one thing — using this to challenge the film’s authenticity and
appropriateness is another entirely.
A small contingent of adaptation scholars has in fact managed to depart from
the fidelity praxis by way of embracing the revisionary — and thereby feminist
— potential of the adaptation process, and the alterations this process
inevitably, purposefully entails. Phyllis Zatlin is one such scholar. In her
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examination of Josefina Molina’s cinematic appropriation of Antonio Buero
Vallejo’s historical drama Un Sonador Para Un Pueblo, entitled Esquilache,
Zatlin argues unequivocally for the practice of unrestrained adaptation,
encouraging the feminist harnessing of otherwise ideologically unremarkable
source texts. In her opening paragraph, she notes that Molina’s productions
have “caused some critics to affirm that [her] feminist ideology had obscured or
exaggerated the original authors’ intentions” (104) — essentially arguing that
fidelity had been sacrificed necessarily so as to make way for feminism. Zatlin
does not deny this truth, noting that the “woman-centred aspects of Esquilache,
not present in [its precursory text], are intentional [textually unfounded]
additions” (105). Examples of such additions include the introduction of
powerful female characters, the skewing of characterisation of pre-existing
female characters so as to make them more sympathetic, and the subversion of
the original text’s idealised portrayal of the principal male characters (107).
Rather than condemning the blatancy with which Molina inflects her adaptation
with feminist meaning, Zatlin celebrates this approach, concurring with Susan
L. Martin-Marquez’s suggestion that such an openly transgressive approach to
adaptation “has been a [useful] route to developing feminist cinema in Spain”
(105). Change is not only sanctioned by such a critical approach to adaptation,
it is welcomed, understood as obligatory.
Christine M. M. Gaudry-Hudson is another proponent of this progressive
approach to adaptation. She flags her anti-fidelity stance at the outset of her
commentary on Euzhan Palcy’s adaptation of Joseph Zobel’s Sugar Cane
Alley, claiming that “film adaptations should be [considered as to] how well they
convey a message, and not how well they convey the exact message of the
original novel” (479). Her encouragement of ideologically inspired infidelity —
spiritual, literal or otherwise — ensures that she does not go on to contradict
herself.
Gaudry-Hudson, like Zatlin before her, condones palpable, contextually
unsolicited, ideologically-inflected revision, as opposed to unthinking fidelity.
She notes that Palcy uses selected elements of the original text and
renegotiates its plot so as to “create a different message” (482):
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In a paper discussing Zobel and Palcy, [Marjorie Haley and Keith Q. Warner] state that
“a fair degree of innovation and originality of interpretation are tolerated as long as [film
adaptations] remain ‘faithful to the spirit (or even, the letter) of the original text’”. I
disagree. In this instance, Palcy has transformed a story, which by the author’s own
admission had no intended
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political message. The literary critics argue that by

weaving the realities of oppression into a story of “social realism”, Zobel inadvertently
made a political statement. Palcy took those realties and put the message front and
centre. She has provided us with a look at the story from a different angle, bringing the
cruelties of the situation into our clear focus rather than letting them languish in our
peripheral vision as they do in the novel (491).

Palcy’s differing political perspective, then, is perceived by Gaudry-Hudson to
find its inspiration within the pages of the source novel itself. Hers is a
subversive rendering of the original text, a rendering that substantially departs
not only from admissions of genuine authorial intention, but also from the
singular, authoritative critical consensus as to the novel’s meaning.
Critical consensus is also key to Walter Metz’s deconstructive exposition of
Martin Ritt’s much-maligned filmic appropriation of the literary classic The
Sound and the Fury. Metz opens his article with an outline of the film’s vitriolic
critical reception:
When critics want to argue against film adaptation, they almost universally turn to Martin
Ritt’s 1959 version of William Faulkner’s 1929 novel, The Sound and the Fury. Reading
this criticism could lead one to conclude that The Sound and the Fury is one of the
worst adaptations ever made [N] Faulkner critics in particular have savaged the
Ritt film, calling it “ludicrous” and “inept”; its relationship to the original novel has been
theorised as a “mangling”, an “emasculation”, and a “betrayal” (21).

This widespread, canonised belief in the film’s untenable infidelity is necessarily
premised upon the existence of a supposed singular, indisputable and correct
critical interpretation of the novel. Metz observes the hegemonic force effected
by the unanimity of the novel’s critically conferred ideological, thematic and
stylistic status, noting that “a modernist orthodoxy asserted itself during the
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early Cold War years and produced a monolithic vision of Faulkner’s novel”
(21). This prevailing interpretation gained an authority that has led to the
exclusion of alternative readings such as Ritt’s:
In the wake of [the novel’s] critical canonisation, Martin Ritt produced a “ludicrous’
melodramatic version which toppled most of the sacred aspects of the text as
emphasised by these modernist critics [N] Given the monolithic construction of the
modernist meaning of The Sound and the Fury by most Faulkner critics, it shouldn’t
surprise us that a film which deconstructs (intentionally or by ineptitude) these bedrock
assumptions should come under such rabid attack (21, 30).

Metz deems Ritt’s The Sound and the Fury “a deconstructive adaptation” given
that the film, “contrary to the canonical interpretation of [its source], takes a
different interpretive path in producing its adaptive strategy”, refusing the
novel’s “stylistically aggressive” modernism as well as its “misogynist content”
(21-2). The film conveys its feminist meaning primarily via the use of narrative
voice. In the novel, Caddy is notably voiceless, never given the opportunity to
speak for herself, to explain and/or defend her actions. “Instead”, notes Metz,
“four men tell us their versions of Caddy’s story” (24). The film, seemingly
informed by the insubordinate interpretations of the novel proffered by feminist
scholars, corrects this bias and silencing, imbuing Caddy’s daughter Quentin
with perspectival authority via voice-over. Significantly, it is Quentin who has
the last word — the film’s final scene, wherein Jason lights a cigarette and
stands under a tree to smoke it, is undercut by Quentin’s non-diegetically
vocalised rejection of Jason’s construction of her identity. According to Metz,
“the film represents [N] a progressive deconstruction of the logic through which
Faulkner and his Cold War critics denied the female characters any voice at all”
(30).
Another feminist strategy evident in the film is the foregrounding and deepening
of the mother-daughter relationship as enacted by Caddy and Quentin. The
film “focuses on the way in which the [N] relationship between Caddy and
Quentin is constantly assaulted by the patriarchal control of Jason” (24). Metz
considers this subversive inflection to be not only a result of Ritt’s ideological
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intentions, but also a tribute to the novel’s critically denied melodramatic
tendencies.
Of note here is Metz’s claim that the novel was initially — prior to its Cold Warera canonisation — perceived as being fraught with “generic instability”, caught
somewhere between the dialectical opposites of melodrama and modernism.
Recognition of the text’s stylistic duality disables and discounts claims of
infidelity. Generically ambiguous, the novel is overtly open to multiple and
conflicting readings, its generic complexity unequivocally facilitating a variety of
possible cinematic renderings, each of which is potentially buttressed by the
source itself.
Although some critics have similarly acknowledged the plainly plural politics of
a number of texts upon which films have been based, they have routinely failed
to recognise the deconstructive potential such texts have to offer to the practice
and theory of adaptation, instead deploying these texts, as per the dictates of
the discourse of adaptation, so as to effectively preserve — rather than disrupt
— the fidelity paradigm. In “Polanski Misses: A Critical Essay Concerning
Polanski’s Reading of Hardy’s Tess”, Charles L. Fierz enacts a feminist critique
that ultimately condemns Tess on the basis of its faithless foregrounding of the
novel’s latent feminist sentiments. This is an interesting claim, given that,
unlike Jane Eyre, Tess of the D’Urbervilles has traditionally been the subject of
intense academic debate as to its political affiliation — there has never really
been any semblance of critical consensus. Fierz signposts this fact early on,
noting that “Hardy’s text might be interpreted vis-à-vis the code of Victorian
culture in two ways — either supportive or critical of that culture with respect to
[its] repression of women” (103), thus hinting at the text’s inherent ideological
instability and the post-structural promise that such plurality produces.
However, he unfortunately goes on to effectively revoke and reverse this
reading, replacing it with a single, stable take on the text and thus ultimately
mimicking Hollinger, Atkins and their counterparts:
Polanski, it seems, took the critical approach, arguing that the victimised Tess would
not have been repressed but for the male forces against her. Such an approach is
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supported neither by consideration of Hardy’s ideas about women nor by sound critical
consideration of the novel (103).

Returning to Hollinger, her later contributions to the study of adaptation also
anticipate the progressive potential that openly plural, critically-contested texts
offer to both the practice of, and scholarly debates surrounding novel-into-film
adaptation. Like her earlier critical offerings, Hollinger’s piece on the adaptation
of Virginia Woolf’s Orlando, co-written with Teresa Winterhalter, chiefly argues
that the filmmaker — in this instance, avant-gardist Sally Potter — has
misinterpreted the essence of her source text. Fidelity-based assessment
does, at least, appear somewhat justified in this instance — given that Potter
herself “has maintained repeatedly that hers is, without question, a [spiritually]
‘faithful adaptation’” (“Orlando’s Sister” 239) — but is still problematic in terms
of its intrinsic hierarchical connotations and the subjectivity such an appraisal
entails. Hollinger and Winterhalter themselves acknowledge the limitations of
such an approach:
As many critics remind us [N] the question of adapting a work’s essence to the screen
is a vexed one that always involves a subjective judgment of what that essence actually
is (239).

They continue in this vein, offering the insightful claim that the fact of the
novel’s vociferous anti-essentialism, “its multiple layers of embedded meaning”
(241), its “dismantl[ing of] the [very] possibility of a stable meaning” (239),
render claims of fidelity to an ostensible essence somewhat absurd (239). The
source text, then, is characterised as one that overtly dodges singularity of
meaning, and would thus appear to effectively dissuade fidelity-based criticism.
For Hollinger and Winterhalter, however, it is Potter’s own apparent
misunderstanding of Orlando’s essential plurality, her own bravado as to what
she believes she has achieved, that invites their judgment of the degree to
which her adaptation is spiritually true to its source. Ironically, the pair
ultimately characterise the novel as being anti-essentialist, and Potter’s
adaptation, then, as being unfaithful in terms of its failure to adequately render
the multiplicity of meaning generated by its literary counterpart. Hollinger and
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Winterhalter assert that “doubt about the existence of a spiritual core itself [is]
one of Orlando’s central thematic concerns” (239), yet rather than using the
text’s contestedness as a basis for alternative approaches to adaptation, they
manage to rather awkwardly re-route the novel’s polysemic plurality as an
essential feature requiring faithful re-enactment. Hollinger and Winterhalter
miss the very point, a point that they come so close to making — that texts
characterised by polysemy inherently invite more than one obvious
interpretation, and thus operate so as to unseat the very notion of textual
essence, and to complicate and disable the discourse’s fascination with and
regard for fidelity.
“A Feminist Romance: Adapting Little Women to the Screen” is also co-written
by Hollinger and Winterhalter. In the article’s opening paragraph, they point out
that, like Potter, Robin Swicord, who authored the screenplay for the1994
Gillian Armstrong directed film adaptation of Louisa May Alcott’s Little Women,
has explicitly stated that she “wanted to do a true adaptation”, albeit one that
would “say what was not being said, particularly to young women and about
young women” (173). Swicord’s approach to her source text, as outlined by
Hollinger and Winterhalter, clearly accords with well-established feminist
revisionary practices:
Because some of the things that Swicord apparently wanted to say were not explicit
themes in Alcott’s text, she turned to historical sources outside the novel to discover a
history of nineteenth-century women’s progressivism, focusing on educational reform,
abolition, and women’s suffrage. Swicord turned to these historical sources in order to
show women’s “politics of the times,” as well as to embellish and detail what she
conceived to be submerged progressive sentiments present in Alcott's text only in “very
veiled way”. Thus Swicord seems to have been keenly aware that revisionist impulses
influenced her transformation of Alcott’s novel — a transformation that shows Alcott’s
major female characters to be not only little women, but also early feminists (173).

This revision, then, is incited by the novel’s own cues, very much a product of
its own complexities. Fraught with ambiguity, “as the history of Alcott criticism
indicates” (173), the source text subscribes to two distinct, “competing
ideologies” (174), alternately critiquing and condoning the strictures of
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nineteenth-century notions of gender (173). Hollinger and Winterhalter
correctly characterise Little Women as “a work of a highly controversial nature”
(174). Its arguably feminist sensibility continues to figure as a source of lively
scholarly debate.
Hollinger and Winterhalter proceed to extract the various instances wherein the
adaptation seemingly inflates the novel’s feminism, and thereby, in their
opinion, problematically “refashion[s] Little Women into an unequivocally
feminist text” (176). For instance:
The film’s Marmee [N] champions feminist causes that are never even mentioned in
the novel and that Swicord seems to have imported from her knowledge of Alcott’s own
reading and of her involvement with the New England Women’s Suffrage movement [N
W]hereas the film’s Marmee advises Jo before she goes to New York, “embrace your
liberty and see what wonderful things come of it,” in the novel she says instead, “You I
leave to enjoy your liberty till you tire of it, for only then will you find that there is
something sweeter” (182).

The film is accordingly criticised by Hollinger and Winterhalter for its unfaithful,
emphatic reworking of the novel’s engagement with feminism, labelled by them
a reductive “misconception” (190) that “eliminates the ideological uncertainty”
(185) present in Alcott’s text. Although the pair initially acknowledge the
exciting revisionary potential offered by this particular literary source — calling it
“a troublingly ambiguous and conflicted work that opens itself to both
progressive and regressive possibilities” (176) — they ultimately condemn the
film as an unfaithful transposition that fails to accurately render the novel’s
duality, thus dismissing its revisionary impetus and thereby missing an
opportunity to interrogate the very notion of fidelity, the discourse’s single most
limiting premise.
Conceptualising novel-into-film adaptation as an inherently revisionary process
problematises the fidelity praxis, in that, rather than maintaining the critical
custom of condemning discrepancies, it allows for their endorsement. In Film
Adaptation and its Discontents: From Gone with the Wind to The Passion of the
Christ, something of an addendum to his earlier commentary on the scholarly
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stasis produced by the fields’s entrenched obsession with fidelity, Leitch argues
for the re-evaluation of adaptation as a necessarily revisionary process as
opposed to an exercise in mimicry, a strategy aimed squarely at re-routing the
study of novel-into-film adaptation away from fidelity-focused original-to-copy
comparisons. The practice of adapting a previous work is in fact predicated on
the fact that “every text offers itself as an invitation to be rewritten” (16). As he
explains, “texts remain alive only to the extent that they can be rewritten and
[N] to experience a text in all its power requires each reader to rewrite it” (12).
Taking this one step further, Leitch looks to films, such as Marilyn HoderSalmon’s adaptation of Kate Chopin’s The Awakening, that are overtly
revisionist, seemingly instances of “screenwriting as a medium of criticism”
(18). Leitch’s discussion of the revisionary potential of the process of
adaptation offers an excellent introduction to the conceptualisation of
adaptation-as-rewrite upon which the following chapters of this thesis are
premised.
If the practice is conceived of as revisionary, rather than as an attempt at an
exact filmic rendering of a literary text, an adaptation’s departure from its
source can be celebrated as an integral meaning-making element of the
process of inter-media transposition. As outlined above, there are a number of
approaches to the act of revision. It may, for example, occur as the result of a
bold, reckless move away from the constraints of the progenitory text, blatantly
reconfigured so as to serve a particular political perspective, or it may be
effected by working with cues found within the text itself, foregrounding that
which is latent.
The patently, palpably polysemic text is perhaps the most useful platform for
revision by way of cinematic appropriation, in terms of its potential to undermine
the hegemonic axioms of the discourse of adaptation. It is in this respect that
the chick-lit genre and its cinematic adaptations become pertinent. The political
plurality of the chick-lit novel, for instance, disables fidelity-focused assessment
— a site of struggle, its uncertainty problematises the notion of textual essence,
and thus both attempts to effect, and critical calls for, spiritual fidelity. Chick-lit,
as an incomplete, imperfect, ambivalent feminist reworking of the Harlequin
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Mills & Boon romance, is suitably controversial — there is no critical consensus
as to the extent of its feminist value. It sits, somewhat awkwardly, between its
generic precursor’s conservatism and a more fully-realised, unfettered
feminism. A revisionist adaptation of a chick-lit novel, then, can go either way,
choosing to either embrace and embellish its source’s somewhat traditional
romantic trajectory, or to emphasise its generic transgression, to foreground its
feminist challenge to notions of a natural, stable feminine identity. Leitch
argues that, if adaptations are to be fairly evaluated, “we need to evaluate their
source texts as well” (Film Adaptation and its Discontents 16). Given that
chick-lit texts are generally considered to be so far removed from the literary
canon, and as such lack the type of authoritative determinations of meaning
that appear to uphold the novel/film hierarchy, and in light of the genre’s
characteristic ambiguous sexual politics, adaptations of chick-lit novels would
seem to be particularly appropriate sites from which to begin the revivification of
adaptation as prescribed by Leitch. Chick-lit has no dominant or singular
essence, no easily extractable meaning or message, a fact which renders it
open to a range of very different interpretations, each of which is equally,
clearly textually supported. The glaring absence of any such essence works to
complicate notions of spiritual fidelity — the fact of the ongoing confusion as to
its ideological identification has the ability to render absurd any efforts to
faithfully, filmically restore such an essence. The fact that the genre only
recently established itself serves to underline its ambivalence. Because it is
classified as a popular genre, critics have hesitated to scholastically engage
with chick-lit, nor have they had sufficient time and opportunity to adequately
and thoroughly explore and assess it. Chick-lit is largely unencumbered by the
type of critical consensus that, as exemplified in the case of Jane Eyre, for
instance, potentially has the effect to delimit and define it, one way or the other.
The commentary that has been documented thus far struggles to define the
genre, and this lack of unanimity supports its status as an undecidable.
Polysemic texts — ideologically contentious, politically questionable — by their
very nature generate multiple meanings. This multiplicity itself may be realised
in the adaptations they inspire, or may be revised so as to allow for a more
transparently and unequivocally made meaning. A text’s political plurality
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allows it to be uncontentiously harnessed by one of multiple political positions,
thus disabling and deconstructing the fixity of the fidelity paradigm, according to
which adaptations are usually assessed, and enabling the making of a
politically inflected statement. The adaptation of texts of this type offers much
for both the critical customs pertaining to novel-into-film adaptation, and the
feminist movement.
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Part Two
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Chapter Three
ANIMAL HUSBANDRY and SOMEONE
LIKE YOU
By nature, man loves change.
The Kama Sutra

THE NOVEL
The above quotation, taken originally from The Kama Sutra, provides an apt
opening for Laura Zigman’s first novel, Animal Husbandry, in that it denotes the
biological essentialism that figures as both the text’s premise and subject — a
supposition that is, however, ultimately refuted by the novel in favour of a more
nuanced response to gender disparity. One of the earliest examples of chicklit, Animal Husbandry tells the tale of a thirty-something single woman’s comical
yet somewhat disturbing obsession with mammalian biology, developed as a
means of making sense of the sudden and inexplicable demise of her
relationship. Animal Husbandry is one of the genre’s more unequivocally
progressive and unique exemplars, making the blatantly romantically-inflected
character of its filmic counterpart, Someone Like You, all the more intriguing
and worthy of consideration.
Published in 1998, Animal Husbandry was one of the first US contributions to
the genre, second in chronology only to Bushnell’s Sex and the City. It quickly
assumed best-seller status and has since been published in such disparate
locales as Brazil, France, Denmark, China and Greece, which arguably testifies
to the truly universal applicability of its themes. The novel’s pre-twenty-first
century release, combined with its critical and popular appeal — the latter
evidenced by impressive sales and translation into numerous languages —
situates it as one of chick-lit’s founding texts. At the time of the novel’s
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publication, the genre, as such, was yet to be established. Consequently, and
unlike a number of its imitators, the text was unencumbered by generic
constraints, free to set the boundaries of the genre it was engaged in creating.
As Zigman herself explains:
When Animal Husbandry came out, everyone compared it to Bridget Jones, which had
already been published in the US by then. But I’d been writing my book five years
before all that. There are just trends out in the aether that simply happen (Hogan 1).

Via Animal Husbandry, Zigman single-handedly enabled the genre’s fairly
unimpeded narrative scope: she was instrumental in helping to shape the genre
as one wherein the heroine’s emotional maturation need not necessarily
ultimately, as Harlequin Mills & Boon would have it, be rewarded with and
signalled by a hero’s love.

For the most part, Animal Husbandry initiates the paradigm for chick-lit’s now
clearly established requisite conventions. Even its genesis is generic. In the
tradition of many a chick-lit writer, Zigman’s career as an author was preceded
by several years working as a publicist for various publishing houses, during
which time she sporadically composed her literary debut, Animal Husbandry.
Like so many chick-lit titles, Animal Husbandry is largely autobiographical, a
fact accentuated by its characteristic use of first-person narration and its
narrator’s tendency to directly address her readers. Says Zigman of her
heroine’s impassioned research project:
Yeah, that part really is autobiographical. I was dumped by somebody and I was really
devastated. And in my illness, I started reading a lot of stuff about animals. You know,
when you’re depressed and heartbroken, you latch onto anything that will explain
what’s happened (Ward 7).

The novel’s heroine herself markedly fits the bill. Jane Goodall is thirty, smart
and single, and appropriately ensconced in a distinctly urban setting, living
alone in an apartment — located in a “prewar elevator building [N], with built-in
bookshelves and a working fire-place” (18) — in Manhattan’s West Village.
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Like so many of her generic counterparts, Jane works in media, as a talent
booker for The Diane Roberts Show, “a serious late-night David-Susskindesque talk show taped in New York” (24). Jane’s story is a deceptively simple
account of one singleton’s suffering as a result of the inexplicability of her
newly-single status: she meets, falls in love with, and is abruptly dumped by
Ray Brown, and subsequently spends an inordinate amount of time trying to
ascertain exactly what went wrong, misguidedly reducing their seeming
incompatibility to biology, in an attempt to quell her own feelings of failure and
loss. In the meantime, Jane moves in with her colleague Eddie, a womaniser
who ultimately enlightens her as to the flaws in what she terms her “Old-CowNew-Cow Theory” (246).
Throughout her ordeal, Jane relies upon the support of her network of friends,
an urban family comprised of doppelganger Joan and obligatory gay confidante
David. This trio is openly described in familial terms: David is said to be “very
protective of [Jane], like a brother would be if [she] had one” (76). At one point
Ray remarks, in reference not to Jane’s parents but, rather, to Joan and David,
“I was wondering when you were going to bring me home to meet the family”
(74). In lieu of any actual, biological kin — who presumably do exist, but are
never mentioned by Jane, let alone called upon during her crisis — this
manufactured unit has the effect of displacing the traditional nuclear family,
thereby questioning the necessity of heterosexual coupling and the essentialist
conceptions of gender which underpin it.
Whilst this text is at least ostensibly heterosexist, it does hint at the
transgressive potential of queer sexualities. Animal Husbandry celebrates
homosexuality as a valid alternative to normative straight sex via the
characterisation of David, who is, perhaps not coincidentally, the only character
to end up happily coupled, having fallen in love with “a jet-setting photographer
on the West Coast who regularly transfers frequent flier miles into his account”
(300). The intense platonic relationship between Jane and Joan hints at latent
lesbianism, and poses a threat to the story’s central, straight romance. That
Joan, rather than Ray or Eddie, is in fact Jane’s most appropriate match is
indicated in their shared, oft-lamented Semitic physicality — “There has to be a
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cure for our hair”, Joan moans at one point (288) — their virtually identical
career trajectories, their similar views on and experiences with men, and their
alliterated, almost interchangeable names. It is also not insignificant that Ray
initially mistakes Joan for Jane’s partner:
“Girlfriend? Significant other?”
I laughed and shook my head. “Practically. That’s Joan. My best friend.”
“You guys look alike,” he said, still staring at the picture.

“I know. That’s what happens when you spend too much time together” (26).

The pair’s friendship does in fact have a distinctly homosocial quality. Joan
provides for Jane — and vice versa — the very companionship and affection
that they each, unsuccessfully, seek in their relationships with men. The pair
speak on the phone “at least eleven times a day” (25), their closeness almost
cloying. Barring sex, the two women give to one another everything that they
could expect to gain from a romantic relationship. This microcosmic sisterhood,
along with its veiled homosociality, is underscored by one of the many
scientific, fact-based excerpts that feature intermittently throughout the text so
as to strengthen the novel’s seeming subscription to science and to signal the
beginning of each new chapter:
Female bonobos establish lifelong relationships, spending much of their time
socialising with one another and even engaging in recreational sexual activity together.
For [male bonobos] with an aggressive bent, such a powerful sisterhood spells trouble
(239).

Once again typifying the genre from whence it springs, Animal Husbandry’s
Jane figures so as to problematise notions of natural, inborn feminine identity.
Jane is far from the feminine ideal as depicted in the conventional romance. As
is the generic practice, Jane is only ever very vaguely physically described.
Unlike her Harlequin Mills & Boon nemesis, her appearance is of concern only
to the extent that it is imperfect and bothersome to her, functioning so as to
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challenge the idea of feminine beauty as effortlessly acquired. Jane frequently
mentions what she perceives as her primary aesthetic shortcomings — her
height (or lack thereof), her Jewish facial features, and her wild, unkempt mop
of hair, all markers of her deficient rendition of femininity. However, in a
departure from the conventions of chick-lit, this novel does not heavily detail the
efforts Jane is forced to go to in order to enact properly the physical
prescriptions that signal her gender. Such references, like the following
description of Jane’s love-induced anorexia, are there, but they are few and far
between:
But I wasn’t paying attention. I was too busy not eating, since “love” had made me lose
my appetite. I fondled both newly protruding hipbones and sucked down another glass
of water [N]
“Eat”, she said, handing me a fork. “Or I’ll tell Ray what a pig you are in real life” (85-6).

At Eddie’s behest, Jane, in a most unfeminine move, also develops a decidedly
masculine taste for beer and “thick, undiluted bourbon” (221), drowning her
sorrows on a nightly basis. The novel is thus generically complicit and
conventional in its depiction of Jane as a flawed female. However, in a
departure from generic custom, Jane’s imperfect enactment of femininity is
never actually validated by the male approval she so desperately seeks. Her
incongruous imitation of the feminine ideal is not ultimately overtly endorsed or
celebrated. Still single in the text’s final few pages, Jane’s failure to adequately
perform ideal femininity is never finally, romantically endorsed. Ray, for
instance, ultimately prefers Evelyn, an exemplar of the Harlequin Mills & Boonesque heroine, while Jane envies Evelyn her seamless portrayal of idealised
femininity:
I looked past him at Evelyn’s long tan legs and shoulder-length horse hair, and tried not
to think about my humidity-induced frizzball hair [N] She was so incredibly sweet [N] I
sometimes wondered what went on behind those big green eyes (38, 145).

Of course, the counter to this argument is a reading that considers Jane’s faulty
femininity as rebellious and thus particularly powerful via its very failure to

135

attract male sanction. It is perhaps problematic for a text to posit romantic
success as an appropriate marker of the viability of non-adherence to gender
norms. Such a strategy arguably undermines the feminist potential of wayward
citations of gender. Okaying such citations via the endorsement of a romantic
hero (or next best thing) implicitly and troublingly venerates masculine
approval.
Although Animal Husbandry is, technically, without an obvious hero with whom
its heroine is paired, it does prominently feature two male characters, each of
whom is, at varying points in the text, posited as Jane’s potential partner. In the
tradition of Harlequin Mills & Boon, Ray Brown, as “executive producer” (25), is
Jane’s professional superior, and is said to have “dark-brown hair, dark-brown
eyes, and a soccer player’s physique” (25), complete with “rippl[ing] abdominal
muscles” (38). A few pages later, in the most conventional of ways, Ray is
described quite simply as “tall” and “dark” (33). As is practiced in the
conventional low-brow romance, Ray is physically depicted, at one point, as
Jane’s opposite other. Staring in a window as she and Ray shop, Jane notices
their “reflection in it: one tall, the other short. One J-Crew-model-bonestructure-endowed; the other Semitically challenged” (39).
The novel’s rendition of Ray as romantic lead is, in a nice example of the text’s
generic complicity, ultimately countered in a way that has both comic and
ideological impact. For instance, like his corresponding Harlequin Mills & Boon
heroes, Ray is in the somewhat cringe-worthy habit of referring to Jane as “cara
mia” (90). Her response is indicative of the novel’s feminist slant — she admits
to finding ”annoying” his use of “the Italian possessive” (90). He is also
repeatedly depicted as child-like, such characterisation constituting an
interesting inversion of the Harlequin Mills & Boon tendency to infantilise its
heroines. “He was like a kid”, says Jane, “with his glasses, and his hair falling
into his eyes, and his flood-level test pants” (38). Zigman’s characterisation of
Ray successfully subverts stereotypical notions of masculinity in a number of
ways, such as via his effeminate fondness for shopping:
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“I love to shop,” he said, taking his wallet out of his back pocket. “I find it very
comforting, the idea of being able to satisfy a need so easily. Like now: I came down
here with only an extra pair of boxer shorts and I needed a pair of pants — and now I
have them [N] Everything should be this easy. Mia thinks I’m insane. She thinks men
are supposed to hate shopping. But I can’t help it” (39).

A more unbridled image of manliness, as exaggeratedly embodied in the figure
of Eddie Alden and sanctioned by Harlequin Mills & Boon, holds less appeal for
Jane than the milder, dissident model of masculinity exemplified by Ray.
Although Ray is ultimately, by way of his sudden and baffling rejection of Jane,
the villain of this piece, he continues to appeal to Jane, and is never depicted
as simplistically malevolent. It is unquestionably his less strident version of
maleness that is favoured by the text. Eddie’s hyperbolic, “handsome” (145)
masculinity, on the other hand, is overstated to the point of being mocked — his
Harlequin Mills & Boon heredity is undeniable, and impossible to miss. To
begin with, that he is tall, dark, “rangy and rugged” (36), and thereby visually
marked as threatening and phallic — “anti-social” is one way of putting it (117)
— is only exacerbated by his tendency to dress in black. Eddie’s fearsome
demeanour is depicted in stark contrast to Ray’s comparative shyness and
timidity:
Just then Eddie appeared. He was wearing all black too, like Johnny Cash, and when
he walked over to the coffee machine Ray cowered slightly, the way he always did
when Eddie was around (131).

Whilst neither Eddie nor Ray can accurately be described as the hero of this
story, given that Jane ends the story sans partner, Eddie does, heroically, come
to Jane’s rescue time and time again. The first instance sees Eddie “save [her]
ass” in an awkward work situation (37). Later, of course, he provides a home
for her when she is on the verge of homelessness. In the tradition of the
Harlequin Mills & Boon hero, Eddie also has a penchant for dating women who
are significantly younger than he, a practice that both signifies and guarantees
his masculine dominance. His partiality for markedly youthful women does not
go unnoticed by Jane, who sarcastically exaggerates the disparity:
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“The redhead in the corner talking to her bald boyfriend is Diana. An actress. I saw
her for about two weeks. Very wild but ultimately unfulfilling.”
I nodded. “She looks like she’s twelve.”
“She’s twenty-two.”

“Like I said: twelve” (146).

And later:
It was late January, and Eddie had been going out a lot lately. As he reasoned, he
wasn’t getting any younger.
But his dates were.

Underage victim du jour?
A twenty-one-year-old Barnard senior [N]
“What could you possibly have in common with someone fourteen years your junior?”
(174).

Through these exchanges, the novel hints at the perversity implicit in the
paternalism of the Harlequin Mills & Boon hero, here figured in the form of
Eddie. Eddie’s heightened manliness is evident not only by way of his age, but
also in his stereotypically aggressive behaviour, signalled, for instance, in his
reckless, anger-induced approach to renovating:
I turned around again to take in the room, and it was then that I noticed the hole in the
wall. Hole in the wall, actually, was a gross understatement, because what I was
looking at was less a hole in the way that a mouse hole was a hole than a huge
doorway-sized yaw in the plaster wall that adjoined the living room with what I suddenly
realised was to be my room [N] He told me that one night he had spontaneously gotten
the urge to “renovate”, that he had started to knock down the wall to make that room
and the living room one “huge room” (133).
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Eddie’s living space is of particular significance in that it marks his bestial,
primal qualities, and thereby literalises Jane’s biologically essentialist take on
gender difference. Not only does he manufacture a cave-like “bat hole” (241)
dwelling for Jane to inhabit; it is also noteworthy that his apartment is known, to
Jane and Joan if no one else, as the “Lair” (132). As Jane becomes further
entrenched in her research, further obsessed with providing a biological
explanation for male (mis)behaviour, Eddie appears to her to be increasingly
less human. Joan makes plain Eddie’s classification as beast rather than
human being:
“He’s an animal. He preys on unsuspecting prepubescent girls and rips their hearts out.
You’re the one show sees the carnage.”
Yes, I had seen it. And each of his hunt-and-kills was worthy of its own PBS science
documentary.
But wasn’t it interesting how, at times, he seemed almost N human (162).

One of the key differences between chick-lit and its generic precursor resides in
their respective responses to biological essentialism. Whereas Harlequin Mills
& Boon is premised on and plagued by notions of the alleged biological
inescapability of gendered identity, chick-lit seeks to interrogate and subvert the
seeming fixity of sexed disparity. Chick-lit both provides alternative models of
masculinity and femininity, and exposes the performative reality of gender
roles. Animal Husbandry foregrounds this generic concern, exploring and
exposing the complexity of identity formation inventively, comically and
particularly explicitly. Rather than figuring as incidental, in this novel biological
essentialism — the claim that “women [and men] are different, obviously” (144)
— actually drives the narrative. It is, however, ultimately, climactically disproved
at its close.
Jane, in the guise of fraudulent alter ego, Dr Marie Goodall — “Marie, like Marie
Curie, with ‘Goodall’ conjuring up [N] scientific observation” (222-3) — explains
her theory, at some length, thus:
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The occurrence of a male tiring of his current female mate and leaving her for a new
female mate is certainly not aberrant in either the human kingdom or the animal
kingdom, though it is far more accepted in the latter. While it is commonly known that
most animal species are not monogamous [N], and that their polygamy runs rampant
at times, what is rarely known is just how rampant it is. Knowledge of this phenomenon
as it appears in the animal kingdom should, I trust, help the human female comprehend
the phenomenon when it manifests itself in her own backyard, as it were [N]
The Coolidge Effect as it applies to the mating practices of sheep and common dairy
cows is known by veterinary scientists and cattle breeders the world over, which is why
farmers need have only one male to service all their sheep or cows: male resistance to
repeating sexual contact with the same female [N]

With human males and females the Coolidge Effect manifests itself in a subtler though
still apparent way. Most commonly it occurs when a male, after engaging in a romantic
and sexual relationship with a female for a period of time [N] grows increasingly bored
with his previously New Cow [N] The male will then begin to sniff around, if you will, for
variety and will pick from the somewhat wide selection of New Cows available to him
one to his liking. Mating with this New Cow will ensue, which will promptly lead him to
view the Cow he is primarily involved with as his Old Cow. In the majority of cases the
male will leave the Old Cow to pursue a relationship with this New Cow, only to find,
after a varying period of time, that this New Cow has gotten Old, and he will desire
variety again and so repeat this process innumerable times (247-9).

The genesis of Jane’s theory is tied to, and symptomatic of, the novel’s
foregrounding of female solidarity and the genre’s exploration of the
commonality of feminine experience. Jane, upon recognising some fairly
startling similarities between her own failed romantic endeavours and those of
her closest friend, misconstrues those same parallels as evidence of an
essential, universal, biologically-based and fixed masculinity. Specifically, it is
when Joan enters into a new relationship, at speed and in circumstances akin
to Ray’s accelerated and impassioned courtship of Jane, that Jane begins to
think:
The more she told me and the more I thought about it, the clearer my sense was that
our two situations had a lot in common [N] One night, while she and I were on the
phone, I found myself jotting words down on the pad of paper I kept by my bed:
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Same pattern.
Whirlwind courtship.
Instant intimacy.
Extremely romantic verbalists.
Jason asking Joan after first date to see house in Hamptons implied commitment to
relationship; Ray telling me after two weeks he wanted to live together implied longterm commitment to relationship (183-4).

Inevitably — or so Jane, equipped with her theory, would argue — Jason is
unfaithful to Joan, and, echoing the abrupt demise of the coupling of Ray and
Jane, their relationship ends as swiftly as it started. Not long after, Jane
stumbles upon a newspaper reference to the Coolidge Effect, and effortlessly
makes the (to her) somewhat feasible leap from bovine mammal to man. Her
ensuing research — fanatical, frantic and evidently misguided — into the
mating habits of animals facilitates a whole host of similarly biologically-driven
(and apparently human-applicable) theories pertaining to male behaviour and
gender disparity, many of which are aimed at explaining the ostensibly
distinctively masculine practice of infidelity, and, as such, are inspired and
exemplified by Eddie and his incessant womanising ways. The “Copulatory
Imperative”, for instance, is described thus:
As much concerned with quantity as with quality, males are often rather indiscriminate
in courtshipD Among invertebrates as diverse as butterflies and hermit crabs, males
are apt to court an astonishing variety of objects, indeed almost anything that bears
some resemblance to a female (218).

The text’s interrogation of biological essentialism is underscored by the various
subtle, humorous references to its bestial theme that are present throughout.
In the early days of her relationship with Ray, Jane, then a new cow, orders
only “a bagel and coffee since [her] stomachs [are] still busy digesting lunch”
(35). Later, Jane likens herself to an animal yet again: in deciding to do away
with discretion and satisfy Eddie’s curiosity, she sings “like a canary” (143),
divulging all the details of her doomed love affair with their colleague Ray.
Towards the novel’s end, Jane and Joan hold one of their pseudo-scientific
summits over a round of drinks at the aptly named “Bull and Bear” (288). Each
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of these allusions has the effect of reminding readers of the important truth that
Jane is, after all, not so much beast as human being.
The selection of texts that Jane consults throughout her story serves not only to
signify the pseudo-scientific basis of her claims, but also to expose the
hegemonic grip and popular appeal of biological essentialism. Along with
scholarly works such as The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes, Natural History,
Scientific American and Sexual Selection: Mate Choice and Courtship in
Nature, Jane also seeks clarification from the likes of populist tomes such as
Men Who Can’t Love, Esquire, GQ and Cosmopolitan, signalling the
widespread, mainstream subscription to the fixity of gender differentiation, and
perhaps also hinting at the dubiousness of her theory. That the novel is
satirising rather than subscribing to biological essentialism is evident
throughout via its comic engagement with biology, and is immediately apparent
on its cover, which is, in the chick-lit tradition, a fairly jarring shade of iridescent
yellow. The book’s jacket is littered with images of black-and-white dairy cows,
one of which is pointedly personified: in a speech bubble, it comically proclaims
the novel’s status as a “National Bestseller!”
The fallibility of Jane’s Old-Cow-New-Cow Theory — along with, by extension,
her essentialist approach to gender — is evident the moment she shares it with
fellow Old Cow Joan, who immediately questions its applicability to people:
Joan shook her head. ‘I don’t know. It’s too simple. And besides, that applies to
animals [N Y]ou can’t extrapolate that the same thing is true in humans [N H]umans
are more complex. There are a thousand things that affect what happens between
them’ (206-7).

Jane herself is also seemingly — albeit, perhaps subconsciously — aware of
her theory’s shortcomings from its very beginnings, astutely describing herself
(as researcher) as “wacko” (207), although it is not until the novel’s final pages
that she finally and emphatically renounces her misguidedly essentialist claims.
Interestingly, at one point Jane actually posits a Butler-esque, constructivist
response to, and correction of, her own essentialist musings, observing that
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normative male behaviour is considered as such simply because it is constantly
being mimicked and, thus, reiterated:
There’s an obscure term I came across which could explain [the uncanny similarities in
the way men dump women]: allelomimetic behaviour [N] Of or characterised by
imitativeness within a group: All the sheep in a flock, or all the fish in a school, or all the
dogs in a pack, tend to do the same thing at the same time [N] It’s somehow a part of
the collective unconscious (243).

Unfortunately, Jane fails to recognise the subversive possibilities of this take on
gender disparity, and quickly reverts to the notion that masculinity is
“genetically programmed” (244). Jane’s momentary hinting at the citational and
impersonatory truth behind the seemingly innate sameness of male conduct,
however, foretells her later realisation of the flaws in her bovine-based theory.
That the theory is problematic from a feminist point of view is made plain rather
than merely implied:
There was a huge piece by an ad hoc collective of feminists, decrying Dr Goodall’s
findings as intrinsically sexist and arguing that females were just as polygamous as
males (265).

Whereas Ray concurs with the theory, no doubt perceiving it as a means of
conveniently deflecting any blame for his own “[un]intentional” bad behaviour
(264), Eddie, agreeing with the aforementioned feminist collective, deems the
theory not “entirely accurate” (266). He goes on to suggest that the Old-CowNew-Cow Theory has a counterpart in “the New-Bull” Theory (266), given that,
like men, women “do cheat” (267). It is, in fact, Eddie who enlightens Jane as
to her erroneous thinking and thereby, significantly and, ultimately in
accordance with generic convention, facilitates her maturation:
Well, I’m sorry to say there’s no big surprise ending here. No fabulous nite of luv with
Eddie [N] No, the only surprise was that after all was said and done, after all my
theories and conclusions about men in general and men in particular had been
formulated, it was Eddie — Eddie the womaniser, Eddie the heartbreaker, Eddie the
animal; who refused to give up on the idea that his perfect mate was out there
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somewhere — who brought me to an understanding that flew in the face of everything
that I wanted to believe was true (299).

The novel’s ending is at once both generically compliant and transgressive, for
although, as is the norm, it is Eddie who enables Jane’s awakening, this fact is
not signalled by their ultimate romantic union: the pair remain single at the
novel’s close. That Jane has matured is, however, unquestionable, marked as
it is by a number of developments: not only has she been promoted, in the
wake of Ray’s resignation, to executive producer, but she has also moved into
a “new prewar doorman apartment building in the Upper East Side” (301). Most
significantly, she has literally buried her case files “in a mouldy storage bin”
(301). For in this text it is not Jane’s single status, but, rather, her subscription
to simplistic notions of biologically-based gender differentiation that signifies her
immaturity.
Jayne Margetts makes the perplexing claim that “feminists will despise Animal
Husbandry and everything it stands for” (4). Christian G. Forsythe similarly
contends that “Zigman [is] simplifying the capabilities of men and their control
over their hormones” (6). It would appear that these commentators are
responding to the novel’s premise and preamble, and ignoring its overtly poststructural feminist finale. For although the text, on its surface, and its heroine,
for the most part, are complicit in essentialist approaches to gender, an
attentive reading of this text reveals that it enacts the very opposite, debunking
essentialism in its climactic close, suggesting instead that there is no singular,
definitive or natural model of masculinity (nor, by extension, femininity). The
novel functions, fairly unequivocally, as a feminist allegory that ultimately offers
an alternative to essentialist thinking. Well before Jane herself realises the
erroneousness of her biologistic thinking, the scepticism displayed by Joan and
Eddie, coupled with Jane’s hyperbolically adamant confidence in and
commitment to her theory, encourages the reader to question her essentialist
assertions. Its denouement, wherein Eddie-as-hero enlightens Jane, her
personal growth secured, is the text’s only real concession to the ambivalent
feminism that is so characteristic of the chick-lit genre.
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THE NOVEL’S CINEMATIC INTERPRETATION
That the film departs from the novel’s fairly undeniable feminist flavour,
foregrounding instead a fully fabricated, heady Harlequin Mills & Boon-esque
romance, is immediately apparent as a result of its renaming. The filmmakers’
decision to entitle the film Someone Like You rather than Animal Husbandry
signifies the shift in focus effected by the adaptation process, from Jane’s
flawed and fundamental take on femininity and masculinity, to her — finally
requited — feelings for Eddie. Reviewer Mary Ann Johnson perceives the film’s
title as problematic:
An unfortunate decision to change the title of this film from the distinctive Animal
Husbandry [N] to the bland and generic Someone Like You is leading many folks, I’m
sure, to the same experience I had at the box office when I attempted to purchase
tickets for this film: “Um, it’s that ‘S’ movie. No, not Say It Isn’t SoN” (1).

This introduced title functions to pre-empt the film’s romantic conclusion.
Generic, in the sense that it is non-specific and instantly forgettable, the film’s
title works to underscore its reworking of the novel via its generic — that is,
pertaining to genre — classification, its status as an homage to the genre’s
Harlequin Mills & Boon heredity. On the other hand, the original title,
idiosyncratic, perplexing and utterly memorable, bespeaks the earlier text’s
unique take on the genre.
Someone Like You, directed by Tony Goldwyn, written by Elizabeth Chandler
and based on Zigman’s novel Animal Husbandry, was released in July 2001. It
stars Ashley Judd as Jane Goodale, Greg Kinnear as Ray Brown, Hugh
Jackman as Eddie Alden, Marisa Tomei as Jane’s (renamed) best friend Liz,
and Ellen Barkin as the irrepressible Diane Roberts. The film tells a very
similar story to that of the novel upon which it is based. As in the original text,
Jane has her heart broken by the rakish Ray, and, homeless as a result, moves
in with Eddie, who is, as it turns out, a more complex character than Jane
initially perceives him to be. With Eddie’s help she eventually realises the
errors in her biologically essentialist explanation of male (mis)behaviour. Whilst
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it is in its final moments that the film deviates most dramatically from its source
text, it actually makes several subtler departures throughout, thereby producing
revisionary meaning.
As in Animal Husbandry, Liz/Joan figures in Someone Like You as Jane’s
preferred and primary source of support. Plenty of screen time is devoted to
demonstrating the extent to which the pair depend upon one another: they are
depicted grocery shopping together, eating together, glued to the phone in
conversation with one another, and offering commiserations upon the demise of
their respective romances. “Remember”, says Liz, after Ray has
unceremoniously dumped Jane, “time wounds all heels”. However, whereas
Joan (as Liz) is a significant presence in the film, David is essentially absent.
Renamed Julian, he is mentioned only a couple of times in passing, but is
never actually featured on screen, and is seemingly more an acquaintance than
an intimate friend. Hugely reduced, David/Julian no longer functions as a
member of Jane’s urban family, and as a result, the novel’s queer politics are
largely missing from its cinematic rendition. In place of the novel’s
manufactured and alternative family is a more traditional unit, encompassing
Jane, her sister Alice, and her brother-in-law, Stephen. Although this familial
structure is itself quite conventional, the pairing of Alice and Stephen is
decidedly less so — assertive and matter-of-fact, tall and stately, Alice is
masculinised, whereas Stephen, emotional and fragile, and physically fairly
unprepossessing, is portrayed as somewhat effeminate, the weaker of the two.
The audience is introduced to Alice and Stephen fairly early on in the film. The
relevant scene opens with Stephen holding a syringe, his hand hovering over
an orange. The audience learns that the couple is undergoing fertility
treatment:
Alice: “What’s the problem? Just jab it in!”
Stephen: “Don’t rush me!”
Alice: “For god’s sake Stephen, if you can’t stick it in a Valencia, how are you going to
stick it in my ass?”
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Frustrated, Alice grabs the syringe and, without hesitation, injects the orange:
Stephen: “Oooh! That was supposed to be my job!”
Alice: “I just wanted to show you how easy it is.”
Stephen: “This is a very emotional time for us and you’re sucking the romance out of
the entire situation.”

Stephen’s noncompliant citation of masculinity, despite being celebrated
elsewhere in the film, is, here, linked to his infertility, and thus posited as
problematic and perverse. The transgressive potential of the pair’s inversion of
gendered behaviours is undermined by the fact that Stephen has a low sperm
count — his effeminacy is marked by his literal, physical emasculation, and is
quite clearly conveyed as the cause of the couple’s crisis. Despite the
subversive potential of the pair’s reversal of gender roles, the seeming
ramifications of such a swap deny any such reading. In fact, Stephen and Alice
should ultimately be read as markers of conventionality, due not only to the
insistence on normative notions of gender that their characterisation ultimately
elicits, but also given that they are on the — albeit somewhat rocky — road to
parenthood. The pair are, in keeping with custom, depicted as actively and
determinedly working to construct their own nuclear family. This return to and
veneration of a more accepted model of kinship signifies the film’s defiance of
and departure from the novel’s progressive politics, and is seemingly informed
by chick-lit’s generic indebtedness to and retrogressive roots in the Harlequin
Mills & Boon romance.
In a similarly recuperative move, Jane no longer functions in the film as a
subversive challenge to the Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine. Indeed, as
embodied by Ashley Judd, Jane is, indisputably, Harlequin Mills & Boon-esque!
In Judd’s body, Jane, physicalised and made specific, is an enviable and
idealised figure of femininity, complete with pretty, pouting lips, slender curves,
long, lissom legs, smooth, flawless skin and shining hair. Judd’s exquisite
beauty has been repeatedly acknowledged by People Magazine — the
publication named her one of the world’s 50 Most Beautiful People in 1996,
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2000 and 2002. Zigman herself, the autobiographic inspiration for Jane,
speaks of Judd’s intimidating physical perfection thus:
I did go on the set of Animal Husbandry, in mid-August last summer, about six weeks
after I'd had my baby. Which was great. And not so great, since I was about 30 pounds
heavier than I normally am, so standing next to Ashley Judd at that moment was
hideously embarrassing since she was absolutely gorgeous, and tiny (I asked one of
the wardrobe people if she was a size 2. The answer: "A size zero, if even."). But aside
from that, it was quite exciting (Keller 8).

In the film, Jane’s feminine physicality is only very rarely shown to be
something that is in fact carefully constructed — at one point, for instance, she
acknowledges her application of red lipstick, and at another, is depicted
relaxing in a bubble bath, her face slathered in a mud mask, cucumber slices
placed over her eyelids. For the most part, however, the film suggests that
Jane’s physical feminine attributes are naturally occurring. Constantly eating
junk food, Jane certainly makes no apparent effort to stay suitably slim, yet is,
somewhat inexplicably, impossibly trim, toned and taut. Jane is frequently and
notably depicted eating — her consumption of unwholesome fare, her
unabashed enjoyment of hot dogs, ice cream, Oreos and Coca-Cola, although
potentially liberating, is actually somewhat deceptive. In the commentary that
accompanies the DVD release, Goldwyn claims that the focus on her love of
food is intended to be purely comical. Notwithstanding this, it also has
significant ideological implications, in that it denies the fact that women, as
women, have to actively attempt to stay as slender as the film’s Jane.
Judd-as-Jane emanates a certain childlike purity and perkiness, a girl-next-door
goodness that is at once in keeping the Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine and at
odds with the jaded, knowing sexuality practiced by Bridget Jones and her
many clones, including the novel’s Jane. In one particular freely-adapted
scene, Jane is, in the tradition of Harlequin Mills & Boon, simultaneously and
somewhat perversely sexualised whilst she is infantilised. In the middle of the
night, unable to sleep, Jane goes to the fridge to retrieve some Chinese food,
wearing only a skimpy singlet and a pair of underpants. Eddie, dressed only in
boxer shorts, follows suit a few moments later, and an awkward, partially
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clothed encounter ensues, wherein Jane feebly attempts to cover herself up
with a scrap of kitchen towel. In a moment clearly designed to foretell their later
romantic union, the pair feed one another cold noodles, and the camera pans
over their respective — exaggerated — gendered physiques. Eddie then
manages to persuade the scantily clad Jane to perform an inane cheer for him.
Her incongruous performance, a remnant from her high school years, is replete
with childish precision and enthusiasm, and yet, in the context of this scene, is
oddly infused with sexual objectification. This scene, in particular, exemplifies
the film’s return to the tropes of the low-brow romance.
In an earlier scene, however, Jane does enact the very sexual agency, ease
and forwardness that chick-lit heroines are known for, a lustiness that
constitutes a distinct departure from the coy inexperience that characterises the
Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine. In this scene, Jane is frantically searching for
her diaphragm, and, finding it, blows dust from it, a move that is comically
indicative of just how long it has been since she last used it. Meanwhile, Ray,
seated on her sofa, reads an Allure Magazine article about erogenous zones,
and chuckles when he finds that Jane has ticked the box next to “belly button”.
Moments later, having inserted her diaphragm off-screen, Jane emerges,
looking flushed, before quite literally and somewhat clumsily pouncing on Ray,
ripping open his shirt in the process — buttons go flying. This irreverent sex
scene is a fairly obvious homage to the film’s chick-lit foundations, yet is
complicated by Jane’s later regression to a demure and infantile asexuality.
Her schizophrenic sexual identity has the effect of bespeaking chick-lit’s
ambivalent polysemy, signifying the genre’s situation somewhere between the
Harlequin Mills & Boon romance and a fully feminist rejection of the same.
The film’s Ray departs, at least physically, quite significantly from the novel’s: in
fact, the disparity is similar in effect to that that exists between the novel’s Jane
Goodall and the film’s Jane Goodale. As embodied by Greg Kinnear, Ray is
blue-eyed and fair, and conspicuously shorter than Eddie. This change is
seemingly intended to unequivocally mark Eddie’s status as this story’s sole
romantic hero. Kinnear-as-Ray is otherwise unremarkable, in the sense that he
seamlessly mimics his literary counterpart. Eddie’s Harlequin Mills & Boon149

esque qualifications, on the other hand, are dramatically heightened in the film
so as to unambiguously foretell his eventual wooing and winning of Jane,
operating to further signify the film’s status as revision-via-romance. To begin
with, Eddie is played by Hugh Jackman, best known for his role as X-Men’s
Wolverine, the fearsome, mutant, part-man-part-beast action hero. As
Wolverine, Jackman is hyperbolically hirsute and possesses a burly
muscularity, both visual markers of the excessive masculinity characteristic of
the Harlequin Mills & Boon hero. As wolf-like Wolverine, Jackman anticipates
this later role wherein, somewhat less literally, he again figures as an animal.
Whilst he is not quite as hairy, nor as bulky, in this film as he is in the X-Men
franchise, Jackman-as-Eddie is perpetually unshaven, exceptionally tall and
physically intimidating.
Eddie’s animalism is underscored in a number of ways in the film. For instance,
it is not insignificant that Eddie lives in the heart of Manhattan’s meatpacking
district. The day Jane moves in, she is, appropriately, pictured walking past
huge, bloodied and disembodied pieces of meat. Understandably, she appears
perturbed by the presence of buckets of butchered meat outside the entrance
to Eddie’s building. His neanderthalism is also apparent in the alternative
ending available on the DVD release of Someone Like You. In this scene,
Eddie dramatically upends a chess table, stalks over to Jane, and,
impassioned, ravishes her, muffling her words in the process — a moment that
could have been taken verbatim from the pages of a Harlequin Mills & Boon
romance.
Eddie is also given a more impressive job title in the film, whereby he is clearly
Jane’s superior — in the novel, he is described as a “private detective-style
researcher” (36), whereas, in the film, he is billed as “writer/producer”. This
change is significant in that it imbues him with authority — explicitly, authority
over Jane, a lowly talent booker — à la Harlequin Mills & Boon. These various
devices come together to magnify Eddie’s masculinity, rendering his filmic
manifestation an unequivocally exaggerated revision of his literary rendering.
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Although the film proffers essentialist and extreme images of gendered identity,
like the novel upon which it is based, Someone Like You makes explicit its
interest in exposing the errors in essentialist thought, in that the development
and debunking of Jane’s Old-Cow-New-Cow Theory sustains the film’s plot. As
in Animal Husbandry, Jane, her thoughts communicated by way of voice-over,
is driven to her theorising by the seemingly static insincerity of the men in her
life:
I lay awake that night wondering which was worse. Guys like Ray who blinded you with
charm and promises, or the Eddies of the world who went right for your pants? And in
the end, it didn’t matter. They were all cast from the same mould.

The theory, as it figures in Someone Like You, closely mimics the one that
features in Animal Husbandry. The film, like the novel, uses a number of comic
devices to cement the centrality of biological essentialism as a thematic
concern. For instance, the film is littered with shots of animals in various states
of decomposition — aside from the butchered meat that signifies the location of
Eddie’s apartment, the camera captures rows of fresh fish lined up for
purchase, barbequed ducks hanging in the window of a Chinese restaurant,
and, later, Jane’s zebra skin handbag in the foreground of a shot, a visual
means of underlining the biologically essentialist discussion she is, at that
moment, partaking in. At another point in the film, Jane, Liz and Eddie, cows
and bulls in human guise, play pool at the Bulls and Heifers Saloon. The
likening of Jane’s love-life to the scientifically-proven practices of animal
husbandry is made literal when, on the verge of being dumped, she watches a
documentary about the “escape behaviours” of male mammals, only to be
stunned when a gopher, speaking directly to the camera, asks her whether she
“smell[s] the bacon”.
The feminist foundation of the film’s interrogation of essentialism is also subtly
emphasised when Jane is seen scouring a bookstore in search for appropriate
research resources. In the foreground of the shot is a table of titles including,
alongside the obviously pertinent Primate Encounters, texts such as Eve and
Lilith, which call up biological essentialism’s biblical associations. As in the
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novel, the eventual, climactic discreditation of Jane’s theory itself enacts
feminism, in that, as renowned reviewer Roger Ebert points out, “if the theory is
correct, it [problematically] gets men off the hook for their swinish behaviour,
since [they] are hard-wired that way and cannot be blamed for millions of years
of tunnel-vision evolution” (“Someone Like You” 2). Liz supports this reading of
the Old-Cow-New-Cow Theory, suggesting that Jane’s pseudonymous Dr
Marie Charles (Goodall in the novel) is a “post-feminist icon”.
The film’s engagement with feminism, is, however, otherwise quite scornful. To
begin with, Diane — a wholly unsympathetic character who functions in the film
as Jane’s nemesis and foil — is portrayed as something of a feminist
caricature, a figure of fun. In Someone Like You, Ray leaves Jane not for
Evelyn, but for the egotistical and irritating Diane, further positioning her, and
her politics, negatively. Her feminism, an absence in the novel, is marked in the
film’s opening scene, wherein she interviews Mary-Lou Corkle, an “outspoken
conservative activist” who is spruiking her new book, The Nest Crisis:
One of your central arguments Mary-Lou is to blame society’s problems on working
mothers [N] By your standards, doing what I do makes me unfit for motherhood [N]
Just out of curiosity, Mary-Lou, who’s been making your kids’ beds while you’ve been
out selling your book these past three months?

Feminism is mocked via the film’s fairly derisory depiction of Diane. The
audience is encouraged to laugh at her, and, by extension, to dismiss and
reject her beliefs.
It is, however, the film’s final moments that are most indicative of its
romantically-inflected revision of the novel upon which it is based. As in Animal
Husbandry, it is Eddie who enlightens and educates Jane as to the
erroneousness of her essentialism. Jane is, herself, somewhat subconsciously
aware of the illegitimacy of her claims — “Liz”, she says at one point, “I don’t
know what I’m talking about”. However, it is Eddie who eventually points out
the simple fact that “people [are] not cows”. Jane’s essentialist dogma is
ultimately and ironically discredited by Ray’s non-compliant behaviour. Having
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reunited with Diane, an Old Cow, Ray has, in Eddie’s words, failed to “do what
[according to Jane] it is in [his] nature to do”. “’Men are evil, men are scum”
exclaims Eddie, in anger, ostensibly mimicking Jane, “but please Ray, won’t
you make a liar out of me?’ Well, you got what you asked for Jane. He did go
back. He just did it with the wrong girl”. Jane, so enlightened, is thus forced to
expose herself as a fraud, and to retract her quasi-scientific claims — on
national television, no less:
I invented [Dr Charles] because I had something to say, and somehow I thought that if,
if, if it were coming from a 65-year-old PhD that you would see it the way I had N As a
truth, as a legitimate, scientific truth. But it isn’t, it’s completely ridiculous.

That it is Eddie who ultimately enables and catalyses Jane’s awakening, is, in
typical chick-lit fashion, signalled by the pair’s romantic embrace in the film’s
final minutes. “You were right”, Jane concedes, just prior to passionately
kissing her hero. This moment consolidates the film’s reading of its source in
accordance with its latent links to the Harlequin Mills & Boon romance. The
novel’s polysemy is revised and resolved in the film in favour of its Harlequin
Mills & Boon heredity. Whereas Animal Husbandry is undoubtedly one of the
more unequivocally feminist examples of its genre, given that it rebelliously
refuses a romantic resolution, its filmic appropriation is testament to chick-lit’s
ambiguity. The film’s romantic renegotiation of its source is seemingly informed
by the novel’s generic classification, by chick-lit’s somewhat ideologically
inconsistent traits and trajectories. Someone Like You not only reinstates the
gendered binarity that is a definitive trope of the low-brow romance, it also
amplifies the pre-feminist potential of its source’s problematic finale: in the
tradition of chick-lit, Eddie’s love for Jane both marks and elicits her ultimate
awakening. Someone Like You, a decidedly romantically-inflected revision of a
novel — and a genre — that variously and haltingly invokes and rejects the
conventions of Harlequin Mills & Boon, is evidently a product of chick-lit’s
ideological ambivalence.
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Chapter Four

Bridget Jones’s Diary
The strange and beautiful Venusians were a mysterious attraction to the Martians. Their differences
especially attracted the Martians. Where the Martians were hard, the Venusians were soft. Where the
Martians were angular, the Venusians were round. Where the Martians were cool, the Venusians were
warm. In a magical and perfect way their differences seemed to complement each other.

Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus

The Bridget Jones franchise has come full circle. Bridget, a single 30something British woman replete with neuroses, came into the world in 1995
via a newspaper column. The column became a novel; the novel, a film and in
mid-2005, a decade after Bridget’s inception, creator Helen Fielding returned to
her journalistic roots, temporarily reprising the column for the twenty-first
century. Bridget Jones’s Diary, in its many manifestations, thus works to
befuddle notions of fidelity not simply via the ideological polysemy that renders
it particularly receptive to revision — the polysemy that so plagues the genre it
ostensibly fashioned — but also as a result of both its intricate intertextuality
and its complicated, circular movement between media. A study in intermedium transposition, as something of a meta-text Bridget Jones’s Diary
proffers a challenge to both naive and binaric notions of novel as source and
film as inferior copy, along with the fidelity fixation such concepts engender.
This chapter primarily seeks to determine, however, whether Sharon Maguire’s
film, Bridget Jones’s Diary, reads its source primarily by way of its engagement
with feminism, or, alternatively, as a regurgitation of the Harlequin Mills & Boon
romance.

THE NOVEL’S INCEPTION AND RECEPTION
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In 1995, Fielding — Oxford-educated satirist, freelance journalist, television
producer and self-described feminist (Taylor 6) — was approached by The
Independent, a high-brow, left-leaning London newspaper, to write a column
“about [her]self” (Weich 3). Too embarrassed to openly expose the minutiae of
her private life, she decided to write instead from the perspective of a fictional
persona named Bridget Jones, a character she had been developing for a
sitcom (Weich 3). Of the ensuing column, she has said:
I was kind of embarrassed. The Independent is sort of left-wing, everyone was writing
about politics, and I was writing about why you can’t find a pair of pantyhose in the
morning and losing weight. I thought they’d ditch it after six weeks (Weich 4).

On the contrary, her column, Bridget Jones’s Diary, quickly acquired a cult
following, and continued to be published weekly, initially in The Independent,
and, later, in The Telegraph, until 1998. In 1996, its progeny, the novel of the
same name, made Fielding a mainstream, global success, and heralded chicklit’s inception. The novel was — and continues to be — epically popular the
world over — Imelda Whelehan quite accurately describes it as “one of the
most talked about novels” of the 1990s (Helen Fielding’s Bridget Jones’s Diary
21). Bridget Jones’s Diary has proven to be endlessly regenerative, having
spawned not only an equally successful sequel, Bridget Jones: The Edge of
Reason, but also an Oscar nominated film (which, in turn, engendered a sequel
of its very own), a reprise of the column from whence it came, and thousands
upon thousands of literary imitations.
As is typical of the genre it created, Bridget Jones’s Diary is notably
autobiographical. Since her serialised beginnings, the fictional character
Bridget Jones has been mistaken for fact, no doubt due, at least in part, to the
diarised format that is a feature of both the column and the novel:
The columns carried a by-line photograph, actually of Susannah Lewis, a secretary at
The Independent newspaper, holding a cigarette and a wine glass, which seemed to
contribute to the notion that Bridget actually existed, and resulted in fan mail and
marriage proposals (Whelehan, HFBJD 12).
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The fervency and pervasiveness of this particular conflation of author and
fictional creation is evident in the fact that “people [apparently] introduce
[Fielding] as Bridget all the time” (Dominus 2). Whilst she has repeatedly and
emphatically denied that she is Bridget in literal terms (Taylor 1, Dominus 2),
she does admit to having found inspiration in “her own calorie-obsessed
diaries” (Whelehan, Helen Fielding’s Bridget Jones’s Diary 12) and to drawing
on many of her own experiences. Not only is the character of Shazzer known
to be based on Fielding’s real-life best friend, Maguire — who went on to direct
the cinematic adaptation of Bridget Jones’s Diary — but Fielding also
“confesses to filching her own mother’s turns of phrase as grist for the mill of
Bridget’s flighty Mum, and to having once made blue soup for a dinner party”
(Taylor 1).
Presaging chick-lit’s characteristic polysemy, the novel’s critical reception was
famously split — it was considered by some to be a feminist satire replete with
parodic value (Waters 10), whereas others, led by Germaine Greer, interpreted
it as nothing more than a Harlequin Mills & Boon-esque romance — albeit, in
Whelehan’s words, “a romance for our age” (The Feminist Bestseller 178).
Although, of proponents of the latter reading, Shari L. Rosenblum suggests —
perhaps with some precision — that “they just don’t get it” (9), there is
undeniably much to underwrite such an interpretation. For instance, it is surely
no coincidence that Fielding, prior to the publication of Bridget Jones’s Diary,
wrote and unsuccessfully submitted a romance novel to the much-maligned
publishing house, Harlequin Mills & Boon (Whelehan, HFBJD 11). This littleknown fact itself bespeaks the novel’s awkward generic position, and suggests,
perhaps, that the novel was born of this failed Harlequin Mills & Boon-esque
manuscript, of Fielding’s desire to write a romance, a desire conceivably
undermined by an inability or disinclination to properly replicate the brand’s
restrictive generic rules. Added to this is the novel’s now legendary blatant
borrowing from what is arguably the most famous fictional romance of all —
Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, and the 1995 BBC televisual adaptation of
the same.

156

The BBC’s beloved rendering of Austen’s canonical text aired while Fielding
was in the process of compiling her columns in novel form, whilst at the same
time continuing to produce new columns for The Independent. Much of the
material from her earliest columns she transposed intact to the novel — one of
the very the first instalments of the Bridget Jones column, for instance, recounts
Bridget’s erratic approach to dieting, detailing a day’s worth of food that
purports to variously and thus problematically comply with the Scarsdale Diet,
the Anti-Cellulite Raw Food Diet, and the Hay Diet. A slightly condensed
version of this very same diary entry, wherein Bridget bemoans having “put on
3lbs since the middle of the night”, appears in the book (74). It is but one of
numerous entries that are extracted virtually verbatim in the novel. Indeed, the
newspaper column and the novel are very closely linked. However, whereas,
like a sitcom, a weekly column can afford to be somewhat inconsistent and
episodic, a novel arguably requires a clearer trajectory. Fielding, aware of this,
freely admits to having stolen her plot from Austen — she was certain it would
provide a workable structure to Bridget’s daily dramas, given that it had been
successfully “market-tested for centuries” (Taylor 6). At around the same time,
a character modelled on Colin Firth’s specific portrayal of Mr Darcy was finding
his way into Fielding’s current columns.
A number of Austen’s keenly drawn characters reappear — albeit slightly
altered — in Fielding’s novel. Mark Darcy’s status as homage to the enigmatic
Mr. Darcy is overt and pointed to the extent that it is impossible to miss:
The rich, divorced-by-cruel-wife Mark — quite tall — was standing with his back to the
room, scrutinising the contents of the Alconburys’ bookshelves [N] It struck me as
pretty ridiculous to be called Mr. Darcy and to stand on your own looking snooty at a
party. It’s like being called Heathcliff and insisting on spending an entire evening in a
garden, shouting ‘Cathy’ and banging your head against a tree (13).

Daniel Cleaver is transformed via Pride and Prejudice in the novel. Rather than
figuring fairly simply, as he does in the columns, as something of a romantic
rogue, in Bridget Jones’s Diary he is quite blatantly the Wickham to Mark
Darcy’s Mr. Darcy — deceptively harbouring an ill-explained dislike for his
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former friend, and initially helping to turn Bridget against him. Wickham’s shady
treatment of the naïve Lydia is, however, mimicked in Pamela Jones’s
involvement with the slimy and suspicious Julio. Mrs. Jones is herself a clever
conflation of both Elizabeth Bennett’s younger sister Lydia, and her painfully
embarrassing mother, Mrs. Bennett, who seeks to sell, in marriage, her many
daughters to aristocrats of sufficient wealth and status:
“Do you remember Mark Darcy, darling? Malcolm and Elaine’s son? He’s one of these
super-dooper top-notch lawyers. Divorced. Elaine says he works all the time and he’s
terribly lonely. I think he might be coming to Una’s New Year’s Day Turkey Curry
Buffet, actually” (12).

The novel’s indebtedness to Pride and Prejudice is underlined by Bridget’s
repeated reference to her own fanatical viewing of the BBC adaptation. As
Shelley Cobb points out, Bridget’s “obsession with the serial” constitutes a “selfconscious nod to the stolen plot” (7):
Just nipped out for fags prior to getting changed ready for BBC Pride and Prejudice.
Hard to believe there are so many cars out on the roads. Shouldn’t they be at home
getting ready? Love the nation being so addicted. The basis of my own addiction, I
know, is my simple human need for Darcy to get off with Elizabeth (246).

As Whelehan explains, however, the links between Bridget Jones’s Diary and
Pride and Prejudice go further than copied characterisation and seemingly
smug and superficial intertextual intersections. She observes that thematically
there are also
a number of echoes — the domestic settings, the constraints of social etiquette, the
dynamics of communication between the sexes, a certain eccentricity in the chief
characters, and the continued importance of the family (HFBJD 34).

In addition, the two texts share a decidedly feminist interest in the plight of
unmarried women, suggesting the timelessness of their exclusion — Bridget, a
twentieth century reincarnation of Lizzy Bennett, is only too aware of the fact
that single women continue to be marginalised and considered somewhat
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perverse. She likens her unmarried self to a monster, her “entire body [N]
covered in scales” (40).
The texts are also similar in that they are each romantically resolved. Bridget
Jones’s Diary may not be a romance per se, but its heavy indebtedness to
Pride and Prejudice works to implicitly position it in relation to the Harlequin
Mills & Boon brand — its readers are encouraged by its imitative intertextuality
to interpret it by way of both Pride and Prejudice and its popular literary
successor, the low-brow romance. Pride and Prejudice’s status as one of the
brand’s antecedents is now fairly well documented. Whelehan notes that the
novel, “one of the perfect romance narratives”, is held to be “one of the models
for the modern [Harlequin] Mills & Boon style romance” (HFBJD 31) and Tania
Modleski concurs, claiming that “it has not been sufficiently recognised how
much Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice has contributed to the development of
the [Harlequin Mills & Boon] formula” (Loving with a Vengeance 36). As well as
the fairly straightforward romantic trajectory and tropes favoured by Austen, her
oeuvre is also known for its witty satiric content — like chick-lit, which is,
arguably, after all, something of a popularised twenty-first century reincarnation
of her work, Austen’s novels sit somewhat awkwardly at the juncture of parody
and romance. In any case, the interconnectedness of Austen’s classic canon,
the Harlequin Mills & Boon brand, and Bridget Jones’s Diary and its ilk is
unequivocal.
The author of this indubitable intertextual association, Fielding, the “postmodern impresario” (Cavanaugh 5) herself, sees her work as a satiric
commentary on the romance rather than a simple and unwitting reprise of its
tropes — she has acknowledged her use of irony in numerous interviews,
thereby suggesting that the novel be interpreted as subversive and self-aware:
I can quite see that if you’re not keen on irony as a form of expression, the book might
get on your nerves. It was initially written to make people laugh. If it raises some
issues that strike a nerve, so much the better (Applewhite 14).
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Ironically, perhaps, this reading is in fact similarly supported by the novel’s ties
to Austen. Austen’s novels have long been universally admired as witty satiric
portraits of nineteenth century English society. Bridget Jones’s Diary’s
appropriation of Pride and Prejudice pushes its readers to recognise a similarity
of tone, a mocking irreverence.
A closer look at the novel provides plenty of evidence for each of these
analytical approaches, marking it, in the tradition of chick-lit, as decidedly plural
and polysemic.

THE NOVEL

Bridget Jones herself is the definitive chick-lit heroine, upon whom many later
such characters — aptly nicknamed ‘Jones clones’ (Cavanaugh 13) — are
evidently modelled. Bridget is witty, humorous, self-deprecating, clumsy,
cynical and sexually active. She is employed as a publicist for a publishing
house and lives, alone, in a flat, in the suitably urban locale of London. Her
story is a simple stringing together of the events of a single year as a sexy,
struggling, sometime-satisfied singleton. Ostensibly her diary, it variously
details her familial frustrations, her many drunken outings with her network of
intimate friends, her dietary failures and triumphs, the highs and lows of her
working life, her television viewing schedule, and, of course, her dual quests for
love — dual in the sense that Bridget seeks to attain not only the affections of a
suitable man, but also, and perhaps more significantly, a state of selfacceptance, of self-love.
In one of a host of revisionary shifts, Bridget Jones’s Diary expressly refutes the
isolation that typically plagues the Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine, recasting
her, in the guise of Bridget, as ensconced amongst a community of close
companions. Bridget’s biological family figure heavily throughout the novel, but
it is her chosen, urban family — comprised of Shazzer and Jude, fellow female
singletons, Magda, a “Smug Married” (39) Bridget alternately envies and pities,
and Tom, her gay confidante — that is most pivotal to the narrative. It is
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significant that Bridget explicitly labels her “network of friends” an “extended
family” (245). Fielding’s text was arguably the first to expressly define as family
a group of intimate friends, and thus proffer the possibility of a contemporary
alternative to the traditional, nuclear model of kinship. This unorthodox familial
vision implicitly operates so as to question the necessity — and thereby unseat
the primacy — of heterosexual marital coupling, upon which normative notions
of family so depend. Indeed, rather than figuring as the text’s idealised and
climactic finale, as it does uniformly in novels that bear the Harlequin Mills &
Boon brand, in Bridget Jones’s Diary, the unexamined veneration of marriage is
questioned, primarily via the text’s depiction of a variety of marred marriages.
Although Bridget openly longs for a romantic companion, she is understandably
somewhat sceptical of the institution of marriage, given the utterly uninspiring
marital unions she is privy to — that of her parents, whose relationship woes
are evidently testament to the pair’s decidedly retrograde recourse to traditional
gender roles, and that of Magda and Jeremy, whose pairing is threatened by
his adulterous behaviour, leaving Magda feeling “miserable” and “powerless”
(133). Marriage is, in this text, by no means celebrated as some sort of
axiomatic aspiration, in and of itself. As Lisa A. Guerrero observes, “the novel
frequently suggests that marriage is not the way for a person to achieve
completion” (99).
Unlike other celebrated chick-lit authors, such as Jane Green, whose detailed
descriptions of her various heroines’ sexual trysts are explicit to the point of
crudity, Fielding refrains from relating Bridget’s sexual encounters in graphic
terms. However, she also avoids the prudish, coded and unintentionally comic
sex talk that characterises the Harlequin Mills & Boon brand. Instead, she
deploys a certain vagueness when it comes to recounting Bridget’s sexual
exploits — all the reader knows is that Bridget engages in sex confidently,
joyously and with a sense of humour. Unlike the archetypal romance heroine,
Bridget is unabashedly informed and experienced — in preparation for the first
time she and Daniel sleep together, she brushes up on her sexual skills by
skimming “the Ultimate Sex Guide” (59). And afterwards:
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Oh joy. Have spent the day in a state I can only describe as shag-drunkenness,
mooning about the flat, smiling, picking things up and putting them down again. It was
so lovely. The only down points were 1) immediately it was over Daniel said, ‘Damn. I
meant to take the car into the Citroen garage,’ and 2) when I got up to go to the
bathroom he pointed out that I had a pair of tights stuck to the back of my calf (60).

A much later passage is, however, a cause for feminist concern, in that it
positions Bridget as somewhat passively acted upon, in the manner of the
stereotypical Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine:
Then he took the champagne glass out of my hand, kissed me, and said, ‘Right,
Bridget Jones, I’m going to give you pardon for,’ picked me up in his arms, carried me
off into the bedroom (which had a four-poster bed!) and did all manner of things which
mean whenever I see a diamond-patterned V-neck sweater in future, I am going to
spontaneously combust with shame (307).

This extract, taken from the text’s closing, which itself constitutes a somewhat
surprisingly unequivocal return to the low-brow romance, is, however,
something of an anomaly. At numerous other points in the novel, Bridget is
depicted as a sexual agent, clearly capable of and willing to either give or
withhold her consent, verbally and incontrovertibly. Even intoxicated, she is
able to refuse Daniel’s unwanted advances, bolstered by the indignant feministflavoured rants she and her female friends frequently engage in:
As he started to undo the zip he whispered, ‘This is just a bit of fun, OK? I don’t think
we should start getting involved.’ Then, caveat in place, he carried on with the zip.
Had it not been for Sharon and the fuckwittage and the fact I’d just drunk the best part
of a bottle of wine, I think I would have sunk powerless in his arms. As it was, I leapt to
my feet, pulling up my skirt (33).

One aspect of Bridget’s life that is recounted in painfully minute detail is her
ongoing attempt to control her dietary intake and thus govern her physique.
Each diary instalment is prefaced with her current, ever-fluctuating weight and
the number of calories she has consumed in the previous twenty-four hour
period. Many entries, such as the following one, written in the midst of an
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imagined pregnancy, also include a meticulously drawn list of food consumed
that day:
2 packets of Emmenthal cheese slices.
1 litre freshly squeezed orange juice.
1 cold jacket potato.
2 pieces unbaked lemon cheesecake (very light; also possibly eating for two).
1 Milky Way (125 calories only. Body’s enthusiastic response to cheesecake
suggested baby needed sugar).
1 chocolate Viennoise dessert thing with cream on top (greedy baby incredibly
demanding).
Steamed broccoli (attempt to nourish baby and stop it growing up spoilt).
4 cold Frankfurter sausages, (only available tin in cupboard — too exhausted by
pregnancy to go out to shop again) (115-6).

Bridget’s battle to manipulate and shape her body is perhaps the novel’s most
famed feature. From a post-structural perspective, it is arguably also its most
feminist feature, in that it foregrounds the constructedness of the female form,
positing femininity as custom rather than inbuilt, biologically determined
condition. Bridget’s persistent and methodical monitoring of her attempts to
control and cast her curves is symptomatic of the requisite ritualistic
repetitiveness of gendered practices. She fruitlessly seeks to embody the
slender youthfulness that works to visually mark the allegedly intrinsic femininity
of the Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine, and is overjoyed when she finally
manages to slim down to her goal weight, only to be horrified by the effect such
drastic slimming has on her face. She discovers that, in order to be sufficiently
slim, she must unfortunately sacrifice any aesthetic pretence to youth:
After eighteen years of trying to get down to 8st 7 I have finally achieved it. It is no trick
of the scales but confirmed by jeans. I am thin [N] Eighteen years of calorie and fatunit-based arithmetic [N] Millions of cheesecakes and tiramisus, tens of millions of
Emmenthal slices left uneaten. Eighteen years of struggle, sacrifice and endeavour —
for what? Eighteen years and the result is ‘tired and flat’. I feel like a scientist who
14

discovers that his life’s work has been a total mistake

14

Emphasis added.
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(107).

It is the repeated reference to the work involved, to the tirelessness of her
efforts to sculpt her body so as to comply with normative notions of the feminine
physique, that makes this and similar such extracts worthy of note. Palpably
frustrated and exhausted, Bridget neatly conveys Judith Butler’s contention that
“being a woman” (Fielding 30) is not “in the least bit natural” (Whelehan,
HFBJD 48-9) — that it is, in fact, a conscious, laborious, constant and fallacious
affectation. As Bridget explicitly points out, “neither [her] personality nor [her]
body is up to it if left to its own devices” (59):
Being a woman is worse than being a farmer – there is so much harvesting and crop
spraying to be done: legs to be waxed, underarms shaved, eyebrows plucked, feet
pumiced, skin exfoliated and moisturised, spots cleansed, roots dyed, eyelashes tinted,
nails filed, cellulite massaged, stomach muscles exercised. The whole performance is
so highly tuned you only need to neglect it for a few days for the whole thing to go to
seed. Sometimes I wonder what I would be like if left to revert to nature — with a full
beard and handlebar moustache on each shin [N], flabby body flobbering around

15

(30).

Bridget’s repeatedly clumsy attempts to apply cosmetics as a means of
replicating the beauty and youth of the Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine —
whose natural feminine radiance, of course, renders make-up redundant —
have comically calamitous results:
Going out to meet Tom for tea. Decided need to spend more time on appearance like
Hollywood stars and have therefore spent ages putting concealer under eyes, blusher
on cheeks and defining fading features.
“Good God,” said Tom when I arrived [N] “Your face. You look like Barbara Cartland
[N] [L]ike a five-year old in your mother’s make-up”, he said. “Look”.
I glanced in the mock Victorian pub mirror. I looked like a garish clown with bright pink
cheeks, two dead crows for eyes and the bulk of the white cliffs of Dover smeared
underneath (148-9).

15

Emphasis added.
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Bridget’s disastrous cosmetic performance of gender is fraught due to its
blatancy, its erroneous hyperbole revealing the fictive nature of femininity.
Samantha Holland claims that the famously camp Cartland, romance writer
extraordinaire, via the excess and obvious falseness of her performed and
painted feminine form, “distanc[es herself] from her rendition of femininity” (1213). Bridget’s mimicry of Cartland — albeit unintentional — is similarly
subversive. The description of her gaudily made-up face evokes the brash
femininity conveyed by the subversive figure of the drag queen, whose
theatricality, according to Butler scholar Esther Godfrey, “works to dislodge
essentialised notions of gender identity and sexual difference” (3). Butler
recommends that gender constraints be “undermined through parody”
(Gauntlett 140), which is precisely what Bridget’s ironic enactment of femininity
realises. In her attempt to duplicate the apparently effortless beauty of the
conventional romance heroine, Bridget actually, comically replicates the overtly
synthetic femininity of the drag queen.
Another facet of femininity that Bridget rather defectively enacts is domesticity.
Her domestic ineptitude produces some of the novel’s funniest moments:
Hoped-for-2-gallon stock taste-explosion has turned into burnt chicken carcasses
coated in jelly [N] Soup is bright blue [N] What has become of tuna? [N] Am
disastrous failure. Michelin-star cookery? Kwik-fit, more like (267, 270-1).

Earlier on, Bridget is prompted by her decidedly domestically capable mother to
perform the very feminine role of gracious hostess so as to attract and attain
the affections of Mark Darcy. The very retrograde canapés and beverages
neatly bespeak the archaic quality of such gendered behaviour:
The worst of it was that Una Alconbury and Mum [N] kept making me walk round with
trays of gherkins and glasses of cream sherry in a desperate bid to throw me into Mark
Darcy’s path yet again [N]
‘Can’t I tempt you with a gherkin?’ I said [N] ‘Stuffed olive? [N] ‘Silverskin onion?’ I
encouraged. ‘Beetroot cube?’ (16).
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The text’s presentation of gendered identities as overtly constructed and
theatrically performed rather than innate and effortless has the effect of
suggesting that gender itself is capable of fluctuation and open to innovation.
In place of the fixed, natural, discernible and polarised models of masculinity
and femininity proffered by the conventional Harlequin Mills & Boon romance,
are images of gender as forced, contrived, and ambivalent. Upon (mistakenly)
believing herself to be pregnant, Bridget herself recognises this instability, her
emotional response unseating the sexed binary by way of its undecidability:
I waited, feeling like a weird sort of hermaphrodite [N] experiencing the most violently
opposed baby sentiments of a man and a woman at the same time. On the one hand I
was all nesty and gooey about Daniel, smug about being a real woman [N] On the
other I was thinking, oh my God, life is over [N] This confusion, I guess, is the price I
must pay for becoming a modern woman (119).

The novel’s hero, Mark Darcy, operates similarly to Bridget so as to mock
simplistic notions of gender disparity, and thus, by extension, question the
hierarchy implicit in dichotomous designations of sexed identities. In its quest
to challenge Harlequin Mills & Boon’s overstated rendering of masculinity,
rather than simplistically providing an ironic citation of such, the novel employs
a twofold strategy, frequently depicting its hero as a hyperbolic version of the
standard romantic hero, only to undercut such a construction, refusing its
essentialist implications. Mark Darcy’s explicit and exaggerated mimicry of the
archetypal romantic figure allows readers to readily identify him as an ultimately
subversive and parodic response to the Harlequin Mills & Boon hero, as does
his obvious indebtedness to and origins in the character of Mr. Darcy, the
ultimate, Austenian hero. As Whelehan points out, the men who populate the
pages of the Harlequin Mills & Boon product:
are always dark, tall, a little older, successful, surly, and smouldering with unawakened
passion. In the mould of this genre, Fielding’s Mark Darcy appears cold and distant
towards Bridget, straight away singling him out to the seasoned romance reader as the
real hero of the piece (HFBJD 32).
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“Tall [N] rich, divorced-by-cruel-wife Mark” (13), a “top human-rights lawyer”
(101), clearly possesses the requisite traits of the Harlequin Mills & Boon hero.
His qualifications for the role are repeatedly overstated to comic effect:
Tried to read myself to sleep with new issue of Tatler, only to find Mark Bloody Darcy’s
face smouldering out from feature on London’s fifty most eligible bachelors going on
about how rich and marvellous he was (194).

As heroes are want to do, Mark comes to Bridget’s rescue on numerous
occasions, at one point saving her flailing television career (242), at another,
helping her out of one of her many cookery fiascos (271). He is also
instrumental in the detainment of Julio, behaving in a way that Bridget
describes as “thrillingly authoritative” (303), a la the Harlequin Mills & Boon
hero. Readers are thus encouraged to expect Mark to possess all the Harlequin
Mills & Boon sanctioned trappings of masculinity, only to have this expectation
denied. Mark’s virility, for instance, is subtly undermined throughout the
narrative:
He turned round, revealing that what had seemed from the back like a harmless navy
sweater was actually a V-neck diamond patterned in shades of yellow and blue — as
favoured by the more elderly of the nation’s sports reporters (13).

Only a couple of pages later, Mark’s awkward dress is again mentioned, this
time so as to infantilise him in an inversion of the Harlequin Mills & Boon
paradigm, wherein the heroine is problematically depicted as childlike, and
thereby in opposition to her much older lover. Looking down, Bridget realises
that he is “wearing white socks with a yellow bumblebee motif” (16).
In the novel’s sequel, Bridget Jones: The Edge of Reason, Mark’s status as a
revision of the Harlequin Mills & Boon-esque hero is consolidated, in that he is
explicitly likened to a tattered, careworn teddy bear. Emasculated, he is
nonetheless appealing, his incipient baldness indicative of a milder, less
threatening masculinity:

167

He looked so vulnerable and cuddly sitting there that could not resist sitting down next
to him, putting arms round him and pulling him close to me.
“Oh Christ,” he said. “It’s not very manly, is it, getting scared at night”.
I stroked his hair, I kissed his bald patch where his fur had been loved off (379).

As Whelehan notes:
Bridget and her friends like nothing better than to rewind the scene of Darcy swimming
in the lake at Pemberley in the 1995 BBC adaptation of Pride and Prejudice, and their
attraction to the character of Darcy as played by Colin Firth suggests that there is still a
lot of mileage in the moody Byronic romantic hero so popular with [Harlequin] Mills &
Boon (HFBJD 181).

Yet it is the less menacing, more personable Mark Darcy that Bridget ultimately
falls in love with. It is arguably his temperate manner and bumbling
awkwardness, characteristics that denote his deviation from stereotypical
masculinity, that so endear Mark to Bridget — the pair are ultimately wellmatched in their respectively imperfect citations of gender.

Via Mark Darcy,

the novel posits as desirable — and thus endorses — a mild, modified and
thereby dissident model of manliness, so as to pose a challenge to the
paradigmatic Harlequin Mills & Boon-esque hero and thereby undermine the
man/woman dualism so reliant upon the rigid opposition of acute articulations of
gender.
Another means by which Bridget Jones’s Diary interrogates and disturbs the
man/woman binary is via its repetitive ridiculing of self-help discourse, and the
biological essentialism that is its mainstay. Whelehan somewhat perplexingly
suggests that
The Diary addresses the perspective of gender by affirming that men are different [N]
and that to ‘survive’ (in other words, to conform and enter heterosexual monogamous
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bliss) one must learn to speak their language whilst celebrating the peculiarities of
one’s own sex

16

(Overloaded 137).

Indeed, at the novel’s outset, Bridget herself is complicit in this type of thinking,
being “halfway through Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus” (14), but
even at this pre-awakened stage she is at least subconsciously aware of just
how nonsensical this self-help prototype’s axioms are — she openly doubts that
“Mark Darcy, though clearly odd, [is] ready to accept himself as a Martian quite
yet” (14). Annie Potts offers the following synopsis of what is arguably the most
recognisable and notorious of self-help texts:
Gray’s central premise [N] is that men and women are from different planets;
fundamentally and properly different [N] The moral of this primal myth could not be
simpler: the key to successful, fulfilling, nonconflictual heterosexual relationships lies in
an awareness and acceptance of these inherent, inevitable and ‘healthy’ differences
between men and women (Potts 154).

“Not only do men and women communicate differently”, claims Gray, “but they
think, feel, perceive, react, respond, love, need and appreciate differently” (5).
As Potts argues, Gray’s recommendations “[reinforce] gender polarisation”
(154) in that they suggest that such disparity is biologically based and thus
immutable. Bridget Jones’s Diary invokes this work so as to refute rather than
recommend its essentialist approach to gender. The text’s suggestions and
childish analogies are frequently parodied, quite clearly posited as
preposterous:
Eventually the three of us worked out a strategy for Jude. She must stop beating
herself over the head with Women Who Love Too Much and instead think more
towards Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus, which will help her to see
Richard’s behaviour less as a sign that she is co-dependent and loving too much and
more in the light of him being like a Martian rubber band which needs to stretch away in
order to come back (21).

It is also significant that Bridget, on occasion, describes herself and Daniel, and
the interaction between the pair, by way of explicit comparisons to mammalian
16

Emphasis added.
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mating behaviours, signalling her own, initial, subscription to the quasi-scientific
axioms of biological essentialism. At one point, she recalls that she and Daniel
“fell upon each other like beasts” (33). At another, she describes them
“star[ing] at each other transfixed like two African animals at the start of a fight
on a David Attenborough programme” (76). Post-structural meaning is
ultimately made, however, by the fact that she refrains from describing her
pairing with Mark in such terms, additional evidence, perhaps, of her eventual
enlightenment.
The ultimate indictment of the discourse of self-help, however, comes at the
novel’s close, when Bridget succeeds in finding romantic happiness with Mark
Darcy in spite of her inability to heed the advice of Men are from Mars, Women
are from Venus and its ilk. It is of great significance that Mark falls in love with
Bridget not so much in spite of, but, rather, because of, her flawed enactment of
femininity, her conspicuous exposure of its constructedness. As Mark points
out, “all the other girls [he knows] are so lacquered over” (237). That he not
only accepts, but cherishes Bridget’s idiosyncrasies marks him as preferable to
Daniel, his romantic rival, whom Bridget can only wish “like[d her] just as [she
is]” (59). To this end, as Whelehan contends, the novel is an affirmative
account of “the triumph of nature over nurture, since Bridget gets her man
despite her haphazard beauty regimen and her dismal attempts at selfimprovement” (TFB 180).
Bridget prefaces her diary with a fairly extensive list of New Year’s Resolutions,
nicely flagging the fact that, as Alison Umminger maintains, Bridget’s quest for
a partner “is entirely secondary to [her] ongoing [and larger] battle” with herself
(240). Her stated objectives vary wildly, ranging from the health conscious —
she aims to “eat more pulses”, for instance — to the philanthropic — she hopes
to “give proportion of earnings to charity” — and everything in between, such as
her intention to “learn to programme the remote”, to be “more confident” and
“assertive”, and, of course, to “form functional relationship with responsible
adult” (3). Bridget’s diary ends, appropriately, in response to its aspirational
opening, with a summary of the year’s feats and failings. Intriguingly, she calls
it “an excellent year’s progress” (310), despite the fact that she has been
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unsuccessful in her attempts to quit smoking, “be poised”, drink less and “go to
the gym three times a week not merely to buy a sandwich” (3). One reason
Bridget appears to end her year on a high note, is, of course, that she has
snared Mark Darcy. But what is more momentous is that Bridget has
seemingly come to accept herself, flaws and all. Bridget’s conquering of the
self-doubt that plagues her is noteworthy — as Whelehan observes, it is highly
significant that “the Boxing Day entry to her diary is stripped of any [N] calorie
updates” (HFBJD 53) — as is the romantic (and thereby arguably regressive)
conclusion to her diarised year. The novel is, above all else, a narrative of
personal growth, something of a delayed bildungsroman, one could say — an
awakening of sorts, made possible by a number of character-building crises
and the encouragement of friends (who, for instance, think Bridget “looked
better before” her temporary drastic and longed for weight loss (107)). What
makes the ending somewhat suspect from a feminist point of view is the fact
that it is Mark Darcy’s profession of love that catalyses Bridget’s recognition of
her own self-worth. The final pages of Bridget Jones’s Diary reinstate the
primacy of romance:
When we got upstairs it turned out he had taken a suite. It was fantastic, v. posh and
bloody good fun and we played with all the guest features and had more champagne
and he told me all this stuff about how he loved me (306).

Bridget succeeds in moving on from the heartbreak of infidelity and the
breakdown of her parents’ marriage, becomes a successful television reporter
and as a friend is a tireless source of support, yet only the validation that comes
with a burgeoning romantic relationship can convince her of her value. To this
end, the novel’s ending “seems less like progression and more like regression,
with Bridget’s succumbing to traditional expectations for [N] womanhood: she
is satisfied, fulfilled, and identified through the love and protection of a man”
(Guerrero 99).
Bridget Jones’s Diary arguably constitutes a partial, unfinished feminist revision
of the conventional romance, given that it problematically retains Harlequin
Mills & Boon’s romantic ending — albeit not as an end in and of itself, but as an
indicator of Bridget’s growth. The novel manages to recast some of the brand’s
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more rigid and pernicious conventions, only to ultimately restore its romantic
conclusion, thereby conveying plural and conflicting meanings. That romance is
celebrated, not for its own sake, but as an indicator of Bridget’s awakening, is
at once both regressive and progressive, a marker of its ideological polysemy.
This tension is underscored via the characterisation of Bridget’s best friends,
her two schizophrenic selves. As Rebecca Michaels points out, Jude and
Shazzer are “polar opposites and deliberate stereotypes — one a self-help
book junkie, the other prone to drunken feminist ravings” (91). Both Bridget,
and the genre borne of her diary are permanently torn between these two
extremes — between the traditional tropes of the Harlequin Mills & Boon text,
and a fully feminist renunciation of those tropes.

THE FILM
In his review of Maguire’s cinematic rendition of Bridget Jones’s Diary, James
Kendrick suggests that, in comparison to its literary genesis, the film “takes a
more romantic turn” (2). Whilst it is true that the film centres, selectively and
almost solely, on Bridget’s romantic escapades — either omitting other
elements of her life entirely or expelling them to the comic periphery — and
thus constitutes something of an homage to the novel’s generic heredity, the
various instances in which the source text’s post-structural feminist politics are
amplified in the film, and positioned at its fore, cannot be ignored. The singular
scope of the film’s plot bespeaks the book’s indebtedness to the Harlequin Mills
& Boon brand, yet, unlike the overt and complete return to the low-brow
romance effected by Someone Like You’s somewhat retrograde revision of
Animal Husbandry, Maguire’s film manages to invoke the ideological
uncertainty that characterises both Fielding’s text and the chick-lit genre more
generally, the polysemy for which the genre is problematically known. At times
the film not only proffers, but, rather, inflates the novel’s progressive poststructural approach to gendered identities, whilst, at others, it affirms the
primacy of romantic coupling by way of streamlining Bridget’s story and
excluding much of the detail that comprises her original day-to-day, diarised,
multi-faceted life.
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Bridget Jones’s Diary, directed by Maguire, and co-written by Fielding, Andrew
Davies and Richard Curtis, was released in April 2001. It stars Renee
Zellweger, in an Oscar nominated performance, as Bridget, Colin Firth — in
what is perhaps the pinnacle of post-modern casting — as Mark Darcy, Hugh
Grant as the rakish Daniel Cleaver, Shirley Henderson as Jude, Sally Phillips
as Shazzer and James Callis as Tom. The film offers a somewhat slighter,
simpler, refined-via-romance version of Fielding’s original work, wherein Bridget
awkwardly, though ultimately successfully, attempts to secure the affections of
an appropriate partner, and thus put an end to her singleton status.
Given the novel’s rather exceptional popularity, and the iconic status of Bridget
herself, it is perhaps unsurprising that Kendrick is not the only reviewer to offer
an assessment of the film’s fidelity — or lack thereof — to the work on which it
is based, for the fidelity fixation that pervades both lay and scholarly critiques of
adaptation tends to be even more pronounced when the original text is familiar
to so many and beloved to such excess. As Dan Lybarger notes, Bridget
Jones’s Diary
has become such a part of popular culture that even those who have not read the book
are likely to be familiar with the central character and her futile but amusingly optimistic
quest for self-improvement. Anyone undertaking a film adaptation of such a book has
to meet an unusually large burden of anticipation (1).

A number of reviews of the film open with an appraisal of the extent to which it
has seemingly realised the presumed aim of fidelity — famed film critic Roger
Ebert, for example, opens his by exclaiming:
Glory be, they didn’t muck it up. Bridget Jones’s Diary, a beloved book about a heroine
both lovable and human, has been made against all odds into a funny and charming
movie that understands the charm of the original, and preserves it (1).

Others, however, are less enthused, damning the film’s inevitable departures
from the novel as flaws. Says CNN’s Paul Clinton, for instance, “the film is not
faultless. While the writers have captured Fielding’s sparkling rhythm with
words, they’ve created a bit of havoc with the plotline” (10). Pam Grady
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concurs, suggesting that “fans of [the] novel may be disappointed at how some
of the book’s events have been conflated and characters reduced”. Zellweger
herself also demonstrates a keen awareness of the pressures associated with
converting a much-loved novel to the screen. Of her portrayal of Bridget, she
has said, “I just wanted to get it right. The book meant such a lot to so many
women that I didn’t want to be the one to bodge it up” (Jones 4).
These responses to the adaptation, varied though they may be, are alike in
their uniform and unquestioning subscription to the fidelity fixation, and together
exemplify something of an adaptation truism — the more widely read, popular
or classic a novel is, the greater the demand for and expectation of filmic
fidelity. The degree to which fidelity is insisted upon is thus inextricably linked to
the breadth of the source text’s audience, and the fervour felt and
demonstrated by that audience for the story as originally conceived. As
adaptation theorist Morris Beja explains:
Filmmakers feel freer when adapting a mediocre or unknown novel than when handling
a widely admired or famous one. Rightly or wrongly, fewer people care what happens
when Lionel White’s novel Clean Break becomes Stanley Kubrick’s film The Killing than
about what David Lean does with Dickens’ Great Expectations, or how best-sellers like
Jaws or The Godfather are filmed [N] It will not be only the dour scholarly pedant who
will raise an eyebrow when the 1929 film version of The Taming of the Shrew carries
the credit line, ‘By William Shakespeare, with additional dialogue by Sam Taylor’ (75).

Rather than mindlessly bowing to the delimiting demands of the novel’s
devotees and attempting an inevitably flawed and painfully awkward scene-byscene mimicry of Fielding’s work, Maguire’s Bridget Jones’s Diary offers a
rather brazen, romantically-inflected re-conception of its source, yet also
deploys a number of specific-to-cinema devices that uphold and, at times,
augment, the novel’s sporadic post-structural politics. This popularly and
critically lauded adaptation also enacts a clever renunciation of the pursuit of
unthinking fidelity by instead escalating the book’s ironic use of intertextuality
so as to playfully undermine the very idea of a singular source. The film’s
heightened intertextuality works to refute fidelity-focused critiques and provide
comedic commentary on the scholastic stasis produced by the fidelity fixation.
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The casting of Colin Firth is perhaps the most significant and effective means
by which Pride and Prejudice is intertextually invoked in Maguire’s film. Firth as
Mark Darcy literalises the link between Mr Darcy and Mark Darcy, ensuring that
the character’s status as a satirically skewed homage to the archetypal
romantic hero is readily apparent, intensifying the intertextual play that takes
place in the novel, and making the technique’s resultant meaning more pointed
— Firth’s Mark Darcy “stands out unmistakably as the reincarnated ideal”
(Rosenblum 6). As Madelyn Ritrosky-Winslow suggests in her article “Colin &
Renee & Mark & Bridget: The Intertextual Crowd”, Firth “playing Mark Darcy is
a deliberate, tongue-in-cheek ruse” (241). For Bridget Jones’s Diary “to deliver
all of its intended layers of meanings [N], the part of Mark Darcy could only be
played by Firth” (241).
Rather than explicitly comparing these two fictional men, as does Bridget,
repeatedly, in the novel, the film instead engages its audience, forcing the
viewer to make the comparison. In Firth’s performance the pair are at once
conflated and distinguished. Steve Friedman observes that, akin to his
portrayal of the Austenian Mr Darcy, Firth’s “thick-haired, square-jawed, steelyeyed [Mark] Darcy thrums with alpha-male magnetism when Bridget [N] spots
him” for the first time (2). Clever costuming, in the form of a rather
embarrassingly childish, garishly hand-knitted reindeer jumper — an
unequivocal amplification of the novel’s “diamond-patterned” sweater coupled
with “bumblebee motif” socks (13, 16) — however, operates so as to
emasculate this otherwise extreme image of machismo. Indeed, the Darcy
references are difficult for a literate audience to miss, as are the film’s various
other allusions to Pride and Prejudice. Mr Darcy’s grandiose home, Pemberley,
for instance, becomes, in the film, the publishing house that employs Bridget,
Daniel and Perpetua — Pemberley Press. The film also rewrites one of
literature’s most famous opening lines — instead of Austen’s, “It is a truth
universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune
must be in want of a wife” (7), the audience hears, early on in the film, via
voice-over, “It is a truth universally acknowledged that as soon as one part of
your life starts looking up, another part falls to pieces".
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Bridget Jones’s Diary goes further than simply citing Fielding’s indebtedness to
and interplay with Austen’s Pride and Prejudice. As previously noted, the novel
itself owes more to the BBC version of Austen’s text, than to her text itself — in
that it is inspired by that very specific portrayal of the novel’s central characters
— and thus works to further undermine notions of the singular, inviolable
source by way of invoking a host of interconnected and explicitly progenitory
source texts. To further complicate matters, Susan Ferriss argues that
Maguire’s film “strengthens the [story’s] allusions to Austen’s novel” (73), at
times to the extent that it is seemingly more informed by the nineteenth century
novel than by Bridget Jones’s Diary, its twentieth century parody. The
aforementioned reindeer sweater is not the only feature of the film’s opening
scene, for instance, that constitutes an inflation that renders it on par with
Austen’s novel and its BBC equivalent. As Ferriss observes, in Fielding’s novel
“the animosity between [Bridget and Mark initially] results from Bridget’s
distaste of his manner and clothing, [N] his refusal to take her telephone
number [N] the final insult” (73). In the film version, however, “this gentle snub
— and Darcy’s sweater — are enhanced for comic effect, whilst strengthening
the ties to Austen” (Ferriss 73). In a typically bleak, yet humorous moment,
Bridget hears Mark refer quite cruelly to her as a “verbally incontinent spinster
who smokes like a chimney, drinks like a fish and dresses like her mother!”
This quite cutting summation more closely echoes that of the original Mr Darcy
than it does Fielding’s Mark Darcy — in both Austen’s novel and its BBC
rendition, he rudely deems Elizabeth Bennett “tolerable, but not handsome
enough to tempt [him]” (14). It is Austen, rather than Fielding, who is once
again invoked in the fact that, in Maguire’s film, Bridget’s dislike for Mark is
bolstered by a lie told by his nemesis, Daniel Cleaver (Ferriss 74), with whom
he was once very closely acquainted, yet ultimately betrayed by — just as the
repugnancy Lizzie feels for Darcy is exacerbated by Wickham’s lies —
whereas, in Fielding’s Bridget, Daniel, although admittedly no fan of Mark’s,
tells no such untruth, and thus plays no direct role in Bridget’s growing
aversion.
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A reading of the film as an Austenian update is also supported by what can be
intertextually inferred from the past projects of those involved. Along with Firth,
Davies was a contributor to both Pride and Prejudice and Bridget Jones’s Diary
— he co-wrote the screenplay for the latter, and wrote the script for the former.
Of his involvement, he says, “I was brought in, rather sweetly, to increase the
Darcy quotient” (Riddell). Some of the film’s more prominent cast members
also have other Austen adaptations in their repertoire — Hugh Grant, for
instance, featured in Ang Lee’s Sense and Sensibility (1995), as did Gemma
Jones, who plays Bridget’s mother. Embeth Davidtz — Natasha — starred as
Mary Crawford in the 1999 adaptation of Mansfield Park.
Bridget Jones’s Diary can thus be said to make meaning via an array of
competing intertexts, of which the acknowledged source text — Fielding’s novel
— is but one. The impact of the film’s intertextual play is twofold. On the one
hand, the film’s zealous deployment of this narrative device works so as to
position multiple texts — Fielding’s novel, her column, Austen’s novel, and the
BBC adaptation of the same — as foundational texts, and thereby problematise
the demand for fidelity, relegating the named source text to the status of one of
many competing intertexts, unseating its presumed primacy and inviolability.
This fact is only compounded in this instance by the film’s frequent favouring of
Austen’s work over that of Fielding, evident in the numerous instances wherein
the novel is overtly transformed in the film via Pride and Prejudice.
On the other hand, the film’s blatant intertexual references to Austen’s classic
work — references that find their basis in Fielding’s Bridget Jones’s Diary, yet
are amplified in the process of transposition — operate so as to signal its status
as a revisionary response to Fielding’s text, underscoring the film’s recouping of
the novel’s somewhat latent links to the low-brow romance, at once both
aligning it more closely with the Harlequin Mills & Boon brand, and magnifying
its post-structuralist departures from the genre’s regressive insistence on
gender disparity.
The works of Helen Fielding and Jane Austen are not the only intertexts to
provide Maguire’s film with additional import. The actors themselves — as
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individuals, as the celebrated personas with which their audiences are familiar,
and as types — infuse their roles with specific meaning. Firth’s famed take on
Mr Darcy is, of course, ever-present in Maguire’s film, but, as noted previously,
the prior projects of the film’s other key players, both writers and stars, also
provide some interesting points of intersection and allow meaning to be made
in a multitude of ways. As noted by Jeff Dawson, Bridget Jones’s Diary can be
read as the third installment of a trilogy of romantic comedies (23) — Curtis,
who co-wrote the film, previously co-wrote Four Weddings and a Funeral and
Notting Hill, the films that cemented Grant’s star status and initial type. In each
of these films he portrays a foppish, yet subtly sexy, male take on the character
of Bridget Jones — neurotic, occasionally misguided, yet ultimately appealing.
As Robert B Ray explains, “the Hollywood system [seeks] to codify [N] its
leading actors, turning them into predictably signifying objects [N] through
consistent cinematic use” (40). In Bridget Jones’s Diary, Grant actually plays
against type, yet, interestingly, depicts a character that is closer to his alleged
real-life persona. The irony of casting Grant given his past work and caddish
infamy gives weight to a satirical reading of the film, stamping it with the same
witty irony and playful knowingness that characterises Pride and Prejudice, to
which this film pays homage, and pervades Fielding’s Bridget. Grant’s sleazy
behaviour is in fact mentioned quite disparagingly in the original work — like
Firth and Mark Darcy, Grant and Daniel Cleaver exist in the novel side-by-side.
Bridget recalls her boss, Richard Finch:
‘Come on! Come on!’ he was saying, holding up his fists like a boxer. ‘I’m thinking Hugh
Grant. I’m thinking Elizabeth Hurley. I’m thinking how come he gets away with it. That’s
it! How does a man with a girlfriend like Elizabeth Hurley have a blow-job from a
prostitute on a public highway and get away with it? What happened to hell hath no
fury?’ [N] ‘Well maybe,’ I said, because it was the only thing I could think of, ‘it was
because someone swallowed the evidence.’ (198)

Like Grant’s, Firth’s oeuvre has some significance. Aside from his legendary
turn as Fitzwilliam Darcy, Firth previously starred in The English Patient and
Shakespeare in Love — acclaimed, award-winning adaptations of literary
classics — as well as Fever Pitch, the British adaptation of Nick Hornby’s novel
of the same name. Hornby, frequently described as a “male Helen Fielding”
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(Gladstone 30), is one of the few writers of lad-lit, the chick-lit sub-genre. So, in
a sense, Firth can be said to have forged a career out of adaptations of literary
classics and chick-lit hits — and in Bridget Jones’s Diary, these two genres
converge.
Renee Zellweger’s rendition of Bridget also, subtly, recalls her prior work. In her
breakout role as Dorothy to Tom Cruise’s Jerry Maguire, Zellweger is the
embodiment of homely helplessness. As Roger Ebert notes, Zellweger’s
“Bridget is a reminder of the first time we really became aware of her in a
movie, in Jerry Maguire, where she was so cute and vulnerable we wanted to
tickle her and console her at the same time” (Ebert 3). Another reviewer also
notes the intertextual resonance, saying, of Zellweger’s Bridget, “she had me at
hello”, a slight rewrite of her famous Jerry Maguire line. As Bridget, Zellweger
teeters between the defiance and vitality of Lizzie Bennett and the fragility of
Dorothy.
The casting of Zellweger in the film’s title role is, in hindsight, widely considered
to be surprisingly apt — the surprise being the authenticity of her performance
in spite of her Texan, and thus hyper-American, heritage and notably slight
physique, factors that led many to initially query the choice. Her casting was the
culmination of a lengthy search for the right actress, during which the
filmmakers met with Kate Winslet, Helena Bonham-Carter and Emily Watson,
British actresses considered to be “obvious candidates” for the role (Dawson
17). The likeable, curvaceous Winslet was certainly the people’s choice —
British journalists patriotically claimed the role seemed “to have been made for”
her (Dawson 17). Winslet indeed comes closer to looking the part when
compared to the usually sinewy and svelte Zellweger. Aware of the
controversy surrounding her casting, and in an attempt to realistically render
Bridget Jones as pleasantly plump, in the months prior to filming Zellweger ate
in earnest. Media coverage of her extreme eating habits — which included up
to 20 donuts per day, plus pizza, potatoes with butter, multiple Big Macs and
full-cream milkshakes — certainly provided fantastic publicity for the film.
However, Zellweger’s extreme physical transformation — from exceptionally
skinny, to decidedly curvy, and back again in time for the film’s premiere —
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visibly undermined the film’s efforts to convey the importance of accepting and,
indeed, celebrating one’s seeming imperfections, coinciding as it did with the
publicity-laden lead-up to the film’s opening. Zellweger did more than revert to
her original weight — according to sources, she lost “at least a stone more than
she had put on” (“On The Red Carpet” 2). In the film’s behind-the-scenes
featurette, filmed both during and post production, a drastically slimmed-down
Zellweger is a visible contradiction to her buxom Bridget. This extratextual
contradiction is only compounded by Zellweger’s later reflections on her
experience. Echoing her character’s obsession with her figure, Zellweger
initially told Working Title, the film's British producers, that "no amount of
money" could persuade her to appear in a sequel. "I was overweight for eight
months”, she said, “and I don't want to go through that experience again”
(Poole), her comment indicating that Bridget’s body was, for her, something of
a burdensome aberration. Instead of celebrating Bridget’s imperfections as
does the film, Zellweger’s comments render Bridget’s body perverse and
repulsive. Along with her extreme, rapid and timely weight-loss, such comments
worked to endorse the very Cosmopolitan culture that is critiqued so
relentlessly in the novel and to negate the film’s attempts to follow suit.
Alternatively, this disjunction can be read as inverting, and thus, in yet another
way, undermining the post-structural notion of the ideal feminine form as a
conceit — a conceit that is only ever realised as a result of a great deal of
discipline. Zellweger’s pre-Bridget body — tight, toned and notably tiny — is
posited, in the many pieces produced so as to publicise both Bridget Jones’s
Diary and its sequel, as a naturally occurring norm. It is her embodiment of the
rather rotund and thus realistic Bridget, as opposed to that of her slight, slender
self, that is seemingly burdensome — in that it was a physical state that
Zellweger had to, allegedly, quite consciously hone and maintain.
Extra, inter-textual inferences aside, Zellweger’s rendition of Bridget’s flawed,
imperfectly feminine physicality sees her “just a little on the puffy side, with a
bosom and a stomach and the vague hint of a double chin” (D’Souza). Bridget
is Zellweger’s seeming obverse in her laxity, in that, as Christine D’Souza
nicely puts it, Zellweger-as-Bridget possesses “exactly the sort of figure you’d
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expect of someone who didn’t exercise, who sometimes binged, and drank
Chardonnay every night” (3). As has been noted by numerous commentators,
the Diary itself never actually mentions Bridget’s height, an absence that
renders feasible a reading of Bridget’s persistent angst over her ever-fluctuating
weight as a symptom of body dysmorphia rather than as a reasonable, founded
response to a less-than-perfect physique. Zellweger’s embodiment signals the
film’s choice of the latter reading, and thus makes more meaningful Bridget’s
happily-ever-after and all that it encompasses — Mark’s affection for her
“wobbly bits”, and her own affection for her flawed self.
The film amplifies the novel’s interest in the many accoutrements of femininity
that are intended to help, but in Bridget’s case, often hinder, the performance of
the proper female form. Bridget’s clothes, for instance, are markedly ill fitting —
a too-short skirt here, a blousy, shapeless top there. Bunched and askew, her
dress tends to enhance rather than hide her physical flaws. As Stephanie
Zacharek notes, her Bridget’s clothes “are just on the wrong side of right” (9).
Of Bridget’s body as encased in her infamously erroneous bunny outfit,
Maguire offers the following commentary:
We were very proud of [Renee’s] thighs ‘cause it took a lot of work to get them that
way. It was fantastic ‘cause Renee and I would watch this scene back [N] on the
monitor and get very excited by the way the cellulite squeezed out in the holes of the
fishnets.

There is one particularly sad scene wherein Bridget is depicted in the bath, her
constraining Playboy Bunny-esque corsetry removed, peeling false eyelashes
from lids that are covered in tear-smudged mascara and liner, pairs of
pantyhose drying above her, hanging over the shower curtain railing. As she
cries, dejected and betrayed by Daniel, she slowly sheds her body of the
trappings of an idealised feminine self, a self that she had worked so tirelessly
to contrive in order to secure Daniel’s interest and approval. The she is
cognisant of the work involved in creating and maintaining a feminised
physicality is indicated, sporadically but repeatedly, by the daily, diarised
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statistics that are scrawled across the screen, recalling the prefaces to the
many diary entries that make up the novel.
The idea of Bridget’s body as something in need of binding and sculpting is
most pronounced in the film’s most famous scene, a scene, wholly unique to
the film, that featured in trailers and teasers, and was at the forefront of the
film’s publicity campaign — the scene wherein Daniel discovers Bridget’s
“absolutely enormous pants” and thus uncovers that which must, in order to
seamlessly create the illusion intended, always remain under the cover of
outerwear. Prior to this moment, Bridget shares with her diary, via voiceover,
her date-with-Daniel quandary:
Hmm. Major dilemma. If actually do, by some terrible chance end up in flagrante,
surely these [scanty knickers] would be most attractive at crucial moment. However,
chances of reaching crucial moment greatly increased by wearing these, scary,
stomach-holding-in-pants, very popular with grannies the world over.

Bridget’s attempt to enact the ideal feminine form is here hampered in that her
contrivance is — ultimately, mistakenly — all too apparent. The slapstick
humour of this scene belies its post-structural power.
The affected and arbitrary quality of the masculine/feminine divide, so cleverly
and comically explored in Fielding’s text, is conveyed carefully and consistently
throughout the film. That Bridget falls short of the feminised ideal is made
apparent almost immediately, described as she is, by Mark Darcy in the
opening scene’s Turkey Curry Buffet, as being inappropriately verbose, poorly
dressed and unforgivably vice-ridden. Determined to improve herself by way of
becoming more fittingly feminine and thereby snaring a suitor, Bridget is
depicted rehearsing her femininity in the days preceding the infamous Kafka’s
Motorbike launch, her feverish preparations literalising Butler’s theory of
performativity, making plain and tangible her suggestion that femininity is
comprised of repetitious citations. Bridget receives detailed instructions from
her friends prior to her big night — to “look gorgeous”, to “ignore Daniel and
suck up to famous authors” and to “circulate, oozing intelligence”. The film then
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cuts to a montage of Bridget zealously, obediently following their directives —
shaving her legs, clipping her toenails, massaging her dimpled thighs and
exclaiming in pain after waxing her nether regions, in an obvious evocation of
the novel’s post-structural reflection on the exertion and dedication required in
order to be(come) a woman (30). Next, Bridget is depicted repeating the name
Salman (as in, Rushdie), practicing a variety of posh inflections and intonations,
and rehearsing suitable conversation topics — “Isn’t it terrible about
Chechnya?” — all the while frantically vacuuming, her hair upswept in rollers.
The montage is a funny, frantic mishmash of feminising conduct, and makes
clear just how unnatural and forced the feminising process is for Bridget. That
femininity is a part she seeks to aptly play is similarly signalled in one of the
scenes that is included in the DVD’s Special Features, but was eventually cut
from the final version of the film. In this scene, Bridget consciously rehearses a
phone conversation with Daniel, only to dismally fail to replicate the rehearsed
version of dialogue at the critical moment.
The film neatly replicates the novel’s account of Bridget’s domestic clumsiness,
neither reducing nor exaggerating her poor cookery skills and somewhat
slovenly tendencies. The film does depart from the novel, however, in that it
makes explicit the seeming link between Bridget’s appeal, and her emphatic
failure to fittingly perform femininity in the kitchen. Her catastrophic attempts to
properly enact the traits accorded to her gender are not merely condoned, they
are celebrated — quite literally, at the infamous dinner party attended by
Shazzer, Jude, Tom and Mark Darcy. Not only do her trio of friends find her
flaws endearing, but, perhaps more significantly, so does Mark. Tom offers the
following toast to Bridget and her bizarre blue soup:
Well done Bridge. Four hours of careful cooking, and a feast of blue soup, omelette
and marmalade. I think that deserves a toast, don’t you? To Bridget, who cannot cook,
but whom we love, just as she is.

The film is undoubtedly more frank, when compared to the novel, in its portrayal
of Bridget’s lustiness. Zacharek contends that Bridget’s “unapologetic”
enjoyment of sex is, indeed, the single “significant and enjoyable” feature of
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Fielding’s work that the film preserves (5). Her sexual antics are rather
explicitly rendered in the film, albeit mostly off-screen. At one point she and
Daniel converse rather unsubtly about anal sex, which Bridget has evidently
initiated for the second time in the one evening. “And over we go”, Daniel
mumbles. “Shall I give you something to bite on?” At the close of their
dialogue, to the sounds of Bridget’s rapt giggles, the camera pans away from
the twosome’s hotel room, capturing instead a newly married couple waltzing,
whilst the less traditional, more deviant pair seemingly engage in the taboo
practise of sodomy. The film’s Bridget, then, is anything but virginal. In fact,
she goes so far as to term herself a “wanton sex goddess”.
If the Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine embodies the feminine ideal, then
Zellweger’s Bridget Jones, the anti-Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine, personifies
its opposite. Her gracelessness is pointedly apparent the moment she likens
herself, riding next to Daniel in an open-top convertible, to “screen goddess [N]
Grace Kelly”, only to have her glamorous head scarf blow away in the wind,
leaving her hair a dishevelled, knotted mess. She follows this faux pas with a
sheepish confession to being “ever so slightly less elegant under pressure”
than said screen star and princess.
The film’s Bridget and her Harlequin Mills & Boon counterpart do share one
interesting commonality, however — each are infantilised. In an early, postTurkey Curry Buffet scene, Bridget is dressed in childish, penguin-print
flannelette pyjamas. Later, she is again depicted somewhat jarringly in the
attire of a child, her paper party hat, messy ponytail and cartoon-print pyjamas
signalling her vulnerability as she sits at the top of the stairs, eavesdropping
hopefully on her parents’ reconciliation. The difference here, however, is that
her childish depiction is matched by that of Mark — repeatedly clothed in
youthful, festive attire — and thus fails to effect the same binary opposition that
is enacted by the Harlequin Mills & Boon brand.
Just as the film finds new ways in which to foreground the farce of femininity,
and to subvert essentialist approaches to the feminine, it also introduces
instances wherein masculinity is falteringly performed, and comically
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undermined. In the novel, Mark Darcy and Daniel Cleaver never actually cross
paths. The film rectifies this absence in a key scene, a scene that relies upon
audiences’ familiarity with the tropes of masculinity as it has been traditionally
defined and marked, a scene that initially invites viewers to anticipate a
testament to conventional, manly masculinity, only to ultimately, humorously,
unseat and defy that expectation.
The relevant scene begins when a drunken, regretful Daniel interrupts Bridget’s
dinner party — a destined-to-fail dinner party saved, as in the novel, by Mark,
his characteristically gallant heroics juxtaposed against his somewhat
unexpected domestic aptitude — asking for her forgiveness and sidelining
Mark’s attempts to finally woo her. Invoking the bygone era of his fictional
genesis, Mr Darcy, Mark asks Daniel to step “outside”, to which Daniel
responds, tongue-in-cheek, “Should I bring my duelling pistols or my sword?”
Mark lands two precise, fairly brutal blows — thus far accurately re-enacting the
machismo of Mr Darcy — before the scene transforms into a playful parody, the
change in tone signalled by Tom’s exceedingly effeminate response to the
action. “Fight”, he squeals, running into a nearby restaurant. “Well quick! It’s a
real fight!” The fight itself quickly feminises as well, the pair whining and
ungainly. In the commentary that accompanies the DVD release of the film,
Maguire describes the duel as “unheroic” and “sissy”, full of “kicking, scratching
[and] pulling of hair.” As Aragay and Lopez observe, the accompanying
soundtrack, which features Geri Halliwell’s cover of “the gay classic ‘It’s Raining
Men’” also works to undermine “the traditional romance concept of masculinity”
(215).
Performativity is at the forefront of the film again — made literal via the casting
of Firth in the role of Mark Darcy, whose status as a celebrated actor is
amplified and blatant as a result of the intertextual interconnectedness of his
take on Mark Darcy and his past performance as Mr Darcy. Aragay and Lopez
suggest that,
Sideburns apart, [N] their insistence on casting Firth — who had become inseparable,
in the (female) collective imaginary, from his role as Mr Darcy — novelist and co-
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scriptwriter Fielding and director Sharon Maguire were trying to (playfully) make a point
about the [N] performative nature of the mythical male hero (214).

Fielding’s novel bolsters its post-structural exposition of the arbitrariness of the
gender divide by way of frequently likening its men and women to male and
female beasts, yet persistently parodying Men are from Mars, Women are from
Venus, and the like — self-help tomes informed by quasi-biological
explanations of the differences between the sexes — and thus complicating
and questioning this essentialist metaphor. The novel’s filmic equivalent makes
only a couple of rather subtle references to the self-help genre and its
associated, biologically-based essentialist axioms, thus rendering somewhat
implicit its stance on the substance of sexed disparity. In one of numerous
telling coincidences, Maguire’s Bridget Jones’s Diary replicates Someone Like
You’s use of the nature documentary as a means of tying human behaviour to
the antics of animals, thus reducing people to their biology, and explaining
away male misconduct as an unfortunate yet unavoidable and inherent
consequence of chromosomal make-up. In the wake of Daniel’s infidelity, in a
moment that recalls the novel’s similarly inflected David Attenborough
reference, Bridget watches a televised documentary about the mating practises
of animals, practises that eerily echo her own situation. “The male penetrates
the female and leaves”, the male narrator explains, as if to justify Daniel’s
actions by way of them being a natural symptom of his sex. “Coitus is brief and
perfunctory.”
In the montage accompanied by Chaka Khan’s “I’m Every Woman”, wherein
Bridget is depicted gaining strength and making over her life, post-Daniel, the
discourse of self-help is quite literally disposed of, and thereby disparaged.
Amidst images of her determinedly working up a sweat on an exercise bike and
circling job advertisements, Bridget is depicted throwing away her collection of
self-help titles, including the — fictional, but not far from fact — hyperessentialist How Men Think, and What Men Want, replacing them with the more
promising sounding How To Get What You Want, And Want What You Have. It
is ultimately without the help of John Gray & Co. that the film’s Bridget comes to
understand and appreciate Mark Darcy, and to attain his affections.
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Although, in so many instances, the film chooses to enhance the novel’s
subversive approach to the distinction between the sexes, in such moments
seeming to revise the novel via its sometimes dormant feminism, at times
Fielding’s feminism appears much reduced in the film, sidelined, and,
occasionally, wholly undermined by the film’s undeniable foregrounding of
Bridget and Mark’s rather clumsy courtship. The film’s treatment of Bridget’s
urban family is a case in point. In the novel, the quintet comprised of Bridget,
Jude, Shazzer, Tom and Magda is so tightly knit and vital that it both
undermines the primacy of the nuclear family and threatens to negate
altogether the need for romantic coupling. The film’s depiction of this network
of friends is far more conventional, in that her platonic companions are
positioned at the periphery of Bridget’s life, rather than as integral to her day-today existence. Magda, in particular, is but a bit player in the film, transformed
from the supportive, sisterly companion of the novel into a somewhat boorish,
Smug Married acquaintance. Maguire herself acknowledges that the film’s
portrayal of Bridget’s friendships constitutes a significant departure from
Fielding’s novel, wherein Bridget’s friendships are intimately drawn. “There
were, you know, a lot more of the friends in the book and in the original
screenplay”, she admits, “but some of that had to get cut so that we could focus
on the main plot” — the main plot having been interpreted for the film, evidently,
as the trajectory of Bridget’s troubled love life. Numerous commentators
observe the same — Grady suggests that Bridget’s friends, in the film, are “little
more than a Greek chorus” and Susan Wloszczyna concurs, adding that they
are “reduced to mere doodles” (1).
In the wake of the novel’s publication, the trope of the “urban family” — as it has
become known, but is never explicitly so named in Fielding’s novel —
established itself as one of the primary requisite characteristics of the emergent
genre of chick-lit, and was the subject of many a scholarly piece. Interestingly,
by way of having Bridget herself use this very term — after she makes an
embarrassing error at work, she calls an “emergency summit with urban family
for coherent discussion of career crisis” — the film tellingly admits to being
indebted to and informed by not only the novel itself, but also the scholarship
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surrounding it. Bridget’s tokenistic reference to this generic trope aside, the
friendships as they function in the film are hardly familial, and thus signal the
film’s revisionist departure from this particular feature of the novel’s feminism.
The novel’s multi-layered critique of marriage is yet another of its features that
is downplayed in the film, a dearth that implicitly marks the adaptation’s return
to the conventional Harlequin Mills & Boon-esque veneration of marriage as
guaranteeing, if not signifying in itself, a happily-ever-after ending. Although
the union of Bridget’s parents is clearly troublesome for much of the film, it is
sweetly and neatly resolved towards the film’s close, unlike the novel’s eventual
cynical, conditional and tentative reuniting of the pair. Despite the problems her
parents encounter, the film’s Bridget quite openly longs for marriage, as
evidenced by the Daniel-centred daydream wherein she and he marry under a
shower of confetti. As for the very feminist-flavoured take on marriage
proffered in the novel by the problematic pairing of Magda and Jeremy, in the
film they feature only once, and, in that moment, appear as a straightforwardly
happy and cohesive couple.
Another of the film’s telling departures from its source is that pertaining to
Bridget’s New Year’s Resolutions. The novel’s list of goals is comprehensive,
ambitious, and ultimately quite meaningful, whereas the film largely trivialises
her attempts at self-improvement, mentioning only that she aims to lose weight
— “twenty pounds” —, to remember to put “last night’s pants in the laundry
basket”, and to “find nice, sensible boyfriend”, thereby streamlining her story via
romance, and positing her quest for love as her primary aim. The film’s first
draft — composed by Fielding herself — includes a more exhaustive list of New
Year’s Resolutions, one that is more akin to the novel’s list, whereas the
screenplay itself — from which the film quite drastically
departs — includes the particularly self-affirming decision to “live own life
without being bullied by people into things I don’t want to do” (Fielding, Davies
and Curtis 7). The filmmakers’ choice to exclude this, and others, signals its
oft-times overtly romantic rewriting of its source.
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The Harlequin Mills & Boon romance typically ends with the marriage of its
heroine to her hero, or, at the very least, the promise of their marriage. This
union is ideologically compromising given its steadfast positioning, in the
novel’s final pages, as an unquestionably climactic and definitive close to its
heroine’s quest. Chick-lit novels, including Fielding’s progenitory text, often end
similarly — not, usually, with a wedding as such, or even, for that matter, an
engagement, but, almost always, with intentions — implied or explicit — of
enduring monogamy. Whereas the heroine’s search for love is the principal, if
not, sole trajectory of the Harlequin Mills & Boon product, however, the chick-lit
heroine is usually primarily on a quest for self-improvement and selfacceptance, a quest to which her search for romantic love is secondary. In
Fielding’s Bridget Jones’s Diary, these dual quests are problematically
intertwined, bespeaking the polysemy that plagues the chick-lit genre. Bridget
closes her diary with a reflection on a year’s worth of progress, and is
seemingly both proud of her accomplishments, and accepting of her failings, a
self-assessment that, whilst progressive in and of itself, is seemingly,
troublingly, catalysed by Mark’s positive appraisal, as signalled by his
affections. At the film’s close, however, Bridget is seemingly blissful simply
because she is finally in the arms of the man she has come to love. Whilst
Mark’s love for Bridget, as she is, is made plain, earlier on in the film — “I don’t
think you’re an idiot at all. I like you. I like you very much. Just as you are” —
there is no evidence of her own acceptance of herself as she is, or of any
parallel celebration of her seeming flaws, thus rendering the film, at least in
terms of its trajectory, more in keeping with the Harlequin Mills & Boon tradition.
Maguire suggests that the film “is about [Bridget] trying to find her confidence.
She has a turn aroundN because somebody has told her they actually like her
the way she is. She begins to find her self-esteem”.
Indeed, when viewed in conjunction with, or as a complement to, the novel,
such meaning could feasibly be made. However, without the additional import
potentially provided by familiarity with the novel, the film fails to clearly
communicate Bridget’s success in reassessing and thereby accepting her self
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as she is, its conclusion comprising a revision-via-romance. This film is a
testament to the ideological uncertainty that is a feature of both Fielding’s
Bridget and the genre it instigated, in that it waivers so drastically, variously
amplifying both the novel’s feminism, and its more conservative links to the lowbrow romance.
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Chapter Five

Sex and the City
How do we get your column to translate to the silver screen? I think I’ve got the answer. What if we
flesh out the central relationship?

“Escape From New York”
Sex and the City

THE NOVEL
One year prior to the journalistic genesis of Bridget Jones, her American
equivalent of sorts, Carrie Bradshaw, came into being. On the other side of the
Atlantic Ocean, Candace Bushnell, now a canonical chick-lit novelist, was
garnering acclaim as the New York Observer’s columnist-cum-sexual
anthropologist. The initial instalment of her “Sex and the City” column was
published in 1994, ahead of the 1995 inception of Fielding’s column, a
chronology that operates to further complicate Fielding’s otherwise unparalleled
status as chick-lit’s founder, and to bolster Bushnell’s standing as one of the
earliest and most significant contributors to the developing genre.
The highlights of Bushnell’s now-defunct column were collected and revised in
the best-selling 1996 novel-length publication, Sex and the City — the
“original” to HBO’s televisual “copy”. This pair of texts, together with the 2008
release Sex and the City: The Movie, comprise the franchise that is the subject
of this chapter. The column drew autobiographic inspiration from its author’s
experiences as a single, thirty-plus, Manhattan-dwelling woman, as well as
those of both her close friends and her less-than-friendly acquaintances (or
rather, as she tellingly and aptly terms them, “’friends’”(107)). Via the voice of
her literary double, the similarly initialled Carrie — who at times features,
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conventionally, by way of first person narration, and, at others, is discussed in
the third person by an unidentified narrator (presumably Bushnell in omniscient
mode) — Bushnell recounts, in characteristically cynical fashion, the seditious
de-sexing of gendered behaviours as practised by her thinly-veiled, comic
rendering of New York City’s “social elite” (Gerhard 39).
Like Animal Husbandry and Bridget Jones’s Diary, Bushnell’s Sex and the City
is considered something of a chick-lit classic, and, as such, unsurprisingly, it
fairly unproblematically ticks most of the generic boxes. The novel’s overt
foundations in autobiography, for instance, are immediately flagged via the
transparently pseudonymous character of Carrie Bradshaw. Bushnell makes
no secret of her book’s roman à clef classification, nor of her heroine’s true
identity: in interviews she unabashedly refers to Carrie as her “alter-ego”
(Degtyareva 12), and seemingly relishes the celebrity and attention that has
come, in the wake of the success of HBO’s adaptation, of being the “real”
Carrie (Zak 1). Of the novel’s somewhat post-modern perspectival flux, of its
perplexing movement between first and third person narration, Bushnell
explains that she “wrote the first few columns in first person” before realising
how very exposed that left her, ultimately devising the Carrie Bradshaw
persona, then, as a means of distancing herself from her stories and thereby
supposedly guarding her anonymity (Degtyareva 12). The novel’s fluctuating
perspective — between that of the subjective self and that belonging to an
arguably more objective, unnamed outsider — also works, however, to
underscore the theme of maturation and self-evaluation that is a feature of both
this particular piece and the genre to which it belongs. Carrie — or, at least, an
earlier version of the character who is later adopted as the author’s alias —
does in fact feature in even the earliest instalments of the column, but it is not
until Bushnell seemingly removes herself from the pages of her work by
gradually converging with Carrie, and thus manipulating traditional narratorial
strategies, that any pertinent meaning is made. Writing about herself as Carrie,
rather than as herself, Candace, a change which occurs about mid-way into the
text, Bushnell quite literally steps outside of herself, and is thus arguably
increasingly able, if not forced, to objectively consider and appraise her own
behaviour.
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Superficially, in typical chick-lit tradition, the story of a woman’s obstacle-laden
quest for lasting romantic companionship, Sex and the City is, arguably, more
accurately an exposé of the somewhat surprisingly subversive enactments of
gender as effected by a specific, New York-based network of privileged men
and women. The text’s abrupt sentences and muted, bemused, understated
tone — Bushnell trademarks — set it apart from the twee, adjectival-laden
enthusiasm of the Harlequin Mills & Boon romance, operating so as to secure
the ironic quality that helps to distinguish chick-lit from its conventionally
earnest generic forerunner. By downplaying the atypicality of the unorthodox
attitudes and behaviours of her cast of characters, Bushnell in fact draws her
readers’ attention to their eccentricities, thereby positing them as feasible
alternatives to prescribed practices.
Bushnell’s novel certainly positions itself in obvious contrast to the Harlequin
Mills & Boon brand. Its blunt, deadpan opening, typically free of exclamation or
embellishment — “Here’s a Valentine’s Day tale. Prepare yourself” (1) — at
once both invokes Valentine’s Day, surely the epitome of hearts-and-flowers,
boy-meets-girl, lower-case-‘r’-romance, and mocks everything it stands for.
Whilst marriage is seemingly the goal of most of the single women who
populate the text’s pages, just as it is the desperate dream of the Harlequin Mill
& Boon heroine, those who are already paired off paint a fairly gloomy picture
of married life as disappointing and dreary:
A girlfriend who was married called me up. “I don’t know how anyone makes
relationships work in this town. It’s really hard. All the temptations. Going out. Drinks.
Drugs. Other people. You want to have fun. And if you’re a couple, what are you
going to do? Sit in your little box of an apartment and stare at each other? When
you’re alone, it’s easier,” she said, wistfully. “You can do what you want. You don’t
have to go home.” (4)

For the most part, the novel constitutes a departure from the conservative
essentialism and florid overstatement of the popular low-brow product,
determinedly rejecting, page after page, the brand’s characteristic naïveté and
trite sentimentality. Publishers Weekly aptly describes the novel as having a
193

“brash, radically unromantic perspective” (244). The title of the text’s first
chapter, “My Unsentimental Education” (1) could be fittingly attached to the
larger piece, in that it neatly encompasses two of the novel’s foci — the
dispelling of the mawkish myth of essential, polarised gender differences, and
the progress of its heroine’s edifying journey. This title also blatantly recalls
Gustave Flaubert’s 1869 classic, Sentimental Education, thereby situating
Bushnell’s work firmly within the realist tradition and in contrast to the fancy that
is so characteristic of the popular Harlequin Mills & Boon-esque romance.
Notwithstanding the text’s many notable departures from the conventional
romance, one feature that both renders it at least partially in keeping with
Harlequin Mills & Boon, and yet also, importantly, provides the common ground
necessary to its functioning as parody, is its somewhat standard romantic
trajectory. Otherwise an almost plotless collection of snapshots of interaction
between, and within, the sexes — snapshots contextualised via the quasianthropological musings of Bushnell and her circle — the novel’s charting of the
relationship between Carrie and Mr Big is its one constant element, and is
arguably the primary unifying feature that permits the collection’s promotion to
novel status. Described by one reviewer as “sweet if feckless” (Publisher’s
Weekly 244), the coupling of Carrie and Big is simultaneously one of Sex and
the City’s only concessions to its literary heredity, and also its most jarring
departure from that tradition, bespeaking the duality and ambiguity that is chicklit’s most confounding and intriguing characteristic; for, like others of its ilk, this
text is said to appeal “equally to urban romantics and anti-romantics”
(Publisher’s Weekly 244).
That Carrie is savvy and sexually confident, rather than staid and sweet à la the
Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine, is evident from the outset. One of her first selfappointed assignments is to visit and review sex club La Trapeze, and her
reaction to what she observes there is tellingly indifferent and unflustered, the
tone of her account sardonic as opposed to scandalised:
What did we see? Well, there was a big room with a huge air mattress, upon which a
few blobby couples gamely went at it; there was a “sex chair” (unoccupied) that looked
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like a spider; there was a chubby woman in a robe, sitting next to a Jacuzzi, smoking;
there were couples with glazed eyes (Night of the Living Sex Zombies, I thought); and
there were many men who appeared to be having trouble keeping up their end of the
bargain. But mostly, there were those damn steaming buffet tables (containing what —
mini-hot dogs?), and unfortunately, that’s pretty much all you need to know (14).

It comes as no surprise, then, that it is Carrie who initially approaches Mr Big,
rather than he, her:
“How much will you give me,” Carrie asked. “How much will you give me if I go over
and talk to him?” She does this new thing she’s doing now with her short hair. She
fluffs it up while the boys look at her and laugh (44).

Whereas Carrie, brash and knowing, bears little, if any, resemblance to the
Harlequin Mills & Boon-esque heroine, Mr Big, superficially at least, appears to
have stepped straight from the pages of the popular brand’s product. Big’s
unsubtle moniker, for instance, is an obvious send-up of the type of man he
represents — that is, a man of excess in terms of wealth, power, and, implicitly,
testosterone. An attractive, confident, cigar-smoking billionaire, whom people
confuse with famous real-life American mogul, Ron Perelman (44), he is
vaguely older than Carrie, a fact highlighted by his tendency to
condescendingly refer to her as “kid” (87). However, despite his seemingly
hyper-masculine persona, Big, like many of his chick-lit contemporaries,
occasionally engages in surprisingly feminising, against-type behaviour,
behaviour that calls into question the rigidity and polarity of gender
differentiation. The most striking and literal example of this occurs during the
initial stages of Carrie’s pursuit of Mr Big. The timing of this exchange is
significant in that it posits such atypicality as appropriate and appealing:
“I’m researching a story for a friend of mine about women who have sex like men. You
know, they have sex and afterwards they feel nothing.”
Mr Big eyed her. “But you’re not like that,” he said.

“Aren’t you?” she asked.
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“Not a drop. Not even half a drop,” he said.
Carrie looked at Mr Big. “What’s wrong with you?” (45).

Carrie and Big’s romantic arc develops fairly unremarkably, in that it is littered
with the requisite highs and lows, the usual roller coaster of obstacles,
misunderstandings and reconciliations. Where it differs, however, from the
standard Harlequin Mills & Boon trajectory — the same trajectory that
problematically achieves perpetuity in chick-lit — is at its conclusion. Anna
Kiernan suggests that, since the novel “sign[s] off with typical romantic closure”,
it would be easy to “contend that nothing has changed, that the romantic
formula is entirely intact” (217). Such a reading is surely too simplistic, for,
instead of the joyous, climactic rapture that traditionally marks the end of a
romantic narrative, Sex and the City’s ending is, in keeping with its tone,
matter-of-fact and anti-climactic — indeed, downright deflating. The novel’s
very last words, “Carrie and Mr Big are still together” (228), do indeed position
the fact of the continuance of their union at the text’s apex, thus indicating its
significance to the greater story and, arguably, to Carrie’s personal trajectory.
However, given the seeming absence of any sense of contentment — let alone
elation or ecstasy — the tone of this final phrase renders the ending merely an
ending, rather than a happy or satisfactory one. The suggestion is, then, that
the mere fact of a romantic relationship does not necessarily equate with a
sense of completion or conclusion. The pair’s coupling is problematic, volatile
and imperfect, right until the text’s end. The last scene in which they interact
sees Carrie essentially ignore Big, and him once again condescend to her:
When he was finished talking, she said: “I’m so excited. The amaryllis finally bloomed.
It has four flowers.”
“Four flowers,” Mr Big said. And then: “I’m so happy you’ve taken an interest in plants.”
(226)

Although Carrie and Mr Big are undoubtedly the novel’s central players, whose
relationship provides the narrative’s basic, superficial premise and unites its
otherwise fragmented parts, Sex and the City primarily seeks to promote the
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subversion of gendered behaviours and the upending of binary oppositions,
rather than to simply provide an anecdotal account of a particularly precarious
love affair. In Bushnell’s novel, stereotypically masculine attitudes towards sex
and love are adopted by women, whereas a number of the novel’s men
demonstrate unconventionally womanish approaches to dating. This feature of
the text functions so as to suggest that women are just as capable as men of
engaging in masculinised behaviour, and, vice versa, that feminine responses
to relationships and romance are not restricted to women. Says Bushnell, of
her post-structural approach to gender:
Many women have this romantic fantasy, and I am showing them something different
[N] One woman called from a TV show in Ireland and said, “You don’t really believe
that women have sex like men.” And I said, “Well actually, I do.” I’m sorry, but women
can be just as promiscuous as men (Leupold 3).

In Chapter Six, entitled “New York’s Last Seduction: Loving Mr. Big”, Carrie
speaks proudly of her newfound ability to have sex like a man — that is,
without feeling:
“I think I’m turning into a man,” said Carrie [N] “You remember when I slept with that
guy Drew?” she asked [N] “Well, afterwards, I didn’t feel a thing. I was like, Gotta go to
work, babe. Keep in touch. I completely forgot about him after that.”
“Well, why the hell should you feel anything?” Magda asked. “Men don’t. I don’t feel
anything after I have sex. Oh sure, I’d like to, but what’s the point?”
We all sat back smugly, sipping tea, like we were members of some special club (41).

A couple of pages later, Charlotte, sounding very much like a stereotypically
libidinous male, complains about the emotional effeminacy of her recent
conquest:
[He] “kept wanting me to go to dinner with him and go through all the chat bit”. He’d
recently stopped calling: “He wanted to read me his poetry, and I wouldn’t let him.”
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“There’s a thin line between attraction and repulsion,” she continued. “And usually the
repulsion starts when they begin wanting you to treat them as people, instead of sex
toys” (42).

Bushnell’s view of feminism, a view given voice via her writing, is that “it won for
women the right to have sex like men and to earn as much money” (Gerhard
39). What is most striking about the novel’s depiction of feminine and
masculine identities is the way that they are shown to be capricious and
capable of inversion. Bushnell herself has professed that she does not “like to
think there are inherent differences between women and men” (Reagan 6).
Rather, she believes “gender-based differences are actually differences based
on the money/status/power dynamic” (Reagan 6). It is significant that
Bushnell’s work operates so as to both reverse the man/woman binary and to
question binaric logic itself. Bushnell comes across as an unconscious disciple
of Butler, complicit in the theorist’s appraisal of the performativity of gender.
She describes “the ‘bad’ masculine traits, like posturing [or] using the opposite
sex as an object” as being consciously performed — “done because they’re
pleasurable” (Reagan 6). Men don’t want to admit to the performative quality of
these maligned acts”, she argues, because they “are afraid that women will
start doing [such things] too” (Reagan 6).
The characters of Carrie and Big each serve Bushnell’s purpose well, in that
they successfully challenge the strictures of their respective sexes. More
extreme examples exist, however, in the comically perverse figures of the
infantile and emasculated Skipper Johnson and the sexually aggressive
Samantha Jones. Skipper is youthful and awkward, the foil to Big’s suave
superiority:
Skipper strips down to his boxer shorts and dives in the water like a cartoon character,
with his knees bent at right angles sticking out to the sides. When he comes up for air,
Mr Big says, “Now I know why you can’t get laid” (99).

Samantha brazenly flouts convention, openly adopting masculinised attitudes:
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Sam is a New York inspiration. Because if you’re a successful single woman in this
city, you have two choices: You can beat your head against the wall trying to find a
relationship, or you can say “screw it” and just go out and have sex like a man. Thus:
Sam (41).

It is evidently no coincidence that Samantha’s name signifies the conflation of
man and woman — she is known as both Sa-man-tha, and by the androgynous
nickname ‘Sam’ — or that Skipper’s moniker recalls the Skipper Roberts doll.
The Skipper doll, a 1970s creation, was Mattel’s youthful, asexual answer to
widespread criticism of Barbie — she of the infamous exaggerated physique
and Skipper’s ostensible older sister — as inappropriately sexualised.
Despite the utter atypicality of their respective rebellious renderings of
masculinity and femininity, despite the fact that they inherently challenge the
notion of gendered behaviours as innate and unerring, in context Skipper and
Sam arguably constitute rather retrograde portraits of gender play, given that
they are portrayed so unflatteringly as unappealing in their deviance. Skipper’s
effeminacy, for instance, is thought to be the cause of his “recent lack of sexual
success” (97).
Another poststructural means of revealing the constructedness and consequent
instability of gendered identities is evident in Sex and the City’s engagement
with fashion and costume, its use of which points to the ongoing performance of
gender. A precursor to the program’s famed and flamboyant fashionforwardness, the novel occasionally particularises and foregrounds fashion —
significantly, that worn by Candace/Carrie — as a means of signalling the
inherent and persistent performance of femininity.
Bushnell makes it repeatedly apparent that Carrie, rather than effortlessly
inhabiting her feminine self, must strive to enact her gender. Acutely aware of
what is expected of her as a woman, Carrie vacillates between resignedly
complying with, and actively rebelling against, the feminine ideal. This is
another aspect of the text’s distinctive duality. Her problematic relationship with
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Mr Big is one arena wherein Carrie, seeming to be submissive and supportive,
endeavours to properly cite an idealised version of her sex:
Carrie sat up very straight in her chair. Mr Big talked on and on about some deal he
was in the middle of doing, and Carrie stared at him and nodded and made
encouraging noises. But she wasn’t really paying attention (226).

Carrie’s jarringly incongruous theatrical ensembles underscore a performance
that is otherwise indiscernible, given that gender (femininity in this case) is, in
Butler’s terms, a “sort of quoting which operates to conceal its own status as a
quotation” (Harris 68). That Carrie is always already in the throes of enactment
is cleverly marked by the otherwise inexplicable conspicuousness of her
clothing:
When Carrie got to the party, Sam said, “Don’t you look nice. Just like a newscaster.”
“Thank you”, Carrie said. “It’s my new look. Early Stepford wife.” She was wearing a
powder blue suit with a skirt that came to her knees and fifties-style satin pumps (214).

What makes this particular outfit so very fitting is its hyper-conservative, postwar associations. Here, Carrie is not simply inappropriately costumed; she is
dressed quite literally in line with the patriarchally prescribed feminine ideal.
One feature of chick-lit feminism that is lacking in Bushnell’s novel is the
presence of the microcosmic sisterhood that has come to be known as the
urban family. The salient absence of the vital, familial and fiercely loyal female
friendships that television’s Sex and the City is famous for no doubt comes as a
surprise to readers who approach Bushnell’s text in the wake of the HBO
adaptation. Indeed, the women who populate the pages of Bushnell’s Sex and
the City meet only sporadically and are actually little more than acquaintances
— or, as The Guardian’s Bidisha describes them, “near-strangers who
encounter each other in a spirit of competitiveness”, and who live “in selfquestioning isolation” (3). In Bushnell’s novel, platonic relationships between
women are plagued by envy and self-interest:
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All of my boyfriends have been wonderful in their own way, but my friends have found
fault with every one of them, mercilessly chewing me out for putting up with any of their
perceived, but in my mind excusable, flaws. Now, I was finally alone, and all my friends
were happy (27).

The inability of women to be unreservedly, unselfishly happy for other women
who manage to find love is a theme that runs throughout the text:
Sam grabbed Carrie’s arm [N] and said, ‘I really want to know about Mr Big. I’m not
sure he’s the right man for you.’
Carrie had to think about whether she wanted to answer or not, because it was always
like this between her and Sam. Just when she was happy with a man, Sam would
come along and those doubts, like driving a crowbar between two pieces of wood (93).

This feature of Bushnell’s work has the effect of distancing it from both its
generic counterparts and its televisual rendition, wherein women function not
merely as friends, but, unequivocally, as one another’s family. In the
Manhattan of Bushnell’s experience and imagination, single women are forced
to live independently, rather than with the support of self-appointed urban
families à la Bridget Jones’s Diary and its ilk, a fact that is arguably at the heart
of the novel’s utterly bleak outlook.
Indeed, it is the novel’s relentless cynicism and bleak, black humour that set it
apart from its generic counterparts, which generally ultimately proffer a chirpier,
optimistic outlook. Candace/Carrie’s growth and eventual enlightenment is
conveyed subtly and symbolically, rather than happily heralded in its final
pages. Darren Star, creator of the HBO adaptation, explains his interpretation
of this process:

[What really got me] was the idea of a single woman in her thirties writing about
relationships and using that column as a tool of self-discovery about her own life,
sometimes even unbeknownst to herself (Sohn, SATC: Kiss and Tell 14).

As previously mentioned, the text’s capricious narration itself bespeaks the
process of self-development, of reflection and appraisal. The text is otherwise
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fairly scant when it comes to conveying its heroine’s journey, and favours
symbolism over literalism. This is evident in the close of its final chapter,
wherein Carrie develops a newfound and enthusiastic appreciation for flora, the
flowering buds a metaphor for herself (226).

THE TELEVISION PROGRAM
Amy Sohn, author of Sex and the City: Kiss and Tell, the program’s companion
text, somewhat bafflingly suggests, “Sex and the City began as a glint in the
eye of Darren Star” (14). Although Star’s input and enterprise must not be
underestimated — nor, too, the extent to which his rendition of the franchise
departs from Bushnell’s — the notion that the series was initiated entirely by
Star’s ideas, is, of course, patently untrue. HBO’s Sex and the City has its
genesis in the original upon which it is quite avowedly based, and, before that,
in Bushnell’s observations and imaginings. Her musings were given voice via
her column, which in turn became a novel-length compilation, which then
became a hugely successful television program that incited an unprecedentedly
populous and rabid fan following. The adaptation process did not stop there:
four years after it ended, the small screen HBO offering elicited a big screen
version, and there are suggestions that a sequel to this is forthcoming. Most
recently, the franchise found itself figuring, once again, in a familiar format: a
Candace Bushnell novel. The 2008 publication One Fifth Avenue features Lola
Fabrikant, a fan of Sex and the City who has viewed “every single episode [N]
at least ‘a hundred times,’ and “adore[s] the idea of moving to the city and
finding her own Mr Big” (37).
Star’s adaptation was initially inspired by Bushnell’s column — the prototype for
all subsequent renderings of Sex and the City — but was catalysed and
clarified by the 1996 publication of the novel-esque collection. When the book
was published,
Star found his core characters: Miranda Hobbes, Samantha Jones, and Charlotte Ross
(whose last name was changed to York for the show), all of whom were featured in the
book. “At one point I was thinking it would be an anthology series”, he says, “just
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Carrie and a different story every week. But when Sex and the City became a book, I
decided to give her these friends and have her explore the issues with them” (Sohn,
SATC: Kiss and Tell 14).

The HBO adaptation at times quite literally adapts Bushnell’s work, column-bycolumn, line-by-line. The pilot episode exemplifies this meticulous approach. If
it were to be categorised using Geoffrey Wagner’s formulation, sections of this
initial episode, if not the episode as a whole, would be tidily classed as
transposition. The novel’s opening, for instance —
An English journalist came to New York. She was attractive and witty, and right away
she hooked up with one of New York’s typically eligible bachelors. Tim was forty-two,
an investment banker who made about $5 million a year. For two weeks, they kissed,
held hands — and then on a warm fall day he drove her to the house he was building in
the Hamptons. They looked at the plans with the architect (1).

— becomes the televisual Carrie’s very first voiceover:
Once upon a time an English journalist came to New York. Elizabeth was attractive
and bright and right away she hooked up with one of the city’s typically eligible
bachelors. Tim was 42, a well-liked and respected investment banker who made about
$2 million a year. They met one evening in typical New York fashion at a gallery
opening. It was love at first sight. For two weeks they snuggled, went to romantic
restaurants, had wonderful sex, and shared their most intimate secrets. One warm
spring day he took her to a townhouse he saw in Sunday’s New York Times (1.1).

Julie Leupold reveals her evidently narrow conception of the adaptation
process, one that encompasses only the most literal of examples, when she
claims that it is only the series’ first season that finds its basis in Bushnell’s text
(3). Whilst it is certainly the case that it is the first few seasons of the show that
relate most obviously to the column, the entire series is, if not a literal televisual
rendering of Bushnell’s work, at the very least, obviously indebted to it.
An alternative reading of the Sex and the City continuum reveals the HBO
program to be based not solely on Bushnell’s writing, but, also — or, more so
— on her life, figuring, then, as something of an adaptation of her
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autobiography. Not only does this occur indirectly, via the rendition of her life
that comprises the column and the novel, it also occurs quite overtly, in some
instances bypassing the written medium. For example, Bushnell recounts the
following experience in an interview with Ariel Levy:
One time I was engaged. I was 31 and I had the ring and I just couldn't do it! I couldn't
get married! I felt like I was drowning, literally drowning. My mother kept calling me up
and saying, 'We gotta go and get your dress!' And I was like, 'Mom, I'm too busy.' I
really thought I wanted to get married, but at the same time, I think I thought as a
woman you might have to turn yourself inside out, and there'd always be little
concessions you'd have to make (1).

Whilst this particular anecdote is absent from both of Bushnell’s renditions of
Sex and the City (although present, perhaps, in the novel’s generally
ambivalent approach to marriage) it does feature explicitly in the HBO version.
The program’s Carrie Bradshaw is famously hesitant to marry, and, in Season
Four, during her ill-fated engagement to Aidan, blatantly shares Bushnell’s antimarriage sentiments. Desperate to avoid making any solid wedding plans, and
awkwardly wearing her ring on a chain around her neck, Carrie makes the
subversive claim that she is “missing the bride gene” (4.15).
The fact that autobiography operates so indisputably as an inspiration and
source for most examples of the genre, including Sex and the City, serves to
punctuate the suitability of chick-lit as an appropriate subject for subversive
approaches to adaptation. The existence of another progenitory text — a life —
weakens the primacy of the literary piece, and calls into question the hierarchy
that enables the fidelity paradigm and so plagues adaptation scholarship.
Sex and the City premiered on premium American cable television network,
HBO, in June of 1998, and spanned six successful seasons and ninety-four
episodes, most of which run for just under half an hour in length, the total
running time thus in excess of forty hours. The text’s particularly vast scope
renders it fiendishly difficult to harness, and necessitates a lengthier treatment
than do the various, comparatively concise renderings of Animal Husbandry
and Bridget Jones’s Diary.
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Sex and the City’s finale, “An American Girl in Paris (Part Deux)”, screened, to
much fanfare, in February of 2004. The show starred Sarah Jessica Parker as
Carrie Bradshaw, in a role so celebrated that Parker will undoubtedly be forever
primarily associated with it, along with a supporting cast headed by Broadway
thespian Cynthia Nixon as Miranda Hobbes, Mannequin Kim Cattrall as
Samantha Jones, Melrose Place’s Kristin Davis as Charlotte York, and Law &
Order’s Chris Noth as Mr Big. Parker’s participation in the program extended
further than her acting role; she was billed as an executive producer during the
show’s later seasons. The extent of Parker’s input into, influence on and
authority over such aspects as costume, script and casting has been welldocumented. Initially both creator and executive producer, Star’s role
eventually changed to one of consultancy, as he handed the reins over to
Michael Patrick King, an executive producer for all six seasons, who, like Star,
individually composed and directed numerous episodes. Jim Smith, author of
Manhattan Dating Game: An Unofficial and Unauthorised Guide to Every
Episode of Sex and the City, terms Star “one of American television’s most
respected ‘showrunners’”, a term used to describe executive producers who act
as “the absolute authority for, and often creator of, many TV shows throughout
their career” (7-8). It could be argued that King, in Star’s absence, became
almost as integral to and synonymous with Sex and the City as was Star, and,
of course, Parker. Cindy Chupack, one of the programs more prominent and
acclaimed screenwriters, was also promoted to executive producer towards the
end of the show’s run.
On the surface, Sex and the City’s vast appeal lies in the gleaming, glittering
garb worn by the girls, the handsomeness of the would-be heroes objectified in
every episode, the dialogue infamous for its frankness and the constancy and
unconditionality of the bond its focal foursome share. However, as Julian
Jenkins argues, its “treatment of gender issues provides the show’s real talking
point”. Alternately depicting heightened, masculinised, mutable and selfconsciously enacted femininities, effecting a revision of the myth of the
appealingly macho male, frequently exposing as fable the binaric Harlequin
Mills & Boon-esque approach to gender, and demonstrating alternative familial
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possibilities in the form of female friendships, this televisual text can be read as
being at the intersection of competing feminist meanings, proffering an array of
feminist approaches to gendered identity and constituting an amplification of
the feminism that is a feature of its source.
Perhaps the most striking difference between Bushnell’s text and its adaptation
lies in the respective texts’ conspicuously contradictory approaches to female
friendship, the latter quite overtly revising the former via the sisterhood
feminism of the second wave. As Gerhard explains,
[Star] took a different piece of [N] feminism for his rendition of Carrie Bradshaw,
[putting] Carrie in a web of committed relationships with other straight women. For this
Carrie, sisterhood is indeed powerful if not political (39).

This discrepancy has been made much of by numerous commentators, each of
whom agrees that the program’s idealised depiction of a family of women
“certainly didn’t come from Candace Bushnell” (“A Fond Farewell” 5). Although
their relationships with one another are, realistically, imperfect and, as such,
occasionally marred by conflicting opinions, the program’s four very different
women consistently relate to one another with warmth, respect, empathy and
scrupulous, unerring loyalty.

In HBO’s Sex and the City, the sisterhood manifests itself in a microcosmic
fashion, via the camaraderie, compassion and sense of community that
characterises the text’s central relationship — the four-way friendship that
exists between Carrie and her best friends, Charlotte, Miranda and Samantha.
For as Mr Big proclaims in the show’s final episode, it is they who are the true
“loves of her life” (6.2.7) — they are her self-appointed family of choice.
Female friendship, as it functions in Sex and the City, is, in Nina Auerbach’s
words, an “emblem of female self-sufficiency” (5). It operates, here, to subvert
traditional conceptions of family and coupling, proffering the possibility of a
contentedly autonomous, spouse-free existence. Although, as Gerhard
observes, the foursome’s “search for lasting romance reproduces the enduring
message that women’s personal and sexual liberation lies with men” (45) — the
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ideological quandary of every chick-lit text, in a nutshell — the pleasure
produced by these platonic friendships is so intense and so tangible that it
frequently threatens to negate any desire for heterosexual romance. Carrie
spells this out, quite explicitly, in “Luck Be an Old Lady”, after a particularly
unsettling blind date experience. “Why should I risk having a god awful evening
when I am guaranteed to have fun with you guys?” she queries, over brunch
with her trio of companions. “I say we skip all the drama and just enjoy each
other’s company” (5.3).
These intimate, female friendships — so intimate, in fact, that, at one point,
Samantha manually assists Carrie in removing her diaphragm (2.6) — are
inherently subversive given that, in friendship, the four women do for each other
what, traditionally, women have been expected to do for their husbands. An
alternative familial vision and thoroughly modern take on kinship, the communal
existence these women share implicitly questions the necessity — and thereby
unseats the primacy — of heterosexual coupling, upon which the traditional
nuclear family so depends. The unquestioning endurance of the foursome’s
bond is enabling, empowering and satisfying. The quartet, bolstered by
economic independence and platonic companionship, are “not really in need
[of] the security, financial or emotional, that an alliance with a man supposedly
provides” (Kokoli 2). As Gerhard argues, Sex and the City suggests that its
“family of four could, in fact, be enough to make up a life, a life still worth living
without husband and baby” (46), a life led outside the conventional dictates of
society. In fact, these women frequently — literally — function as husband
substitutes for one another, rendering the men in their lives, as Carrie’s
reviewer, Michiko Kakutani, claims, “disposable” (5.6).
In one of the show’s bleaker episodes, the Season Four premiere, “The Agony
and the 'Ex'-tacy”, Carrie bemoans being thirty-five and still sans soul mate.
Sitting in a café after a calamitous and lonely birthday celebration, she cries,
surrounded by her three friends. Charlotte offers the following, telling
suggestion, as solace:
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Don’t laugh at me, but, maybe we could be each other’s soul mates. And then we
could let men be just these great, nice guys to have fun with (4.1).

By looking to one another for the security and sustenance that a spouse
traditionally provides, Carrie and her friends refute the necessity of romantic
coupling, figuring as spouse stand-ins for one another. Another example of this
literal substitution occurs in a later Season Four episode, “My Motherboard, My
Self”. At Miranda’s mother’s funeral, Miranda, the only unmarried one of a set
of four siblings, walks behind her mother’s coffin, alone and crying with grief.
Carrie jumps up to walk beside her, kissing her hand so as to provide comfort,
literally in lieu of a more conventional partner (4.8).
One of the most unambiguous examples of spousal substitution occurs in “The
Ick Factor”. In a cab, on the way to Miranda and Steve’s wedding, Samantha
confesses to Carrie that she has been diagnosed with breast cancer. The
ceremony weds not only Miranda and Steve, but, also, implicitly, Samantha and
Carrie. During the exchange of vows, the camera turns from the couple being
overtly, conventionally married, to the two friends, for whom the words signify
so very much. Miranda’s words underscore the image of Samantha and Carrie
hand-in-hand, likening their bond to that of husband and wife. Carrie squeezes
Samantha’s hand as Miranda promises to love Steve “in sickness and in
health”, for “as long as [they] both shall live” (6.2.2). It is this same promise that
cancer-stricken Samantha and concerned Carrie make to one another.
In “Ring a Ding Ding”, Carrie seeks financial assistance from Charlotte in her
efforts to purchase her apartment and thereby symbolically mark her autonomy
after she and Aidan end their engagement. It is with the help of her friend that
Carrie secures her own independence, whereby although she may desire a
husband, she will never actually require one. It is highly significant that
Charlotte gives Carrie her own engagement ring rather than a cheque or wad of
cash. The dialogue in this scene — a sequence of “I will”s rather than “I do”s
—appropriately mimics that of a wedding proposal. Via this transaction, wherein
vows are exchanged, Charlotte essentially replaces her commitment to her
estranged husband, Trey, with a commitment to her beloved friend, Carrie.
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The most literal example of spousal substitution, however, is actually an
outtake: an alternative ending filmed so as to leave the show’s stars, and fans,
guessing. In this scene, Carrie proposes to Charlotte, Miranda and Samantha,
in what would have been a fitting finale to a show that is so very focused on
friendship.
In keeping with the generic tradition of favouring chosen kin over the biological
kind, Sex and the City rarely mentions, let alone features, mothers, fathers,
sisters or brothers. The examples can be counted on one hand — at one point,
Miranda’s siblings attend her mother’s funeral, at another, Charlotte’s brother
visits her and ends up sleeping with Samantha, and later, Carrie, faded photo in
hand, recalls her absent father. Michael Patrick King explains that the show is
“not about the family you were born into” (“The Secret of good Sex” 10). Rather,
it is about fabricating one of your own choosing. The following voiceover is
accompanied by a shot of Carrie, smile on face, meeting up with her steadfast
group of friends:
The most important thing in life is your family. There are days you love them, and other
days you don’t. But, in the end, they’re the people you always come home to.
Sometimes it’s the family you’re born into, and, sometimes, it’s the one you make for
yourself (2.15).

Although not overtly maternal herself, Carrie mothers her friends on several
occasions. She replaces Miranda’s mother as her “in-case-of-emergencyperson” after Miranda suffers a panic attack (2.5), and, when Samantha is sick
and feeling sorry for herself, Carrie makes, at Sam’s request, Samantha’s
mother’s remedial concoction, a blend of Fanta, cough syrup and ice (3.10).
Not always figuring as partners of a spousal kind, then, Carrie, Samantha,
Miranda and Charlotte variably act as one another’s sisters, mothers and
daughters — invariably, one another’s family.
Although the series frequently and successfully works to undermine traditional
concepts of family via its depiction of a fabricated family comprising a
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foursome of female friends, its final moments, in the tradition of the literary
genre from whence it was inspired, enact an ideological duplicity that to some
extent recoups the very conventionality it predominately seeks to subvert. The
dramatic montage that precedes the show’s closing scene seemingly
reinscribes the desirability and inevitability of the nuclear family. These
climactic scenes — wherein beleaguered Miranda finally acquiesces to the
sacrifices required of her as a mother and wife, Samantha surrenders to
Smith’s desire for monogamy, Charlotte and Harry embrace incipient
parenthood, and Big finally tells Carrie that she is “the One” — venerate
monogamy and procreation, and, as such, are somewhat at odds with the
dissidence that the program celebrates prior to its awkward ending.

As is marked by its fairytale-esque opening, Sex and the City subversively
engages with the closely connected mythic discourses of the Harlequin Mills &
Boon romance and its child-friendly predecessor, the fabled fairytale.
Relentlessly mocking of the naiveté implicit in essentialist approaches to
difference, the series seeks to reveal as illusory the myth of the man/woman
binary as promoted by these popular and persuasive narratives, to challenge
the dominant and unthinking understanding of gendered identities as innate,
categorical and rigidly disparate. Far from simply “reproduc[ing] psychological
essentialism” (Gerhard 41), as Jane Gerhard suggests it does, for the most part
Sex and the City refutes crude and idealised stereotypes of masculinity and
femininity, preferring instead to, at times, invert the hierarchised binary, and, at
others, to dismantle completely the concept of binaric classification. The show
proffers a variety of versions of manliness, each of which effects a poststructural revision of the archetypal romantic hero. Its male characters are
variously humorously and unappealingly hyperbolic, moderate and thereby
desirous exemplars of masculinity, or complete inversions of the Harlequin Mills
& Boon binary, infantilised yet nonetheless beloved and admired.
The prototypical, hypermasculinised Harlequin Mills & Boon hero is given
frequent parodic, hyperbolic treatment in HBO’s Sex and the City. Take
Samantha’s senior, almost-lover, Ed, for instance. A millionaire “many times
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over”, Ed — whom Samantha guesses is “72. A young 72!” (2.8) — is
exaggeratedly elderly, a comic caricature of the macho maturity that is a
uniformly celebrated trait of the conventional heroic figure. All is seemingly
going swimmingly until Samantha, catching an unfortunate glimpse of Ed’s
flabby, sagging buttocks, is faced with the unattractive reality of dating
someone so much older than herself. The very feature that renders Ed so very
eligible is here overplayed for grotesque, subversive, comic effect.

Seniority again operates satirically, when Carrie Bradshaw meets her
substantially older suitor, Aleksandr Petrovsky. In more ways than one, The
Russian, as he is known, is a send-up of “what an urbane single woman is
supposed to want” (Bellafante and Cline), in that it is his excessive masculinity
that ultimately garners reproach. Petrovsky’s advanced age is an ongoing
talking point — Miranda refers to him as the “old guy” (6.2.1) — as is his
outlandish wealth and sexual prowess. With maturity comes authority:
Petrovsky is notably bossy and dictatorial, instructing Carrie, at one point, as to
how she should take her coffee. “Milk will ruin it”, he asserts. “Keep sipping it.
You’ll see” (6.2.4). Rich, in comparison to her (relative) poverty, old to her
comparative youth, the oppositional Petrovsky/Carrie contrast is discussed by
King in his directorial commentary – he claims that Carrie is “always sort of a
little girl making a joke”, whereas Petrovsky is “sort of shyly the older grandpa,
not really getting it”. The binary is bolstered by the juxtaposition of Petrovsky’s
earnest and intense European sensibility against Carrie’s witty New York
cynicism. Their decidedly dichotomous and dysfunctional pairing ends,
appropriately, with an act of macho menace: Petrovsky slaps Carrie, albeit
“accidentally”, in their final shared scene. Something of an anti-hero, The
Russian’s excessive masculinity renders him repugnant.
Mr Too Big, a reference to Big’s own, tellingly macho moniker, is another
exemplar of the program’s tendency to parodically overstate and thereby
contest the veneration of the hypermasculine hero. Mr Too Big is, as he mildly
puts it, “very well-endowed” (2.18) — too well-endowed, in fact. The immense
girth of his penis makes their sexual pairing not only uncomfortable for the ever
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lusty and libidinous Samantha, but, ultimately, downright impossible. Again, it
is this almost-hero’s quite literally inflated manliness that detracts from his
appeal and prevents his pairing with Samantha.
Yet another example of hyperbolically heightened masculinity exists in the
attractive, affluent, and frighteningly aggressive, Arthur, with whom Charlotte
enjoys a brief dalliance. Exaggeratedly enacting the testosterone-fuelled
ferocity that is so often used to designate the Harlequin Mill & Boon heroine’s
Mr Right, Arthur quickly morphs into Mr Wrong. During their first — and only —
date, Charlotte, upon being inadvertently jolted by a fellow patron of the cosy
restaurant in which they are seated, spills her wine. Ostensibly coming to her
rescue, Arthur violently attacks the stunned stranger, his aggression working to
repel rather than charm Charlotte. Carrie describes him as “a man who liked to
start fights” (3.1). “Charlotte’s white knight”, she quips, acknowledging the
parody, “turned into a white nightmare” (3.1).

Just as some of Sex and the City’s aspirant heroes are rejected as a direct
result of their grotesquely embellished enactments of masculinity, others are
embraced in spite of — perhaps even because of — their subversive inversions
of the man/woman binary. These complementary textual tactics together
comprise a feminist recasting of Harlequin Mills & Boon archetypes. Rather
than, in the tradition of the low-brow romance, depicting its women as childlike
and thereby the inferior opposites of their more mature men, Sex and the City
infantilises a number of its heroes whilst retaining their appeal. Miranda’s
Steve, for one, is repeatedly portrayed as childlike. In Season Three’s “The Big
Time”, for example, Miranda is depicted as unwillingly mothering him, wiping up
his spills and nagging at him to lower the volume as he sits, fixatedly, in front of
the television, watching an episode of Scooby Doo. “I’m so sick of you being
the kid”, she complains (3.8). Indeed, Steve is the antithesis of the heroic
archetype: aside from the bouncy, childish exuberance he exudes, he is
conspicuously poor to Miranda’s rich, and notably short of stature. Yet it is he,
as opposed to a more clichéd rendition of manliness, with whom Miranda is
ultimately, happily partnered.
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Samantha’s Smith Jerrod enacts a similar subversion of gendered stereotypes.
In an inversion of the binary endorsed by the Harlequin Mills & Boon brand,
Smith, though suitably, beautifully built and buff, is much younger than Sam.
“He’s hot”, Samantha admits, “but he’s a baby. I don’t know whether to blow
him or burp him” (6.2.1). His youth is made much of in Season Six’s “Let There
Be Light”, wherein he is celebrated at a party for “the thirty hottest people under
thirty” (6.2.1). He tells Samantha of his nomination whilst bouncing around on
her bed like a little boy, in accordance with King’s self-confessed directorial
intention. The man/woman, Sam/Smith inversion is only furthered by the fact
that, instead of Samantha taking on Smith’s name via marriage, in accordance
with tradition, it is she who, as his publicist, renames him: the amusingly,
clumsily-named Jerry Jerrod is replaced by the more sophisticated and starmaking Smith Jerrod (6.1.5). Again, what makes this inversion so noteworthy
is the fact that Smith is, unmistakably, Samantha’s masculine match, his
feminised identity thereby ultimately endorsed as attractive.

Mr Big is perhaps the text’s most noteworthy challenge to the Harlequin Mills &
Boon hackneyed, heightened and heroic rendition of masculinity. As the text’s
definitive hero, he functions so as to mock simplistic notions of gender disparity,
and thus, by extension, question the hierarchy implicit in dichotomous
designations of sexed identities. In its quest to challenge Harlequin Mills &
Boon’s overstated rendering of masculinity, rather than only providing an ironic
citation of such, Sex and the City employs a twofold strategy, with Big, like his
Bridget Jones counterpart, Mark Darcy, at once imitating and complicating the
heroic stereotype. Exaggeratedly moneyed, senior, suave and self-assured,
Big’s satiric functioning is immediately evident.
From his very first scene in the pilot episode, Mr Big is portrayed in accordance
with the popularised and paradigmatic romantic hero. Typically clumsy Carrie
trips, dropping her handbag and spilling its contents in the process. Big assists
her, coming to her rescue. Something of a superhero, he rescues her again
later in the episode, showing up seemingly out of nowhere in his big black car
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and offering her a ride home. This trope figures again in Season Four’s “I Heart
NY”, in which he bribes the couple’s carriage ride driver to leave Central Park
and get Carrie to Mount Sinai Hospital in time for the imminent birth of
Miranda’s baby. Here, he is quite literally equated with the quintessential
heroic figure: thanking him for the ride, Carrie calls him “Prince Charming”,
recalling the fabled figure upon which the Harlequin Mills & Boon princely
prototype is based. In addition to his suitably chivalrous demeanour, Big is
excessively rich — described, simply, as a “major tycoon” (1.2) — as well as
“very arrogant” (2.9), tall, dark and handsome. Via this seeming subscription to
the stereotype, Big initially invites viewers to anticipate a testament to
conventional, manly masculinity, only to ultimately complicate the cliché. As
Parker herself observes in a piece that accompanies the DVD release, Big is,
seemingly, “such a man [N] — reserved and smart and distant and all those
sort of things that are really man ideas”.

There are two distinct scenes that work to undermine Big’s otherwise
straightforward enactment of heroic machismo. The first features in the pilot
episode, the second, in the finale, their placement adding to their significance.
The latter sees Big, thwarted by Carrie, very awkwardly and obstreperously
attempting to rescue her from The Russian. Upon hearing about the
unfortunate physical altercation between Carrie and Petrovsky, Big rushes up
the hotel’s sweeping staircase with the seeming intention of exerting some sort
of brutish retribution. However, Carrie trips him, comically undermining both his
efforts and his masculinity. “This is totally unnecessary”, she tells him. “I took
care of this myself. I don’t need you to rescue me!” (6.2.8).
The former scene proffers a fairly literal adaptation of an aforementioned
excerpt from Bushnell’s work, wherein Carrie and Big discuss what she
perceives to be an unproblematicatically masculine, no-strings-attached attitude
towards sex. Big’s words are mimicked virtually verbatim — after he confesses
to being in possession of a more feminine approach to sex, Carrie wonders
“what’s wrong with [him]”, signposting his aberrantly compromised masculinity.

214

This initial episode, as well as the series in its entirety, rewrites the traditional
perception of female sexuality as inherently entailing submission and servitude,
proffering instead an alternative model characterised by agency, aptitude and
independence. The women in this show do habitually approach sex with the
confidence and libidinousness that has traditionally been associated with male
sexuality — they “have sex like men” (1.1), without any bashful unease. Sex
and the City’s first episode is telling in terms of its portrayal of Carrie & Co as
unashamedly flirtatious and sexually free, in accordance with Bushnell’s original
vision and in opposition to the prudish hesitance of the conventional Harlequin
Mills & Boon heroine.
Sex and the City refuses to eroticise sexual aggression. Its women uniformly
have the agency required to both initiate and resist sexual acts. Charlotte, in
particular, exemplifies this dual prerogative. In Season One, when faced with
the expectation that she will engage in sexual practises with which she is
unfamiliar and about which she feels ambivalent, Charlotte is unmistakably and
unreservedly resistant. She refuses Brian’s proposition of buggery, persuading
him, instead to “fuck the regular way” (1.4), and rejects Michael’s request for
fellatio, a rejection that surprises and confounds him. She is, however,
steadfast in her refusal: “Would you really want me to do something that I didn’t
want to do?” (1.7).
Charlotte’s impressive capacity to manage her own sexuality is also evident in
the frequency and blatancy with which she initiates sexual encounters. She
quite openly entreats Mike to “make love” (2.9), and, later, goes to great lengths
to assist in resolving her husband Trey’s sexual dysfunction, dressing in
transparent negligees (3.14) and pasting photographs of her face over the
faces of the pornographically posed women that populate his copies of Jugs
Magazine (3.13).
Sexual independence is another of the program’s themes. Both Samantha and
Miranda openly admit to owning and using a vibrator, and, although she is
somewhat more reticent, the audience is also privy to Charlotte’s temporary
obsession with her “Rabbit” (1.9). Indeed, vibrators are not merely discussed;
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the show’s audience is voyeuristic witness to each of these women engaging in
self-satisfaction. Just as her friends threaten to negate the need of the love
and companionship a spouse traditionally provides, Miranda’s vibrator
undermines her need for a spouse’s sexual services. It is her motherly
housekeeper, Magda who ultimately spells this out. “No man will marry you if
that is by bed”, she contends, in broken English. “It mean you don’t need him”
(3.3).
The final notably subversive aspect of Sex and the City’s portrayal of female
sexuality is the sexual skill with which its principal female players are
unequivocally, and proudly, endowed. Like the sexually expert Harlequin Mills
& Boon hero, who tutors his protégée as to how best to please both him and
herself, Sex and the City’s heroines have gleaned much from their years of
sexual experience, and are audacious enough to explicitly share their
proficiency with the various men with whom they sexually interact. In Season
Two’s “Was It Good For You?” Carrie starts dating, and sleeping with, Patrick
Casey, a recovering alcoholic. He is at first resistant to her advances, and
finally admits to never having had sex whilst sober. They spend the night
together, and he is effusive in his admiration for her sexual aptitude. His
awakening, at Carrie’s practised hands, is not unlike the adjectivally-laden
moment of sexual enlightenment characteristically experienced by the virginal
Harlequin Mills & Boon heroine in the adept arms of her lover:

Oh, sex is amazing. It feels so fucking amazing. Do other people know about this? [N] You
are the best. You are the best. You’re the best [N] You are amazing (2.16).

Samantha, unsurprisingly, is an avid and shameless sexual teacher. In Season
Two’s premiere episode, fittingly titled “Take Me Out to the Ball Game”,
Samantha instructs James as to how best satisfy her. Carrie’s accompanying
voiceover adopts a baseball analogy, likening Sam to a coach, and James, a
rookie player, thereby enhancing the binaric inversion of superior and skilled
man/inferior and inept woman. “A good coach”, Carrie claims, “encourages and
motivates [N] and [N] passe[s] on the benefits of her years of experience”
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(2.1). The binary is again upended in “What Goes Around Comes Around”,
when Samantha meets and sleeps with her much younger, male namesake,
Sam Jones. Inexperienced and eager to please, Sam is the conscientious pupil
of his older lover, and welcomes her tutelage. Finally, Samantha’s Season Six
pairing sees her yet again instructing a younger lover. Although Smith is,
without a doubt, sexually adroit, even he can benefit from Samantha’s
startlingly detailed sexual directives:
Now, put your index finger on my clit. Good. But less pressure. Okay, now two
fingers, a little higher, a little more to the left. Now, you feel that ridge? [N] Now, keep
your finger there but move your thumb. Higher, higherN (6.1.11).

Sex and the City’s women not only “have sex like men” — some of them also
display stereotypically masculine ambivalence to monogamy, Carrie in
particular shunning the very idea of marriage. Her decidedly uncertain, uneasy
and, thereby, unfeminine approach to marriage is initially flagged in Season
One’s “Bay of Married Pigs”. It is in this early episode that she meets and
dates Sean, aka “The Marrying Guy”, a man so keen on marriage in the
abstract that he optimistically purchases, whilst still single, a costly familyfriendly apartment, complete with a prematurely cherub-festooned nursery.
Carrie is affronted and aghast, and abruptly terminates their association. “We
want different things”, she contends. “You obviously want to get married, and I
don’t know what I want” (1.3).
Carrie’s resistance to marriage underpins Season Four’s quite confronting
central arc, wherein she initiates the rekindling of her relationship with Aidan,
only to disingenuously agree to his marriage proposal, and, ultimately, break
his heart. Upon discovering the hidden — and, in her eyes, ugly —
engagement ring Aidan has chosen for her, Carrie is quite literally sickened, the
first clear sign of her opposition to the institution. Later, the exaggeratedly
numerous and enormous moving boxes that take up every corner of the home
she and Aidan temporarily share, visually denote how stifled and smothered the
impending marriage makes her feel. Carrie’s uneasiness is made more and
more undeniably apparent with each consecutive episode. Slyly refusing to
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wear her ring on her wedding finger, for instance, Carrie wears it, instead,
threaded onto a chain around her neck — ostensibly so that it is “closer to
heart”, but, actually rendering it much less conspicuous and thus rendering
herself less conspicuously coupled (4.15). The accoutrements associated with
marriage again catalyse Carrie’s anxiety, when, at Miranda’s insistence, she
tries on an (albeit hideous) wedding dress, and is left panicky, breathless and
covered in an itchy, red rash, her body “literally rejecting the idea of marriage”
(4.15).
Carrie’s typically male behaviour is in stark contrast to Aidan’s effeminate and
unabashed eagerness to wed: “I love her and she loves me. What are we
waiting for?” (4.15). In Season Four’s “Change of A Dress”, the pair’s
conflicting approaches to marriage finally, inevitably, undo their union, their
binarised differences underscored visually by Aidan’s black tuxedo and Carrie’s
white, corseted, quasi-wedding dress, worn when they attend Richard Wright’s
Black and White Ball (4.15). Aidan’s feminised psyche is first evident during
the early stages of the initial instalment of the couple’s relationship. Carrie,
here, is the sexual aggressor, frustrated when Aidan fails to respond to her
forwardness, to her “very little dress” intentionally worn because it leaves “very
little to the imagination” (3.6). Cementing the inversion of gendered tendencies
that characterises their coupling, Aidan is in no hurry to consummate their
pairing. Along with the perhaps more advanced and nuanced disabling of
binaric thought it tenders via its post-structural use of costume, Sex and the
City offers innumerable instances of binaric inversion whereby men and women
defy expectation and apparent inherent categorisation.
Femininity comes under post-structural scrutiny primarily via Sex and the City’s
loaded engagement with fashion.

The wardrobe of HBO’s Carrie Bradshaw

has confounded and confronted fans, detractors and commentators alike. In
fact, during its run, Carrie’s bizarre but beautiful use of fashion — a use
inspired by her literary counterpart’s less blatant, but similarly self-conscious,
approach — was one of the program’s most hotly debated talking points. As
Anna Konig observes, Carrie’s “outfits [N] are frequently complicated and
sometimes downright odd” (136), and appear more “bizarrely affected with each
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passing season” (Zacharek 2). A number of her more left-of-centre and thus
noteworthy fashion moments, in which she wears a cape or a kimono, a tutu or
a tiara, quite literally reference performance. Others see Carrie adopting the
camp excesses of drag — oversized fabric flowers, for instance, or strand upon
strand of pearls. She also exhibits a conspicuous fondness for wearing
underwear as outerwear, boldly exposing bras and corsets. As Sarah Jessica
Parker points out, Carrie’s clothes are “intentionally provocative” (Sohn, SATC:
Kiss and Tell 70) and thus invite attention and analysis. Her frequently grating
usage of flamboyant and obvious costume functions as a poststructural device,
ingeniously exemplifying Judith Butler’s theory of gender performativity.
Although HBO’s Sex and the City straightforwardly mimics and extends its
source’s constructivist use of costume via Carrie, it also subscribes, via fashion,
to more conservative approaches to gender difference. On the one hand,
Carrie’s self-conscious donning of costume can be read as a decidedly
constructivist feminist practice, hyperbolically literalising Butler’s notion of
femininity as fashioned. On the other hand, the program’s portrayal of Carrie’s
engagement with fashion as effortlessly and innately feminine denotes
Harlequin Mills & Boon-esque essentialism, the very antithesis of the Butlerite
constructionism that the show elsewhere seeks to endorse. For, whereas
Carrie’s peculiar dress is met with approval amongst her intrinsically fashionconscious female friends, it frequently operates to perplex and alienate the
various heterosexual men in her life. By her own admission, Carrie is “adept at
fashion” (3.2), in contrast to the likes of Aidan, Berger, Big and Petrovsky, who
unanimously respond to her fashion-forwardness with mockery and unease. In
the televisual version of Sex and the City, men are universally excluded from
the discourse of fashion — fashionability is celebrated as a definitive and
exclusively feminine attribute, a marker of the intrinsic polarisation of
(heterosexual) men and women. This division of gendered responses to
fashion supports an essentialism that is at odds with Butler’s constructivist
approach, an essentialism that contradicts the program’s aforementioned poststructuralist renunciation of organic, definitive gendered identity. Carrie’s
clothes, as they feature in HBO’s Sex and the City, problematically function to
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both signify and undermine sexual differentiation, to concurrently invoke and
query the man/woman binary.
Sex and the City negotiates the divide between the prevailing popular
perception of femininity as being the inherent inverse of masculinity, and
Butler’s alternative interpretation of femininity as a fabrication open to flux. Via
this vacillation, the show both extends and softens chick-lit’s characteristic poststructural renunciation of Harlequin Mills & Boon-esque essentialism — a
stance notable for its obduracy amongst the genre’s abundant and perplexing
contradictions. However, although both essentialist and constructionist
approaches to gender are given voice and thus explicit, rather than, simply,
figurative (visual) sanction by members of Sex and the City’s central quartet, it
is significant that constructionist avowals are generally preceded by, and thus
work to undermine, conservative proclamations of essentialism. This telling
and seemingly deliberate sequencing of dialogue figures most frequently in the
scenes that anchor each episode of Sex and the City — those wherein the four
women, sharing brunch, lunch or cocktails, dissect one another’s lives and
clarify their respective and sometimes conflicting positions on politics, sex and
the enactment of gender. In “The Power of Female Sex”, for example, the
women discuss Amalita Amalfi, an acquaintance of Carrie’s who provides sex
in exchange for extravagant gifts and luxury holidays. Samantha endorses
such behaviour — “Men give, women receive”, she asserts. “It’s biological
destiny”. “Do you really want to be saying that?” Miranda responds, horrified by
and questioning of the conviction of Sam’s statement. “I mean, that’s exactly
the kind of argument men have been using since the dawn of time to exploit
women”.
In a later episode, entitled “The Cheating Curve”, the man/woman binary is
once again invoked, only to be challenged. Again, Samantha favours an
essentialist approach, claiming that men are biologically programmed to cheat,
thereby at once positing women as innately morally superior and removing all
blameworthiness from misbehaving men. Carrie disagrees, given that “women
[— including herself in Season Three —] also cheat”. To this, Charlotte replies,
“Yeah, but that’s completely differentN We don’t go around randomly attacking
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any man that we’re attracted to. We’re not driven by testosterone”. Asked
what does drive women, Charlotte claims, “Emotions! The little voice inside of
me that says, “mate for life, mate for life”. Here, Charlotte supports Samantha’s
essentialist statement, maintaining and celebrating the customary ascription of
emotion to women. Yet Davis’ girlish delivery is suggestive of an uninformed
naivete, and, significantly, Charlotte is not granted the final word on the matter.
In response, Samantha mockingly deadpans, “Sweetheart, you can’t go
listening to every fucking little voice that runs through your head. It’ll drive you
nuts”.
In a much later episode, an openly sex-starved Carrie contemplates whether
single women “are the new bachelors” (5.7). Once again, Charlotte, so often
the ambassador for essentialism, is the voice of dissension, appalled by
Miranda’s suggestion that they open “a brothel where the men are cute and the
sheets are 500 count Egyptian cotton”. “A place like that”, Charlotte contends,
“doesn’t exist in reality because women don’t think about sex like that, it’s not
an animal urge, we need to feel things, we need a connection”. Carrie
disagrees — “Big is my male prostitute”.
Thus, although essentialism does figure in conversation amongst the focal four,
it is an undeniably less prevalent and popular approach. That the show is poststructurally skewed is also evident in Carrie’s column, communicated via her
trademark voiceover narration. It is here, on page seven of the fictional New
York Star, that Carrie reflects upon and appraises the competing perspectives
voiced by various characters. Whereas essentialist ideology is conspicuously
absent from Carrie’s series of anthropological hypotheses and conclusions,
ponderings pertaining to the artificiality of gender polarity feature predominantly
in four separate Carrie Bradshaw-authored columns/episodes (each episode
ostensibly generating/being generated by a particular column). In Season
Three’s “Easy Come, Easy Go”, Carrie returns to the man/woman,
rational/emotional binary, first discussed in Season Two, and queries whether it
is “really that cut and dried” (3.9). The pretence and consequent mutability of
gender is the subject of “Boy, Girl, Boy, GirlN”, and the column the episode
produces:
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If women can transform into men, and men can become women, and we can choose to
sleep with everyone, then maybe gender doesn’t even exist anymore. If we can take
the best of the other sex, and make it our own, has the opposite sex become obsolete?
(3.4)

The binaric thought that characterises the discourse of self-help again comes
under scrutiny in Season Four’s “The Belles of the Balls”, when Carrie
suggests:
Maybe men and women aren’t from different planets, as pop culture would have us
believe. Maybe we live a lot closer to each other, perhaps, dare I even say it, in the
same zip code [N] Are men just women with balls? (4.10).

The tension between these clashing philosophical positions is played out
visually in Sex and the City via the multiple meanings generated by Carrie’s
strikingly playful, yet possessive, approach to fashion. Yet, again, it is the poststructural position, enacted by Carrie in costume, that, due to its frequency and
manifest visibility, overwhelms the essentialist meaning that is made by way of
the decidedly flummoxed approach to fashion exhibited by the show’s leading
men.
Discussing the function of costume in film and television, Jane Gaines argues
that like “make-up on the face, costume is invisible as it is present” (193). The
reverse is true of costume as it operates in Sex and the City, wherein it is
uncommonly self-conscious and highly visible. It is largely via its meaningfully
affected use of fashion that the Sex and the City franchise distinguishes itself
from its chick-lit — and chick-flick — counterparts. Carrie routinely dons
costume instead of clothing — her eccentric attire is deliberately theatrical and
affected. What is significant is the fact that she wears costume in the absence
of any apparent, perceptible performance, so as to reference the incessant,
omnipresent yet usually invisible performance of gender that she, as a woman,
continually enacts. Carrie’s consistently startling theatrical attire marks a
performance that is otherwise invisible, and always underway. It is important to
make clear the distinction between Carrie Bradshaw the fictional, fashion-loving
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character, and Sarah Jessica Parker, the actress who, of course, as Carrie, is
necessarily in costume. Costume has a double usage here: in it, Parker plays
the role of flashy, fashion-forward Carrie Bradshaw, whereas Carrie plays the
role of woman. Carrie’s flamboyant aestheticism highlights the knowingness of
her execution of femininity. Carrie herself, for instance, is no ballerina, yet she
has a curious penchant for wearing tutus. The opening sequence of Sex and
the City features what Amy Sohn calls a “wild but quintessentially Carrie outfit:
a tutu” (SATC: Kiss and Tell 80. Although the item is, technically speaking, a
“tulle skirt” rather than a tutu, it is unmistakably tutu-esque and thereby alludes
to performance. Of this particular outfit, Parker recalls:
Frankly, had I had my way, it would have even been a bigger silhouette of a tutu, rather
than the tiered cupcake thing. I would have had a more classic, Degas-like, properly
layered tutu because I think it would have been prettier (Sohn, SATC: Kiss and Tell 80).

No doubt, a more classic incarnation of the ballerina’s signature piece would
have only strengthened the moment’s constructivist potential, heightening the
significance of Carrie wearing costume whilst seemingly artlessly walking
through the streets of Manhattan. Inappropriate given the non-theatrical
context, the tutu indicates that Carrie is in fact performing, and thus makes
visible a performance that ideally achieves its very aim by way of being entirely
imperceptible.
The ballerina motif nicely bookends the series — a gorgeous, authentic, sea
foam green tutu, an obvious homage to the opening sequence, appears in the
final episode, “An American Girl in Paris (Part Deux)”. In his commentary that
accompanies the DVD release, executive producer Michael Patrick King
explains:
This is the big dress that Carrie wears through the [N] last six scenes of the Paris
episode, so it had to be very special [N] What the designer does, is she travels all over
the world [N] to opera houses and theatres, finds old costumes, takes them back, and
dyes them interesting colours and rebuilds them [N] There’s a very Degas quality to it.
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The examples of Carrie in costume, sans any obvious performance, are too
numerous to mention in their entirety. In the Season One episode “The Power
of Female Sex”, Carrie attends an exhibition at Charlotte’s gallery, wearing a
colourful kimono — her hair in a topknot, she impersonates a Japanese geisha.
In “The Agony and the ‘Ex’-tacy”, Carrie incongruously dons a navy blue
nurse’s cape, a look described by Entertainment Weekly as “urban Florence
Nightingale” (?). Perhaps the most over-the-top example, however, sees Carrie
dressed as Heidi, a Swiss milkmaid, complete with a red and white dirndl and
pigtails. Of this, Parker says:
It’s been spoken of as too extreme and self-conscious. It became the example of when
we’ve gone too far. I take total blame for that, but I also stand by that [N] I even had
[N] the make-up artist put freckles on my face (Sohn, SATC: Kiss and Tell 70).

By continually dressing for performance, Carrie highlights the seeming absence
of any such performance, thereby alluding to her unremitting though otherwise
indiscernible execution of gender. In Season Six’s “Lights, Camera,
Relationship”, Carrie closes with the line, “Maybe we were all acting, all the
time”. Her random and incongruous use of costume as dress emphasises this
point perfectly, as does the acting style — undoubtedly unintentionally —
adopted by Parker in the show’s final seasons. In her article, “The Trouble With
Carrie”, Zacharek discusses the very staged quality of Parker’s enactment of
Carrie as it features in Seasons Five and Six, a departure unfavourably noted
by numerous commentators:
Parker has changed as an actress, and not wholly for the better: Her line readings can still
be wonderful, but there's something stiff and self-conscious about her [N] Her mannerisms,
and even the set of her mouth, seemed to change subtly, becoming more studied and less
natural (2, 3).

The irony of this perceived flaw in Parker’s performance is that it serves the
show’s post-structuralist politics so nicely. Whereas the assumed aim of any
actor is to seamlessly inhabit a character, here the very contrivance of acting
itself is foregrounded and thus works to emphasise the farcical fabrication that
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is Carrie’s femininity. For it is not only Parker who, posturing, performs in Sex
and the City, but Carrie, too.
Carrie’s performance of gender is not only made evident by way of her
otherwise inexplicably odd sense of style. Carrie does, in fact, reference her
enactment in conversation. In Season One’s “The Drought”, Carrie speaks of
her compulsion to perform for Big, to knowingly adopt a persona that she feels
is fittingly feminine. She tells Miranda that, when around him, she “wears little
outfits”, and occasionally “catch[es] [her]self actually posing” (1.11). “It’s
exhausting”, she exclaims, in a moment reminiscent of Bridget Jones’s own
diatribe on the challenges of performing womanhood.
It is Miranda, however, who is most obvious and awkward in terms of her
attempts to properly cite her gender. Miranda has a penchant for knowingly
faking her femininity: at one point she pretends to orgasm so as to allow her
partner to see himself as “the man” (2.4), at another she feigns femininity via an
assumed, feminising profession — air hostessing — and a breathy, girlish voice
and demeanour (3.12). She also fakes maternal joy when told that her unborn
baby is a boy (4.15). That femininity by no means comes naturally to Miranda
is patently obvious.
Sex and the City uses fashion in a couple of different ways so as to question
essentialist dogma — aside from the costume-as-clothing-as-costume device,
the program also engages with drag so as to complicate mainstream
assumptions about gender. Ashley Audrain observes that Carrie’s “flamboyant”
and “impractical” outfits echo “the exaggeration” and “theatricality” of drag (12).
Butler considers drag a subversive, parodic act and suggests that its inherent
theatricality “works to dislodge essentialised notions of gender identity and
sexual difference” (Godfrey 3). As a woman mimicking a man mimicking a
woman, Carrie’s donning of drag literalises Butler’s claim that gender is
ultimately a kind of impersonation — albeit an impersonation of — an
impersonation of — an idea of the natural. According to Butler:
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Drag is not an imitation or a copy of some prior and true gender [N] Drag enacts the
very structure of impersonation by which any gender is assumed. Drag is not the
putting on of a gender that belongs properly to some other group [for] there is no
“proper” gender (Butler, “Imitation and Gender Insubordination” 21).

Sex and the City’s engagement with drag is flagged in the pilot episode, in
which the four friends go out to dinner to celebrate Miranda’s birthday. A
throng of cross-dressed waitresses carry a candle-lit cake to their table, singing
“Happy Birthday” slightly off-key. Drag is a constant presence throughout the
series. For examples, the women attend Drag Queen Bingo at one point (2.8),
and discover that Samantha has unknowingly inspired one man’s feminising
transformation. In a later episode “Boy, Girl, Boy, GirlN” — notable for its
blatant post-structuralism — Charlotte, dressed, convincingly, as a drag king, is
the subject of an artist’s photographic piece (3.4). Photographer Baird’s
explanation of his work confirms his allegiance to Butlerite constructionism. “I
feel we have dual powers within each of us”, he contends. “Men can be very
female and women can be very male. Gender’s an illusion. Sometimes a very
beautiful illusion”.
These moments underline Carrie’s frequently camp approach to clothing and
cosmetics. Parker’s face is, significantly, and often, described as being
somewhat manly and, in Hollywood terms, unattractive — Zacharek is
somewhat gentler than most in her description of Parker:
Her beauty is more classical than classic: The contours of her features are noble and
good-natured. She has the kind of face you'd see on a Roman coin (2).

This only adds to the queer potential of her enactment of Carrie. Done up in
thick, garish, multi-hued make-up — as she frequently is during Season One
but most notably in Season Five’s “Luck Be An Old Lady” — Carrie mimics the
blatancy and excess that defines drag. Carina Chocano likens Season Five’s
Carrie to “Harvey Fierstein on the set of Hairspray” (2), whereas Zacharek
observes that she uses “one erect forefinger to [N] push back the front strands
of her hair — the kind of thing [N] drag queens do” (3).
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Extremity is a constant and notable feature of Carrie’s wardrobe. Perhaps the
best example of this can be found in the numerous incarnations of Carrie’s
trademark accessory, the oversized fabric flower (floral insignia having been
traditionally associated with femininity). It is at its biggest, and most startlingly
camp, when Carrie attends Brady’s baptism in Season Five’s “Unoriginal Sin”.
Fittingly, Miranda refers to this event as “baby’s first drag show”. Excess is also
a feature of Carrie’s famed footwear fetish. Be they Manolo Blahniks, Jimmy
Choos or Christian Louboutins, Carrie’s heels are always painfully high — “the
higher the better”, she remarks in Season Four’s “The Real Me”.
The finale of Season Three, “Cock A Doodle Do!”, caps Carrie’s dalliance with
drag via dress. Samantha throws a “Kiss and Make-Up Party” for the
transgendered prostitutes who, nightly, loiter noisily under her window. The
four friends are in attendance, and Carrie, oversized fabric flower and sky-high
stilettos firmly in place, wears an exaggeratedly tiny, drag-friendly pair of hot
pants. Carrie pointedly performs a sexy twirl, mimicking the inflated femininity
enacted by the drag queens and thereby playing up the derivative quality of
gender. As Butler puts it, “drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of
gender itself — as well as its contingency” (Gender Trouble 137). The fact that
Carrie’s drag is of the female-to-female variety only strengthens drag’s political
potential, in that it “illuminate[s] the fact that the ‘real thing’ is as much ‘drag’ as
the supposedly poor copy” (Harris 58). It is certainly no coincidence, then, that,
in Season Six’s “Boy, Interrupted”, Carrie and her gay friend Stanford,
partnered at the Gay Lesbian Bisexual and Transgender Prom, are crowned
“queen and queen” (6.1.10), an open acknowledgement of Carrie’s complex,
camp status.
In the tradition of chick-lit novels and their cinematic renditions, Sex and the
City also conveys the importance of clothing as a tool for contouring and
contriving the ideal feminine shape. As Asia Friedman explains,
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The female body and its differences from the male body have historically been stressed
primarily in order to serve as the grounds for naturalising social differences between
men and women (23).

Butler perceives gendered bodies as being repetitively constructed so as to
both create and comply with normative notions of sexual difference. Of course,
it is not solely corsetry that enables the feigning of the feminine physique. Sex
and the City acknowledges the multiple means of manufacturing the idealised
female form. For, as a done-up Carrie points out to Big, she does not “wake up
looking like this”, but, rather “actually need[s] stuff to look like this” (2.11). For
instance, Samantha is a vocal advocate of both plastic surgery, and the
publicising of its prevalence — she seeks to subversively expose that which
must, in order to achieve its intended illusory effect, always remain concealed.
In Season Five’s “Plus One Is The Loneliest Number”, after a routine round of
Botox injections — a procedure with which she is apparently “familiar” —
Samantha opts to try a “freshening chemical peel”. Her skin is left red, raw and
sore, but she attends Carrie’s book party anyway, “minus one layer of skin”.
Carrie is aghast at the sorry sight of Samantha’s face, which, although initially
concealed under a funereal veiled ensemble, is eventually exposed for all to
see:
Carrie, I’m entitled to a chemical peel [N] Women shouldn’t have to hide in the
shadows because they’ve had cosmetic surgery, which society nearly demands of
them (5.5).

A recent Sunday Life article discusses the bra as a means of manipulating the
female body. Note that the bra and the breast are seemingly interchangeable:
Curves are back but nipples are out — two trends acknowledged by bra designers [N]
“The aesthetic of the bust has changed over the decades. At the moment it’s a
rounded shape and quite high. In the ‘70s, it was a more natural and wide-set look.
Before that, it was more pointy”.
To create the rounded shape now in vogue, bras have padding in the bottom of the cup
[N] “There’s also an aesthetic which is you don’t show your nipple N unless you want
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to be sexy” [N] Invisible nipples are an international trend, as contoured bras, with their
thin layer of foam, dominate global markets (Swart, 20).

By exposing that which is supposed to be hidden, Carrie highlights the
fabrication of her female shape and undercuts the illusion of the ideal feminine
physique. In Season Two’s “Evolution”, for instance, Carrie wears a revealing
mesh top, through which can be seen a simple white cotton bra. Later in
Season Four’s “All That Glitters”, Carrie takes this one step further — dancing
away at gay nightclub, Train, her neon pink bra and underpants clearly show
through her tiny white dress. However, it is in the Season Four episode
entitled, fittingly, “The Real Me”, that Carrie’s fondness for wearing underwear
as outerwear is most manifest. In the opening scene, Carrie is dressed in a
complicated and decidedly non-titillating combination — a sleeveless black
dress with a strapless white satin corset worn over the top, cinched at the waist
with an oversized wide black belt. It comes an no surprise when, later in the
episode, Dolce & Gabbana send Carrie down the runway in an electric blue
trench coat, loosely fastened to reveal a pair of jewelled underpants and a
black satin push-up bra. Ultimately, Carrie’s exposed bras foreground the
constructedness of what is a seemingly natural physical gendered disparity,
portraying the female body as contrived and gender classification — along with
the hierarchised dichotomy such categorisation enables — as consequently
potentially contestable.

Carrie uses fashion so as to effectively deconstruct gender classification.
However, the heterosexual men in her life typically respond to her heightened
fashionability with unease, their alienation only serving to reinstate the
man/woman binary. As Joanne Entwhistle notes, there has long existed an
association of femininity with “inconstancy and change, characteristics which
also describe fashion” (148). Efrat Tseelon concurs, observing that
fashionability is “heavily marked as gendered” (103). Indeed, there exists an
essentialising belief that women innately understand and appreciate fashion.
Interestingly, Parker herself subscribes to this view. “I really love clothes”, she
says. “Have you ever met a woman who says, ‘I don’t like clothes’? For me, it’s
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an involuntary reaction” (Burr 118). Feminist theorist Iris Marion Young cites
another manifestation of this essentialist rhetoric:
We [as women] often feel that [other] women will understand the way clothes are
important to us and that men will not [N] Other women will understand the clothing
aesthetic [N] Clothes often serve for women in this society as threads in the bond of
sisterhood (70).

Whereas none of Carrie’s female friends — or, for that matter, Stanford, her
feminised gay confidante — ever negatively comment upon or question Carrie’s
often challenging fashion choices, her various boyfriends frequently do, and are
consequently posited as lacking fashion know-how, as innately incapable,
inferior and inept. Attempts to participate in Carrie’s progressive engagement
with fashion ultimately end in failure, such as Big’s proffering of a bejewelled
Judith Leiber swan purse in “The Caste System”. Crystal encrusted and
thoroughly tacky, the clutch is, in Carrie’s knowing eyes, simply “wrong” (2.10).
Later, in “The Good Fight”, Carrie and Aidan struggle to make space for one
another in their cosy joint apartment. Carrie lays out clean towels on the
bathroom floor in readiness for her enforced closet clean out. Aidan, clearly
stunned by the reverence with which Carrie treats her clothes, rolls his eyes.
“When and where were you planning to wear this?” he asks, holding a
shredded beige Roberto Cavalli top (4.13). “Don’t do that”, Carrie replies.
“Don’t mock the clothes”. In the final scene of the episode, Carrie trots down
her street proudly wearing the ridiculed piece, showcasing her fashion fluency
yet again.
One of the most dramatically divisive fashion moments in Sex and the City
occurs in “Pick-A-Little, Talk-A-Little”, wherein Carrie and Berger argue over the
fashion merits of the much-maligned hair scrunchy. Carrie teases Berger, a
writer like herself, for having his “leading lady running all over town wearing a
scrunchy” (6.1.4). “The hair thing?” Berger replies. “What’s wrong with that?”
After gently reprimanding him for the fashion faux pas he has inadvertently
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committed, Carrie tells Berger, “Man, it’s a good thing I came along because
you may know the fellas, but I know the ladies”.
Towards the end of the episode, the couple are still arguing over what Carrie
considers a terrible error. Carrie is wearing a miniature hat-cum-fascinator in
this scene, all tulle and lace. “If you thought I had made some kind of mistake
I’d want you to tell me”, Carrie claims. “Nice hat”, is Berger’s retort. “It’s
fabulous and you just said that to hurt my feelings”, Carrie responds, ever
confident. “Fabulous!” she repeats.
The next episode sees the essentialist theme extended. Much is made of
Carrie and Berger’s excursion to Prada. Recalling the binaric approach to
gender so characteristic of the self-help discourse, Berger exclaims, in
response to the store’s trendy sparseness, “You know, on my planet the
clothing stores have clothes!” (6.1.5).
There is a significant exception to the show’s seemingly essentialist bifurcation
of male and female approaches to fashion — the figure of the fashion-forward
gay man. Stanford Blatch and Anthony Marantino in particular each function so
as to disrupt and thereby deny the woman/man, fashionable/unfashionable
binary. Stanford, Carrie’s endearingly loyal gay confidante, dons brash
ensembles that mimic the eccentricity and audacity of Carrie’s clothes. In “A
Woman’s Right to Shoes”, for example, he is characteristically attired in a green
plaid suit, matched with a neon green shirt and striped navy and green tie
(6.1.9). His nemesis, Charlotte’s wedding planner and frequent companion,
Anthony, actually offers fashion advice to brides-to-be, as well as snide
commentary on the clothing of friends and acquaintances. He knowingly terms
Charlotte “Audrey Hepburn-owitz” when he sees her in her wedding gown
(6.1.8), the Hepburn reference evidence of his fashion literacy. These men —
and there is no doubting that they identify as such, despite their rampant
effeminacy — unseat the easy opposition otherwise established by the
program’s use of fashionability as an innately feminine skill.
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In Sex and the City, fashion is celebrated as a site of exciting, creative artistry.
The program revels in and relishes fashion at its most extreme, challenging and
thought provoking, privileging fashionability as a feminine quality. Carrie’s
fashion occupies a site of contestation, a space wherein essentialism and
constructivism meet. Although it clearly favours post-structural feminism over
its essentialist alternative, Sex and the City explores the limitations and
strengths of each of these approaches to gender, which, like Carrie and her
friends, are constantly, and sometimes acrimoniously, in dialogue. As the
program’s creator, Darren Star, points out, Carrie Bradshaw “wears outfits that
make you think”.

The final feature of HBO’s adaptation deserving of discussion is its heroine’s
gradual growth and enlightenment, culminating in her very own happy ending.
Carrie’s flawed enactment of femininity — as evidenced by the cigarette
smoking that Aidan finds so distasteful, the unabashed promiscuity and brazen
sexual confidence she and her friends exhibit, her reluctance to marry, her
“mortif[ying]” (1.11) inability to modestly curtail her own bodily functions, her
trademark domestic ineptitude and, of course, the obviousness of her
fabricated-via-fashion femaleness — is the cause of much of her own, initial,
nagging self-doubt, a self-doubt that she does, eventually, significantly, seem to
conquer. Carrie is continually torn between her desire to uphold and embrace
her own autonomy, and her undeniable craving for male approval, a craving
signified by her sometimes latent longing to be coupled with Big; for, perhaps if
she were less unruly, and more compliantly, seamlessly feminine, like her
outwardly faultless nemesis Natasha, she could secure Big’s esteem and
affection once and for all, and therein, be validated. Sex and the City’s Season
Two finale, “Ex and the City”, intertextually references the 1973 film The Way
We Were, likening Carrie’s intriguingly imperfect rendition of femininity to that of
Barbra Streisand’s Katie Morosky. Carrie, feeling despondent and rejected
upon hearing the news of Big’s engagement to Natasha, asks, over and over,
“Why her?” Miranda offers the Katie/Carrie comparison in response to Carrie’s
entreaty:
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Robert Redford is madly in love with Barbra Streisand [N] But he can’t be with her
because she’s too complicated and she has wild, curly hair [N] So he leaves her and
marries this simple girl, with straight hair (2.18).

Carrie welcomes the likeness, excitedly proclaiming herself to be “a Katie girl!”
Shortly thereafter, she quite explicitly gives voice to her growing acceptance of
her less-than-perfect rendition of femaleness. “I will never be the woman with
the perfect hair who can wear white and not spill on it”, she maintains, “and I
can’t feel bad about that” (3.3).

Parker speaks thus of her enactment of clumsy Carrie, an enactment that
visually bespeaks Carrie’s perceived awkward imperfections:
I trip a lot on the show. I actually try to trip as often as possible [N] The truth is, Carrie
is such a wreck of a person so much of the time, and her apartment is such a mess,
that she should trip over shoe boxes because they are in the way (Sohn, SATC: Kiss
and Tell 22).

Carrie’s decided lack of proper, womanly poise, a visual, figurative and comic
marker of her erroneous take on femininity, is apparent in the show’s opening
credits, wherein she is splashed by the bus that drives past her, bearing her
image — the suggestion being that she is her own harshest critic. Of this
opening sequence, Star explains:
They shot another version with Carrie in [a] Marc Jacobs dress — without the splash.
In it, she sees the bus, trips but doesn’t fall, and keeps going. I always figured we
could someday replace the tutu sequence with the other one [N] and it could be our
version of The Dick Van Dyke Show. In the first few seasons, he would trip over that
ottoman when he was coming home, and later he learned to avoid it (Sohn, SATC: Kiss
and Tell 81).

For, of course, Carrie does, like Dick Van Dyke, learn and mature, eventually
not simply accepting herself, but, rather, loving herself, flaws and all. The story
of HBO’s Sex and the City is, ultimately, one of personal growth. The finale
sees Carrie finally awakened to her own self-worth, an enlightenment enabled
233

by the encouragement and honesty of her friends and the intense rumination
that is a requirement of her work.
Problematically, perhaps, throughout the series it is Carrie’s attitude towards Mr
Big that marks her growth or, in some cases, her stasis. In the first few
seasons, for instance, Carrie masochistically and consistently allows Big to
treat her carelessly and disrespectfully, reuniting with him repeatedly. In
Season Four, finally, it is his feelings which are, for the first time, hurt, when
she mercilessly flirts with other men when in his company. In Season Five, her
progress is marked by her very conscious decision to sleep with him in a
shockingly no-strings-attached sense. By Season Six, the tables have turned
completely, and, for the first time, it is he who pursues her, to no avail, he who
is left feeling “like a needy chick” (6.2.7). Carrie’s ability to resist Big — to
whom she yells, “Forget you know my number. In fact, forget you know my
name!” (6.2.7) — marks her maturation. The ultimate, and somewhat
problematic, irony is that this very maturation is rewarded by the pair’s
reconciliation in the finale’s final scenes.
It is not until Season Six, and the onset of Carrie’s thirty-ninth year, that she so
shamelessly conveys an affection for and confident pride in the choices she
has made and the person that she, unapologetically, is — that is, a no-longeryouthful, still single, happily childless, domestically incompetent and
professionally successful woman. Carrie’s healthy ego is made plain in the
landmark episode, “A Woman’s Right To Shoes”, wherein Carrie forces society
to celebrate her own, less traditional, personal trajectory. After proferring yet
another gift in celebration of her friend Kyra’s multiple, sanctioned milestones
— her engagement, her wedding, three baby showers and as many
christenings — Carrie, rudely unshod of her brand new stilettos, cleverly
resolves her loss whilst also quite literally referencing her developing selfesteem and embracing her single status. She leaves the following message on
Kyra’s answering machine:
Hi, it’s Carrie Bradshaw. I wanted to let you know that I’m getting marriedN To myself.
Oh! And I’m registered at Manolo Blahnik. So thanks, bye (6.1.9).
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Carrie’s confidence in and affection for her single self, however, is all but
obliterated when she witnesses an ageing, single socialite plummet to her
death out a window in “Splat!”. It is this macabre incident, coupled with the fact
that each of her three best friends are happily paired off — two of the three in
the initial phases of creating their own, individual, nuclear renditions of family —
that precipitates Carrie’s misguided move to Paris with the sophisticated but
selfish Aleksandr Petrovsky. Subsumed by Aleks, Carrie wilfully and
mistakenly forgoes her own, independent identity, the very autonomy that she
fought so hard to maintain and is so worthy of pride and inspiring of self-love, in
order to be part of a more traditional pairing, despite its abject dysfunctionality.
Frightened by the prospect of living out her days as a single woman, and
momentarily believing herself to be in need of the validation that comes with a
man’s love, Carrie sacrifices her relationship with her self — the self she
married only episodes ago.
Carrie’s column both aids in her awakening, and acts as a marker of the
anthropological analysis and associated self-appraisal for which she is known,
and with which her maturation is linked. Her column is the means by which
Carrie gains insight both into those around her, and, more importantly, into
herself, and features in the text via the voiceover that begins, ends and is
peppered throughout each episode. In “An American Girl in Paris”, Parts Une
and Deux — the duo of episodes that complete the season and the series —
Carrie’s voiceover is conspicuously absent, other than just before she sets off
for Paris, and, in the closing moment where she struts down a Manhattan
street, shopping bag aptly in hand. As with all of the little details that comprise
an episode, this absence is weighted with significance, as King explains in his
commentary:
Our big subversive end-of-the-series thing was, there were no voiceovers in the last
episode, except for at the very end and at the very top. The conceit that we had was
she left her computer; she left her column [N] The only person Carrie doesn’t know
about is herself.

235

Carrie’s identity is symbolised by her trademark, “ghetto gold” ‘Carrie’ necklace,
the necklace that she quickly misplaces upon her arrival in Paris. “It cost
nothing”, she explains to a bewildered Petrovsky, “but it’s priceless. I’ve just
had it forever” (6.2.7). Petrovsky offers Carrie a grandiose string of raw
diamonds as a replacement, his gift offered, significantly, as a substitution for
what was a gift to herself. The trope of the dual, split self, of being enamoured
of and contentedly married to oneself — the ‘Carrie’ pendant tellingly figuring as
an emblem of self-love, worn in lieu of the more traditional accessory of a locket
encasing a lover’s photograph — features repeatedly, and favourably, in the
show’s final episodes. At one point, a lonely Carrie buys herself a bunch of
violets — a purposeful selection, as explained by King in his commentary:
In France, traditionally the violet is the flower a husband gives a wife when he’s
disappointed her or they’ve had a fight. So I just thought it was kind of tragic that
Carrie bought violets for herself, like she’s disappointed by herself.

The necklace metaphor continues into the next and final episode. A miserable
Carrie follows Petrovsky to his gallery opening, rather than honouring a prior
arrangement to celebrate her own success, and whilst there, discovers the
missing necklace inside the torn lining of her vintage silk purse. Immediately,
she springs from her seat, realising that being alone and autonomous, in a
relationship with herself, is preferable to being part of a farcical, unrewarding
pairing. “Maybe it’s time to be clear about who I am”, she announces, just
before ending the relationship. Says the episode’s writer and director, King:
I did read the reactions from the fans [to the previous episode]. And everybody was
convinced that Big was going to fly to Paris and find her necklace, and I just thought it
was so interesting, ‘cause people thought she needed Big to find her identity and I was
pretty happy that I knew that she was going to find her identity all by herself.

It is indeed imperative that Carrie makes clear her decision to leave Aleks and
return to New York — independent of any man — before her timely and
romantic reunion with Big. Upon requesting to be moved to a room of her own,
Carrie is told that there is only a single room available. To this, she defiantly
replies, her words replete with import, capturing the show’s ostensible
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message, “I am a single and I will be fine”. King was evidently determined to
leave no room for misinterpretation: he claims that he “wanted to make sure
that the audience got that she’s accepting the fact that she’s single before” Big
finally labels her “the one”. Although Carrie’s declaration makes for an
undeniably profound and powerful feminist revision of the Harlequin Mills &
Boon-esque climactically poised romantic ending, it does not entirely resolve
the text’s ideological schizophrenia — Big does seemingly magically appear
immediately following Carrie’s important avowal, thereby in some way still
signalling her growth and undermining her satisfiedly single stance. Jennifer
Frey observes the finale’s contradictions:
Well, there was no wedding. No marriage proposal on a bridge over the Seine in the
moonlight (okay, we got close). In other words, we escaped without having to swallow
a Harlequin romance ending [N] Carrie got herself back. And, yes, she got Big [N]
Inside you’re swooning and groaning simultaneously (1).

Added to this is the political polysemy realised by the show’s other, surprisingly
conservative, conclusions. As Caroline Overington contends, Sex and the
City’s ending “is at odds with its traditional themes [in that] every single one of
the main characters ends up in a relationship” (1). As A. Rochelle Mabry adds
Sex and the City ends on a note that threatens to overturn any of its more overt
feminist messages [N] In and of themselves, these storylines are not necessarily
problematic. After all, these women still have their careers and their relationships with
one another. What is important is the fact that these pretty conservative endings
happen in the series finale (204).

The romantic anxiety that underlies every episode is arguably Sex and the
City’s most troubling feature. Carrie, Samantha, Miranda and Charlotte are
each financially autonomous, owners of their own homes and successful in
their respective and fulfilling career paths, yet the independence that so
enables them also frequently figures as a limiting loneliness. Indeed, the
show’s final moments seem to suggest that all of the freedoms facilitated by
feminism are worthless in the absence of the validation of self provided by a
man’s love. The ultimate contentment so obviously felt by the women in the

237

finale’s final scenes is tellingly marked by traditional emblems of female
fulfilment. For Carrie and, most surprisingly, Samantha, this is, finally, the onset
of monogamy, whereas for Miranda and Charlotte, it is the assembly — albeit
atypical — of a conventionally composed, nuclear family. Whilst there is
nothing inherently wrong with partnering off or having children, the placement of
these plot points at the text’s apex is problematical. Occurring at the climax, at
the conclusion of this text, these narrative developments are posited as more
significant and momentous than any others, sitting uneasily beside the
subversive and alternative familial structures and lifestyle choices endorsed by
the program throughout its six seasons. In a final concession to the text’s
ideological indecisiveness, however, the program’s very last words — Carrie’s
very last contemplative voiceovered verbalisation — undermine the primacy of
its prior images of gleefully coupled pairs, and are accompanied by a shot of
Carrie, autonomous and alone, adorned with her ‘Carrie’ necklace, clearly
smitten with both Big and, more significantly, herself:
The most exciting, challenging and significant relationship of all, is the one you have
with yourself. And if you find someone to love the you you love, well, that’s just
fabulous.

THE FILM
It would be false to treat Sex and the City: The Movie, as a discrete text,
detachable from, or more worthy of critique than, the ninety-four episodes that
precede it. The film, a product of the collaboration of the same team of writers,
directors, actors and stylists responsible for Sex and the City’s televisual
rendition, is not so much an adaptation of the television program, but, rather, a
nostalgic, cinematic continuation of the small screen text, a final finale that
straightforwardly affirms and protracts the show’s feminist reworking of
Bushnell’s original literary offering. This fact is played out via the film’s
awkward opening, which features excerpted footage from the television show.
This introduction to the women and their stories — a crude, reductive summary
of a particularly unwieldy televisual text — positions the series as the film’s
compulsory prologue. Ostensibly comprising a corrected ending to the
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narrative played out over six seasons, The Movie’s meanings and conclusions
are largely consistent with those that emerge during the final few episodes of
the series. The television series is thus transposed to the big screen largely
unchanged, effecting an affirming familiarity that serves to corroborate and
clarify scholarly responses to the prior HBO product. Despite the film’s
seeming newness and superficially distinct, unique storylines, all it really
achieves is an extension, and, in some cases, elaboration on, the narrative
devices, along with the themes they generate, that have come under scrutiny in
academic analyses of HBO’s pioneering televisual text.
That The Movie is treated herein as an afterthought, seemingly summarily, is a
reflection of its somewhat superfluous, postscript status. It offers only a limited
selection of conspicuously meaningful moments and machinations. The film’s
portrayal of the focal foursome’s friendship is one the few facets wherein new
meaning is made. As previously noted, the television series ends with the
incipient emergence of traditionally comprised nuclear families, families that
threaten to supersede the fabricated family of friends that figures so strongly
throughout. However, The Movie reveals that the opposite has occurred — the
introduction of Charlotte and Harry’s adopted daughter, Lily, into the fold, only
serves to solidify the links between Carrie and Charlotte, literalising the familial
flavour of their friendship via Carrie’s newfound status as “Aunt” to Lily.
In the tradition of the series, the friends frequently stand in for one another’s
absent spouses and biological, legally recognised kin, providing companionship
and support in times of crisis and despondency. During her separation from
Steve, Miranda is forced to welcome in the New Year sans both Steve and her
son Brady. “I thought that one of the perks of having a family”, Miranda tells
Carrie, “was that you didn’t have to spend New Year’s Eve alone with Chinese
food”. Carrie responds to Miranda’s need reflexively, and runs through the
snowy streets of Manhattan in high heels, pyjamas and a bejewelled beret,
arriving at Miranda’s door seconds before midnight, proving to her that she is
“not alone”.
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The women rally around Carrie after the shocking incompletion of her initial
attempt at marrying Mr Big, quite literally functioning as spousal substitutes
when they join her on what was intended to be her honeymoon in Mexico.
During their stay at a stunning Mexican resort, Miranda, Charlotte and
Samantha are Carrie’s husbands, sisters and mothers, as well as her friends,
evidenced by, for example, Samantha’s loving and unsentimental feeding of her
mute, broken friend.
The device of spousal surrogacy again features later on in the film, when Carrie
and Miranda’s relationship is comically yet meaningfully queered. Newly single,
the pair attend Valentine’s Day dinner at a romantically themed, balloon
festooned, restaurant. Their waitress mistakenly refers to Miranda as Carrie’s
girlfriend, and neither bothers to correct her. The companionship they provide
for one another is thus explicitly and accurately likened to that of a non-platonic
partner.
Another feature of the HBO television program that is replicated in the film is its
campy dalliance with drag. Costume is once again characterised by extremity
and excess, as is signposted by the film’s very first Carrie Bradshaw fashion
moment — “the flower on steroids”, as King terms it the directorial commentary
that accompanies the DVD release. From the film’s opening depiction of its
heroine adorned with a ludicrously exaggerated lily corsage, a big-as-her-head,
flashy gold and white reference to her famed floral fetish; to the gaudy purple
platform stilettos that Louise gushes over, complete with sequins, jewels and
feathers, Carrie’s clothes are once again embellished and overstated, signifying
the artifice and innate theatricality of her enactment of femaleness. The
pinnacle of Sex and the City’s post-structural engagement with costume and
clothes/costume as clothes is, of course, Carrie’s Vogue shoot, wherein she
adopts a variety of bridal looks, wearing theatrical, fantastical, impractical
examples of bridal couture, posing and posturing, a woman in bridal drag. That
this montage is Carrie dressing up in drag is underlined by Stanford’s
admission, in awed response to Carrie’s donning of a frothy Vera Wang gown,
that “when [he] get[s] married [he] want[s] to wear something like that, only
bigger”. The Dior dress is particularly noteworthy, all puffs, flounces and frills.
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Parker herself recognises the performative posturing she, as Carrie, practices
in this scene:
The dress that was the most physically cumbersome was the Dior dress with the
massive hat. It was really tight at the waist, and required that I stand the way that
those models did in the fifties, where you contort your body and go concave. Andre
[Leon Talley, Vogue’s editor-at-large] directed me to stand that way. I happily obliged
(Sohn, Sex and the City: The Movie 43).

It is, however, the Vivienne Westwood number Carrie ultimately wears to her
own ill-fated wedding — its sharp sweetheart neckline an exaggeratedly pointy
subversion of the traditional, cleavage-enhancing strapless look — that of
course provides the film’s focal fashion moment(s). The choice of a Westwood
piece is fitting here, given the designer’s status as the doyenne of antiestablishment fashion. The dress is twice the subject of exaggeratedly camp
treatment, when Carrie models it for Vogue, and, later, when she wears it with
the intention of marrying Big. Its significance is twofold here: not only does it
mark the contrivance of femininity, as it features in the marriage ceremony and
the figure of the bride, at its most rigidly stereotyped; it also works to distance
Carrie “from bridal fashions that connote tradition, convention and conformity”
(Walker 226). The blatancy of Carrie’s bridal look is made complete by the
application of severe, heavy red lipstick and green eye shadow — overtly
made-up, Carrie’s face comprises a pointed and knowing departure from the
seemingly “natural”, subtle fresh-faced look usually adopted by brides. Instead
of the tiara, bejewelled comb, or flowers with which a bridal veil is usually
festooned, Carrie’s veil is adorned with a jarringly bizarre green bird headpiece.
In her article, “Feminists in Brideland”, Lisa Walker explains the inherently
satiric quality of this type of overstated bridal costume:
Any element of the dress that is ‘overdone’ is deliberately exaggerated to create witty and
ironic fashion statements [N] Some of the most delightful parody is generated with
elaborately coiffed hair and dramatic headpieces. Models sport huge picture hats covered in
feathers or wrapped in clouds of tulle, elaborate mantillas, powdered wigs that reference
Marie Antoinette and the Bride of Frankenstein, conical towers of braids, doves, overblown
roses, and twigs arranged as reindeer antlers (224).
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Carrie’s hyperbolically parodic engagement with bridal fashion is matched in
terms of its subversive power by the deflating minimalism of her initial, and,
ultimate, approach to marriage. Carrie originally rejects the grandiosity
associated with the traditional wedding. She announces to Anthony and
Charlotte, for instance, that she has found ‘the’ dress, leaving them in baited
breath anticipation, to the accompaniment of swelling strings, only to reveal that
‘the’ dress is a modest, vintage, label-less suit, the absolute inverse of the silky
creampuff concoction that replaces it, its minimalism “provid[ing] distance [from
convention] by refusing the hyperbole of traditional bridal fashion” (Walker 226).
That Carrie does, eventually, wear this understated ensemble in place of the
Vivienne Westwood dress, combined with the City Hall setting, works to counter
the problematically climactic positioning of her wedding at the film’s apex. It is
also worth noting that the film does not end with Carrie and Big, in their
wedding garb, locked in a loving embrace. Instead, it continues on, if only for a
few more minutes, and concludes with the four friends, signature
Cosmopolitans in hand, celebrating both Samantha’s fiftieth birthday and the
fortitude of their friendships. Says King, via commentary voiceover, of the film’s
ending:
A lot of romantic comedies would have ended on the marriage, and that to me would
have been a mistake considering that the legacy of this show is not about getting
married, it’s about the friendship and the growth.

In the tradition of the polysemic ending that so plagues the chick-lit genre, as
well as many of its cinematic renderings, Sex and the City: The Movie sees
Carrie marry Mr Big towards its close, compromising its feminism by way of
seemingly using marriage to signal the completion of her personal trajectory.
However, just like the television series that precedes it, it is significant that
Carrie’s happiness is already marked before she and Big reunite and wed.
Carrie suffers terrible sadness after Big’s ambivalent absence from her first,
faux wedding day, but she manages to restore herself, to smile with selfsatisfaction, well before their serendipitous reunion. King claims that Carrie is
eventually “reborn as herself — a slightly newer version”. It is with the help of
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Charlotte, Miranda, Samantha and, most significantly, Louise, her assistant,
that Carrie is “brought [N] back to life”, sans Big.
Louise is an intriguing, conspicuous addition to the Sex and the City cast of
characters. Within a narrative that is so heavily devoted to addressing the
inadequacies of essentialist thinking, that Louise figures so simplistically as the
token and stereotypical African-American underling is somewhat surprising.
Race aside, as Carrie’s personal assistant, she manages the chaos of Carrie’s
life — she supervises the “grown-up” (Sohn, Sex and the City: The Movie 133)
revamping of Carrie’s apartment, organises her closet, refurbishes her website,
checks her email and offers advice pertaining to the more important matters of
the heart. What is telling, however, is the fact that Louise never actually meets
any of Carrie’s friends; her interaction with Carrie is purely one-on-one. It is
entirely possible that Louise is a product of Carrie’s own imagination, a
schizophrenic, illusory double, the conscience that guides her. Carrie, in the
guise of Louise, is then, herself, responsible for the renovation of her life, for
rescuing herself from the debilitating melancholy she experiences, a sign of her
relentless independence.
The device of the doubled self, first used in the closing stages of Sex and the
City’s televisual rendition, also figures in the film in relation to Samantha.
Instead of the ‘Carrie’ necklace, it is the extravagant flower ring that is sought
by Sam as a token of her love for herself, a love that ultimately unseats her
affection for Smith and undoes their pairing. Samantha is frustrated by Smith’s
figurative undermining of that love, by his generous purchase of the ring for her.
The ring is an anti-engagement ring, or, as Samantha puts it, “a ring with
diamonds, not a diamond ring”, and Smith’s proffering of it precedes the end of
their affair. Towards the end of the film, Samantha leaves Smith — for herself.
“I love you”, she confesses, “but I love me more. And I’ve been in a
relationship with myself for 49 years and that’s the one I need to work on.”

CONCLUSIONS
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In a 2003 New York Times Letter to the Editor, a viewer and fan of HBO’s Sex
and the City defends its feminism, claiming that it “sits squarely in the feminist
tradition in its characters’ repudiation of the sexual double standard and its
valorisation of female friendship” (Gilbertson 1). Indeed, the televisual version
of Sex and the City, along with its cinematic addendum, is an undeniably,
irrefutably feminist text, a feminist revision of its source. The show furthers the
incipient feminism that is a feature of Bushnell’s original work, “flesh[ing] out”,
as cameo character Matthew McConaughey urges, “the central relationship” —
not the pairing of Carrie and Mr Big, but, rather, the familial friendship of Carrie,
Miranda, Samantha and Charlotte — as well as amplifying the novel’s poststructural renunciation of rigidly categorised gendered attributes. Aside from
the odd, anomalous, endorsement of essentialist thought, HBO’s Sex and the
City consistently seeks to convey as contrived male and female identities, and
to thus posit them as unstable and mutable. The show and its big screen
postscript offer a predominantly feminist rethinking of a less unequivocally
feminist source.
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Conclusion
And finally we say goodbye. And I don’t know if that’s the end, or the beginning of another chapter.
Adele Parks
Husbands

PREQUELS, SEQUELS
The chick-lit genre’s tendency towards franchising, recycling and resurrecting
its more canonical stories and (in)famous singletons does not yet appear to be
abating. In September 2009, Working Title announced that an as-yet untitled
third Bridget Jones film was in pre-production, slated for release in 2011.
Reports are circulating that Renee Zellweger has signed on to revisit the role
she is now so strongly associated with. It is likely that the film will be based on
the 2005 reprisal of Fielding’s newspaper column, in which Bridget continues to
divide her affections between Daniel Cleaver and Mark Darcy – ultimately
falling pregnant to the former whilst still pining for the latter, with, as always,
awkwardly comedic consequences. There has recently been mention in the
press of Zellweger’s preference to don a fat suit for this final installment, as
opposed to putting on, and then shedding, the requisite excess weight. It will
be interesting to see whether this is accommodated, and, if so, how such a
move will impact upon the franchise’s thus far meaningful post-structural
interrogation of the constructedness of the female physique.
The Sex and the City franchise is also continuing to produce new texts in a
variety of formats. A sequel to Sex and the City: The Movie is currently
screening in theatres worldwide. This latest filmic installment sees the quartet
of now very much middle-aged women encountering the unique sexual politics
of the Middle East, a significant and controversial development that renders the
text particularly ripe for academic exploration. Talk of a second sequel is
gaining momentum.
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Sex and the City has also recently reappeared in novel form. Candace
Bushnell’s 2010 publication, The Carrie Diaries, a prequel, of sorts, to Sex and
the City, provides her teenage, motherless heroine with a firmly feminist
outlook, a flair for socially observant journalism and a developing interest in
kooky, left-of-centre fashion. This piece of young adult fiction also sets the tone
for the competitive spirit with which Bushnell’s female characters tend to relate
to one another, with Carrie envied and ultimately betrayed by her closest friend.
This new text offers further fruit for the continued study of the Sex and the City
franchise.
These various works in progress will no doubt further complicate and develop
the findings of this thesis, and will inevitably encourage additional scholarship.
Indeed, it is hoped that the groundwork found herein is treated as such, and
used by other scholars as they work to expand upon and strengthen the various
bodies of theory and criticism that feature in these pages. This thesis is by no
means intended as an exhaustive or final answer to the various problems to
which it seeks to respond – namely, the fidelity-inspired stasis of novel-into-film
adaptation theory, the delimiting feminist treatment of popular texts, and the
ever intriguing but occasionally frustrating ambiguity of the chick-lit genre.
Far from providing unproblematic resolutions, this thesis poses its own
quandaries, and is thus, like the genre it examines, regenerative, its findings
provisional rather than in any way absolute. Its many claims, queries and gaps
are summarily revisited below. Prior to this, however, it is perhaps worth asking

WHERE TO FROM HERE?
There are a number of ideas alluded to in this thesis that offer valuable future
directions for other scholars to take up, but which were either too tangential or
too involved to be pursued at length here. I would like to briefly outline two
distinct suggestions for further study. Whilst this thesis focuses on feminism,
there is no reason why other modes of ideological criticism and theory could not
be similarly utilised so as to further unseat the assumption that adaptation
uniformly aims to achieve fidelity. Literary texts that are potentially, arguably or
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ambivalently classified as either post-colonial, anti-capitalist or queer each offer
the possibility of denying simplistic claims of or attempts at faithful cinematic
transposition. There is much to be done at the intersection of adaptation theory
and each of these critical frameworks.
As is discussed at some length in Chapter One, chick-lit has traditionally
garnered largely journalistic rather than scholarly treatment. Dismissed for
engaging in the superficial, decried as silly and insubstantial, the genre requires
further critical consideration. The study of chick-lit, given its newness, is ripe
with possibility. One potential approach could involve an examination of the
intertextual relationship between the chick-lit genre and its cinematic
counterpart, the romantic comedy. It is evident that each of these genres in
various ways informs the other, with the pair relying on a shared library of
conventions. This could also offer yet another alternative approach to the
analysis of adaptations – a look at how a source text is re-shaped so as to
comply with the conventions of the filmic genre to which its adaptation seeks to
belong.

IN SUMMARY#
This thesis deploys a collection of critical approaches: its scope is markedly
broad, encompassing exegeses of Derridean post-structuralism and its queer,
Butlerite derivative, a response to the contentiousness of the study of popular
culture texts, a critical appraisal of the development of novel-into-film
adaptation theory, an exploration of the practice of feminist revision, an outline
of the differences between essentialist and constructivist feminism and an
examination of the contested quality of the chick-lit genre. Ultimately, Part One
synthesises this extensive and somewhat disparate theoretical work to
underwrite the new analytical framework it eventually proffers, the framework
upon which the three textual analyses of Part Two are based.
The Introduction begins by offering an account of the essentialist/constructivist
dichotomy that continues to, at times problematically, figure in modern feminist
thinking. This binary is the first of many to feature throughout – the thesis goes
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on to explore, and trouble, a number of opposing dualities, including
man/woman, novel/film and romance/feminism – and thus prefigures the thesis’
focus on the problems inherent in binaric thought. The seminal work of Judith
Butler emerges as being critical to the post-structural feminist approach that is
favoured throughout this thesis, as does Derrida’s concept of the undecidable,
which is later harnessed so as to complicate and discredit fidelity-based
criticism of novel-into-film adaptations.
This treatise on the essentialist/constructivist split, which initially seeks to
undermine the former of these strands of feminism and uphold the latter,
ultimately proffers a modified, moderate constructivist approach, one that
necessitates the retainment of a degree of essentialism for pragmatism’s sake.
The term ‘woman’ is emptied of much of its constrictive meaning, but is retained
strategically as a unifying label that links those who identify with, or are
identified with, this classificatory idiom, thereby allowing for the continued
relevance of feminism as a political movement. The very possibility of such a
compromise usefully offers an early indication of the errors inherent in the
binary quality of essentialist thinking – for, if the two opposing poles can
cooperate and merge, then perhaps they are less oppositional than they
appear. This qualified take on constructivist feminism, then, rather than simply
exposing the precarious imperfections in post-structuralism, also works to
demonstrate its logic. By openly displaying the challenges to feminism that are
provided by each of its dominant strands, this thesis also seeks to encourage
further exploration of the quandary.
The Introduction then shifts focus from the content of feminist philosophy to its
controversial and increasingly prevalent application to the study of popular
texts. It provides a dual defence of popular culture – both as a subject suitable
to feminist scrutiny, and as a medium with the potential to effectively
disseminate feminist thought – as a segue into Chapter One’s consideration of
chick-lit, a genre frequently dismissed elsewhere as superficial and trite.
Chapter One essentially delineates the recently established chick-lit genre,
locating its genesis in the Harlequin Mills & Boon brand of popular romance – a
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notably formulaic textual type to which it both violently reacts and is greatly
indebted. Via the post-structural feminism of Butler and other like-minded
scholars, chick-lit is compared to its much-maligned antecedent, and
demonstrated to be particularly cognisant of and responsive to the fictive
images of gendered bodies and psyches that frequent the pages of the
paradigmatic Harlequin Mills & Boon product. As appealingly imperfect
examples of their respective sexes, the heroes and heroines of chick-lit offer a
subversive replacement of their impossibly idealised and strictly polarised lowbrow romance counterparts.
However, although chick-lit makes much headway in terms of this type of poststructural recasting, its feminist rewriting of the Harlequin Mills & Boon narrative
is only partially complete. Far from constituting a straightforward renunciation
of the romance’s biologically essentialist approach to gender difference, the
singleton-lit strand of chick-lit problematically upholds the Harlequin Mills &
Boon tradition of using male approbation as a means of marking the happy
culmination of its heroine’s story. Chick-lit is thus situated somewhat
ambivalently between the abject pre-feminism of the conventional popular
romance novel and a comprehensive feminist update of the same. The genre
can therefore be read as particularly and pertinently ideologically polysemic, the
undecidable that bridges and muddles the polarised association of feminism
and the low-brow romance.
Chapter Two returns to chick-lit in its culminating pages, offering it as a means
by which an alternative approach to adaptation can be realised. It begins,
however, by posing the quandary it seeks to resolve, explaining and reflecting
upon the relentless focus on fidelity that continues to paralyse the progression
of novel-into-film adaptation theory. The chapter goes on to trace the many
ultimately fruitless responses to what I have termed the “fidelity fixation” that
have been offered since – and including – the 1957 publication of George
Bluestone’s unprecedented theoretical text, Novels Into Film: The
Metamorphosis of Fiction Into Cinema. Bluestone’s much mimicked mediumspecific approach is shown to be a flawed rejoinder to fidelity-based criticism, in
that it inadvertently promotes a hierarchical conception of the relationship
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between a film and its source novel that posits fidelity as the ultimate aim of the
adaptation process, thereby ironically working to serve rather than reject the
fidelity paradigm.
This is where Derrida’s undecidable comes into play, troubling and ultimately
undoing the novel/film binary that forms the philosophical basis for the fidelity
fixation. The adaptation itself is the undecidable, at once novel and film, yet
neither fully nor solely novel or film, it destabilises the polarisation of the two
narrative modes, along with the hierarchy this polarisation proffers.
Bluestone, whose medium-specific approach misguidedly essentialises both
the novel and film format, is but one of many theorists who have attempted, yet
ultimately failed to remedy adaptation theory’s troublesome focus on fidelity.
Brian McFarlane, Sarah Cardwell and others have sought to provide
alternatives that allow for a genuine departure from fidelity-based criticism, and
whilst each of these has effectively advanced the study of novel-into-film
adaptation, they have also ultimately and ironically worked to reinscribe the
seemingly intractable fidelity fixation. Three workable alternative models of
adaptation criticism are outlined – namely, the reader/viewer response model,
the intertextual model, and the ideological model – with the last of these
providing the basis for the critical and theoretical feminist approach to
adaptation that this thesis endorses and undertakes to exemplify.
Chapter Two shifts from novel-into-film adaptation as a mode of textual revision
to the longstanding tradition of feminist literary revision, which has produced
exciting and meaning-laden literary, cinematic and televisual rewritings of a
variety of texts – from those condemned as problematically and foundationally
patriarchal, such as biblical stories and fairy tales, to those less rigidly
categorised, such as the contentious canonised classic, Tess of the
D’Urbervilles. Feminist revision can take a number of approaches – it can work
with cues embedded in the original text, working with gaps, expanding on
suggestive scenarios or perhaps offering the perspective of a peripheral
character, for example; or it can be more brazen in its rewrite by switching the
gender of its protagonist, or by introducing entirely new situations and removing
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selected pre-existing elements. In this way, feminist revisions either draw out
and emphasise the feminism inherent in their source texts, or alternatively work
to point out their pre-feminist or patriarchal classification.
Various novel-into-film adaptations have, of course, taken a feminist, or,
alternatively, patriarchal turn, and many have consequently already been
subjected to feminist commentary and criticism. However, the feminist study of
novel-into-film adaptation has thus far generally operated, somewhat
predictably, as little more than another conduit for the perpetuation of the
fidelity fixation. Most of the critical responses to adaptations of arguably
feminist texts ultimately condemn such adaptations for insufficiently or
ineffectively imparting the feminism with which their respective source texts are
associated, thus once again calling for a type of spiritual fidelity that accurately
transposes the politics of the novel to the screen. Adaptations of literary texts
as wide ranging as Beaches, Les Liaisons Dangereuses and Jane Eyre have
each been criticised for diminishing the feminist meaning for which their
originary works are known. Alternatively, adaptations of novels less
unambiguously categorised as feminist, or more aptly considered pre-feminist,
such as Little Women, have been attacked for introducing or clarifying feminist
thinking – again, suggesting that fidelity to the spirit, if not the letter, of an
original text is the primary and most appropriate aim of the adaptation process.
Chick-lit provides a possible way out of this paradigmatic predicament. Given
the genuine polysemy of its politics, the genre opens up plural interpretive
possibilities. Sitting so precariously between the pre-feminism of its generic
predecessor and a more strident and complete renunciation of the same, the
genre offers both straightforwardly romantic and progressively post-structural
meanings, either or both of which can potentially be embraced via the
adaptation process. Chick-lit is unencumbered by any single identifiable
ideological imperative – its very contestedness works to complicate calls for
fidelity, spiritual or otherwise. Despite my own commitment to feminist
principles, this thesis endeavours to endorse a multiplicity of ideological
interpretations of chick-lit, and to thereby problematise the assumption that
adaptation’s singular aim is to achieve some sort of transpositional accuracy.
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Whilst my status as a fan of the Sex and the City franchise on a personal level
is made plain early on, as a novel-into-film adaptation critic and theorist, I
refrain from preferring its overtly feminist rendering of its source text over the
more conventional, romantically-inflected chick-lit adaptation effected by
Someone Like You. It is worth reiterating here that the three sets of texts
critiqued in Part Two are offered so as to exemplify the excitingly plural
possibilities chick-lit’s polysemy provides, rather than in order to favour or
endorse one adaptation as more valid than the others. The trio of adapted
texts – Animal Husbandry/Someone Like You, Bridget Jones’s Diary and Sex
and the City – is provided to demonstrate the variety of equally plausible
ideological interpretations generated by the chick-lit genre. These canonical
examples of the genre can each be read as, in equal measure, both reviving
and renouncing the tropes of the Harlequin Mills & Boon romance. Their
adaptors have chosen to render on screen either one, or both of these
opposing readings. Neither is more accurate or appropriate than the other.
Part Two, then, essentially seeks to read the cinematic and televisual
adaptations it interrogates not as flawed attempts at fidelity, but rather as
meaningful ideologically-laden interpretations that in fact harness infidelity as a
method of meaning-making.
This thesis has had a dual central aim. Along with complicating fidelity-focused
criticism of novel-into-film adaptation by way of providing an alternative
analytical framework that looks at meaning-making via revisionary infidelity, it
posits feminist adaptation as a continuing political project. Feminist adaptations
of popular, politically ambiguous works offer an exciting and effective means by
which feminism can be popularly disseminated. This thesis is, then, intended to
inspire and encourage practitioners of feminism, as well as to locate feminism
as just one of plural and equally plausible interpretative possibilities with
respect to works of chick-lit.
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